The Debrief Project

The Debrief Project History & Healing: Sharing veterans’ stories to preserve history, honor service, and promote healing through honest conversation, connection, and legacy.
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LTC Fee explains that Wolfpack arrived in Iraq in July 2006, several months before 1-12 CAV, during a quieter pre-surge ...
09/04/2026

LTC Fee explains that Wolfpack arrived in Iraq in July 2006, several months before 1-12 CAV, during a quieter pre-surge period when convoys moved cautiously and Apaches rarely fired. By the time 1-12 arrived, the rules of engagement had changed, the fight was becoming more kinetic, and Wolfpack’s focus shifted toward Baqubah alongside the ground force.

LTC Fee explains that Wolfpack arrived in Iraq in July 2006, severa...

LTC Morris “Mo” Goins explains the brutal “troop-to-task” math of commanding 1-12 CAV in Baqubah, where every mission — ...
09/03/2026

LTC Morris “Mo” Goins explains the brutal “troop-to-task” math of commanding 1-12 CAV in Baqubah, where every mission — government-center security, COPs, OPs, MiTT teams, and combat patrols — consumed manpower the battalion could not easily replace. With no real option to tell higher headquarters “no,” Goins had to decide where to concentrate combat power and where to assume risk, summed up by the old military truth: “He who defends everything defends nothing.”

TC Morris “Mo” Goins explains the brutal “troop-to-task” math of co...

Retired LTC Bruce Stanley, School of Advanced Military Studies, explains that 1-12 INF Charger Battalion was facing an e...
08/31/2026

Retired LTC Bruce Stanley, School of Advanced Military Studies, explains that 1-12 INF Charger Battalion was facing an enemy force ratio that may have ranged from 5-to-1 to as high as 12-to-1 in Diyala and Baqubah. He argues that, on paper, any schoolhouse plan built around those odds would have been considered tactically unsound — but the true scale of the enemy buildup simply had not been recognized yet.

OIF 06-08 / History and Healing

Retired LTC Bruce Stanley explains that Charger Battalion was facin...

COL Morris “Mo” Goins (Ret.) explains how 1-12 CAV deployed expecting to serve as a theater reserve in Kuwait, only to b...
08/31/2026

COL Morris “Mo” Goins (Ret.) explains how 1-12 CAV deployed expecting to serve as a theater reserve in Kuwait, only to be redirected at the last minute to Baqubah, a city he had to find on a map. He breaks down the battalion’s core problem: they had tanks, Bradleys, and massive firepower, but not enough dismounted soldiers for a city of roughly 650,000 people while also supporting MiTT teams, government-center security, and advisory missions. What began as a relatively quiet handoff from the previous unit quickly revealed lawless areas, thin coverage, and impossible choices about where to assume risk. Goins frames the early deployment as a commander’s brutal math problem: “he who defends everything defends nothing,” and soon after those first tactical decisions, all hell broke loose.

In this 15-minute segment, COL Morris “Mo” Goins (Ret.) explains ho...

Major John Cyrulik describes Wolfpack’s relief-in-place as they arrived in Iraq in 2006, saying the outgoing force was t...
08/27/2026

Major John Cyrulik describes Wolfpack’s relief-in-place as they arrived in Iraq in 2006, saying the outgoing force was tired and told them there “wasn’t too much to worry about” in the Baqubah area. Looking back, he contrasts that early handoff with what followed: a far more aggressive ground fight, dramatically higher aviation tempo, and a level of enemy contact the incoming unit had not yet been led to expect.

Major Cyrulik describes Wolfpack’s relief-in-place as they arrived ...

LTC Morris “Mo” Goins explains that 1-12 CAV arrived in Baqubah with enormous firepower — Bradleys, tanks, scouts, engin...
08/26/2026

LTC Morris “Mo” Goins explains that 1-12 CAV arrived in Baqubah with enormous firepower — Bradleys, tanks, scouts, engineers, mortars, and support elements — but limited dismounted manpower. He was not worried about the battalion’s ability to win a fight; the bigger challenge was having enough soldiers to cover the city, hold ground, and meet every mission at once.

LTC Morris “Mo” Goins explains that 1-12 CAV arrived in Baqubah wit...

LTC Fee explains how moving the Apaches up to 1,500–1,600 feet completely changed the fight, allowing crews to see the b...
08/26/2026

LTC Fee explains how moving the Apaches up to 1,500–1,600 feet completely changed the fight, allowing crews to see the battlefield clearly instead of struggling through a narrow sight at low altitude. With the new Apache sensors, Wolfpack could spot enemy fighters placing IEDs from miles away, turning altitude into a major advantage as they began seeing enemy activity nonstop.

LTC Fee explains how moving the Apaches up to 1,500–1,600 feet comp...

Dr. Bruce Stanley, LTC (Ret.) explains that AQI’s “caliphate” was more than a slogan — it meant a state-like area of con...
08/22/2026

Dr. Bruce Stanley, LTC (Ret.) explains that AQI’s “caliphate” was more than a slogan — it meant a state-like area of control with political, economic, religious, and military significance. He describes why Baqubah and Diyala made sense as a capital and staging base, with population, recruits, money, supplies, and outside support flowing through the area after AQI was pushed out of Baghdad and Anbar.

Retired LTC Bruce Stanley explains that AQI’s “caliphate” was more ...

COL (Ret.) Morris “Mo” Goins recalls how 1-12 CAV trained for a year expecting a standard Iraq deployment, only to learn...
08/22/2026

COL (Ret.) Morris “Mo” Goins recalls how 1-12 CAV trained for a year expecting a standard Iraq deployment, only to learn after arriving in Kuwait that their mission had changed. Instead of remaining as a theater reserve, the battalion was redirected to Baqubah — a city Goins had to find on a map, and one that would soon become the center of a much larger fight.

LTC Morris “Mo” Goins recalls how 1-12 CAV trained for a year expec...

COL (Ret.) Morris “Mo” Goins recalls that the handoff into Baqubah initially seemed quiet, with the previous unit report...
08/22/2026

COL (Ret.) Morris “Mo” Goins recalls that the handoff into Baqubah initially seemed quiet, with the previous unit reporting limited contact and few casualties, but one warning sign stood out: parts of the area were described as “lawless.” As Goins questioned how a U.S. unit could supposedly own the terrain while leaving areas untouched, 1-12 CAV began shifting forces to close those gaps — and shortly after, “all hell broke loose.”

LTC Morris “Mo” Goins recalls that the handoff into Baqubah initial...

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