08/25/2026
NIETZSCHE, ZEN, AND THE PROBLEM OF NIHILISM
Friedrich Nietzsche died on August 25, 1900, at the age of fifty-five. His statement that “God is dead” has become one of the most widely cited phrases in modern philosophy, but its significance extends beyond a rejection of religious belief. Nietzsche used the phrase to describe a historical and cultural crisis in which traditional European sources of moral authority and metaphysical certainty were losing their persuasive force.
Nietzsche regarded Christianity as one of the principal structures through which European culture had understood morality, purpose, truth, and human destiny. By the nineteenth century, developments in science, historical criticism, and philosophy had weakened confidence in many traditional religious claims. Nietzsche argued that the erosion of these foundations created the possibility of nihilism: a condition in which inherited values lose their authority without being replaced by an equally compelling framework of meaning.
Much of Nietzsche’s later philosophy can be read as an attempt to respond to this problem. Concepts such as self-overcoming, amor fati—the love of one’s fate—and eternal recurrence are connected to his effort to formulate an affirmation of life that does not depend upon a transcendent or otherworldly source of value. Nietzsche’s project therefore concerns not only the critique of religion, but also the problem of how human beings might live after the decline of inherited metaphysical certainties.
This concern has created an important point of comparison between Nietzsche and Buddhist philosophy, particularly in later encounters between European philosophy and Japanese Zen thought.
Nietzsche was not a Zen Buddhist, and his philosophy should not be treated as a form of Buddhism. Nevertheless, both Nietzschean philosophy and Buddhist thought address questions concerning fixed identity, permanence, attachment to conceptual systems, and the foundations upon which human beings construct meaning. Their responses to these questions, however, differ substantially.
A central concept in Mahayana Buddhism is śūnyatā, usually translated as emptiness. Emptiness does not mean that phenomena do not exist. Rather, it refers to the absence of independent, permanent, self-sufficient essence. Phenomena arise through causes and conditions and exist in relation to other phenomena. This principle is closely associated with the Buddhist teaching of dependent origination.
The distinction between emptiness and nihilism is therefore important. Nihilism concerns the loss or negation of meaning, value, or metaphysical foundation. Buddhist emptiness concerns the mode in which phenomena exist: dependently, relationally, and without permanent self-nature.
In simplified terms, nihilism may be associated with the conclusion that nothing possesses ultimate meaning, whereas Buddhist emptiness denies that anything possesses independent existence.
These positions are not equivalent.
This distinction can be particularly relevant for Western students of Buddhism whose intellectual background has been shaped by Christian concepts. Christianity encompasses a wide range of theological traditions, but Western religious thought has often included ideas such as God as creator, an enduring soul, divine purpose, salvation, and eternal existence. Buddhist concepts such as anātman or no-self, emptiness, impermanence, and “nothing to attain” emerge from a substantially different philosophical framework.
As a result, Buddhist teachings can sometimes be interpreted through categories inherited from Christian theology. The doctrine of no-self, for example, can be misunderstood as a claim that persons do not exist. In classical Buddhist thought, however, anātman denies the existence of a permanent, independent, unchanging self. It does not deny the conventional existence of persons.
Similarly, emptiness is not a doctrine of nonexistence. A phenomenon such as a flower exists conventionally, but its existence depends upon soil, water, sunlight, biological processes, time, and numerous other conditions. The flower is therefore described as empty of independent existence rather than nonexistent.
The same analysis is applied to human beings. Persons arise through biological, psychological, social, cultural, and environmental conditions. Buddhist analysis therefore treats the self as conditioned and relational rather than as an independent and permanent entity.
The relationship between Nietzschean nihilism and Buddhist emptiness became especially important in twentieth-century Japanese philosophy through the work of Keiji Nish*tani (1900–1990).
Nish*tani was a major representative of the Kyoto School, a group of Japanese philosophers who brought Buddhist thought, particularly Zen, into sustained conversation with European philosophy. Nietzsche was one of the central Western thinkers in Nish*tani’s work, particularly because of Nietzsche’s analysis of nihilism.
Nish*tani argued that nihilism could not simply be overcome by returning to earlier religious or metaphysical certainties. Instead, he treated nihilism as a historical and existential condition that had to be examined fully. In Religion and Nothingness, he described a movement through the standpoints of being, nihility, and emptiness.
For Nish*tani, nihility emerges when previously accepted foundations of identity and meaning lose their authority. At this level, things can appear to lack any ultimate ground or significance. Nish*tani regarded Nietzsche as one of the Western philosophers who confronted this condition most directly.
Nish*tani nevertheless distinguished nihilism from the Buddhist standpoint of emptiness. The standpoint of emptiness does not replace lost foundations with another metaphysical substance. Instead, it challenges the assumption that phenomena require an independent, permanent foundation in order to exist.
From this perspective, emptiness is not an underlying “nothing” beneath the world. It describes the relational and conditioned character of reality itself.
Nish*tani’s philosophical work was also shaped by his engagement with Christianity, especially Christian mysticism and the writings of Meister Eckhart. The Kyoto School consequently became an important site of dialogue among Zen Buddhism, European philosophy, and Christian theology. This dialogue did not depend upon treating the traditions as identical, but rather upon examining how each addressed questions of selfhood, nothingness, transcendence, suffering, and ultimate reality.
The distinction between nihilism and emptiness also helps clarify several expressions commonly encountered in Zen literature:
No self.
Nothing to attain.
Emptiness.
Mu.
Taken outside their doctrinal and practical contexts, such expressions can appear to advocate a philosophy of negation. Within Zen and Mahayana Buddhism, however, they function within a broader critique of attachment to fixed concepts and independent selfhood.
Buddhist philosophers also warned against treating emptiness itself as an absolute doctrine. Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka philosophy rejects both the assertion of permanent independent existence and the opposite claim of complete nonexistence. Emptiness therefore functions as part of a “middle way” that avoids both substantialism and nihilism.
Zen practice applies these philosophical concerns experientially. Rather than asking practitioners simply to accept propositions about emptiness or no-self, Zen traditions generally emphasize direct investigation of experience, impermanence, attachment, and the construction of identity.
Nietzsche and Zen therefore intersect around a shared problem without arriving at the same conclusion. Nietzsche examined the consequences of the collapse of inherited metaphysical and moral foundations and sought forms of life-affirmation beyond them. Zen Buddhism examines attachment to permanent identity and independent existence and interprets emptiness through dependent origination and non-self.
The relationship between the two became particularly important through Nish*tani and the Kyoto School, where European nihilism and Mahayana emptiness were placed into sustained philosophical dialogue.
Their similarity lies less in shared doctrine than in the seriousness with which both traditions examine what remains when familiar assumptions about self, permanence, and meaning are called into question.
READING LIST
Friedrich Nietzsche — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
Keiji Nish*tani — Religion and Nothingness
https://www.ucpress.edu/books/religion-and-nothingness/paper
Keiji Nish*tani — The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism
https://sunypress.edu/Books/T/The-Self-Overcoming-of-Nihilism
The Kyoto School — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/
Nāgārjuna — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nagarjuna/
Chan Buddhism — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/buddhism-chan/