Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

16/10/2026

𝐇𝐚𝐬 𝐌𝐚𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐮𝐬 𝐥𝐨𝐬𝐭 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐚𝐠𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐲 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐂𝐡𝐚𝐠𝐨𝐬 𝐝𝐞𝐚𝐥?

The May 2025 agreement promised to restore Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago while allowing Britain to retain Diego Garcia for 99 years, securing continued US military operations. But implementation has stalled after Washington withdrew its support.

The impasse exposes a paradox: by accommodating US security interests, Mauritius has limited its leverage over a settlement intended to complete decades of decolonisation. Diego Garcia’s growing strategic importance amid the Iran conflict further complicates Mauritius’ position.

While it still has diplomatic and legal options, the country remains dependent on British and American decisions. For displaced Chagossians, continued delays could extinguish the possibility of returning to their homeland within their lifetimes.

ISS Today by Timothy Walker https://issafrica.org/iss-today/has-mauritius-lost-its-agency-in-the-chagos-deal

16/10/2026

𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐟𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞: 𝐅𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐤𝐧𝐨𝐰𝐥𝐞𝐝𝐠𝐞 𝐭𝐨 𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 – 𝐝𝐨𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐰𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐰𝐨𝐫𝐤𝐬 𝐢𝐧 𝐒𝐨𝐮𝐭𝐡 𝐀𝐟𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐧 𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐧𝐠

SA policing is entering a period of significant change, creating an opportunity to move from commitments to practical action. Join police and criminal justice practitioners, government officials and civil society experts at the 2026 Evidence-Based Policing South Africa Conference to examine what can realistically be done differently, who should lead implementation and how results can be measured.

Discussions will cover leadership and accountability, the criminal justice process, hotspot policing, military deployments against crime, extortion in township economies and holistic violence prevention.

📅 19–20 October 2026
⏰ 08:30–16:00 (GMT+2)
📍 Cape Town or online via Zoom

Register now:

From knowledge to action: doing what works in South African policing

16/10/2026

Kenya-Uganda Lokiriama Peace Accord: lessons from an unwritten agreement

Fifty years on, the 1973 Lokiriama Peace Accord between Kenya's Turkana and Uganda's Matheniko communities has outlasted countless formal agreements across East Africa.

The accord is local, cost-effective and respected. Communities with shared ancestry reconcile when peacebuilding operates within their social institutions and values.

The diminishing power of traditional elders threatens mechanisms that have proven effective for five decades across the wider Karamoja Cluster, leaving other communities vulnerable.

Governments in Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia must apply lessons from Lokiriama with community elders, scale up human security programming and conduct coordinated regional disarmament.

Read the policy brief by Guyo Turi > https://issafrica.org/research/policy-briefs/kenya-uganda-lokiriama-peace-accord-lessons-from-an-unwritten-agreement

15/10/2026

𝐍𝐞𝐰 𝐂𝐚𝐦𝐞𝐫𝐨𝐨𝐧𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐚𝐫𝐦𝐲 𝐜𝐚𝐦𝐩𝐬 𝐚𝐥𝐨𝐧𝐞 𝐰𝐨𝐧’𝐭 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐋𝐚𝐤𝐞 𝐂𝐡𝐚𝐝

Cameroon has established new military bases and a 1 000-strong Rapid Intervention Battalion to strengthen its response to Boko Haram. Recent jihadist attacks in the north of the country displaced over 11 300 people.

The reinforcements could improve rapid response and disrupt armed groups’ logistical networks. But multiple military units, overlapping command structures and difficult terrain complicate operations.

Cameroon must strengthen coordination within its security forces and cooperate with Nigeria, Niger and Chad. Better-equipped land and maritime patrols are needed to maintain territorial control, prevent militants from regrouping across borders and restore the security needed for displaced communities to return home.

ISS Today by Raoul Sumo Tayo https://issafrica.org/iss-today/new-cameroonian-army-camps-alone-won-t-secure-lake-chad

15/10/2026

Cameroon faces a threefold security threat: Boko Haram and its splinter factions in the Far North, separatist violence in the North-West and South-West, and incursions by Central African rebel groups and cross-border bandits in the east. Across all three fronts, organised and transnational criminal networks are exacerbating conflict and sustaining violence.

In the Far North, kidnapping for ransom, cattle trafficking, drug trafficking, arms trafficking and piracy on Lake Chad have become integrated criminal economies rather than isolated crimes. In the North-West and South-West, armed groups increasingly rely on kidnapping, cocoa and fuel smuggling, cattle theft and cybercrime to finance their operations. Along the eastern border with the Central African Republic, illegal gold mining, kidnapping for ransom and cross-border trafficking sustain an interconnected criminal system that blurs the line between armed groups and criminal networks.

Read the report by Raoul Sumo Tayo and Aïcha Pemboura for the full analysis and recommendations

https://issafrica.org/research/books-and-other-publications/mapping-violence-and-organised-crime-in-cameroon

14/10/2026

𝐋𝐢𝐛𝐲𝐚’𝐬 𝐚𝐫𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐬: 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐛𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐝 𝐬𝐩𝐨𝐭 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐓𝐫𝐢𝐩𝐨𝐥𝐢 𝐚𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭

The 30 August electoral agreement has revived hopes of a reunified Libya. But that requires disbanding militias that have not disarmed since the 2020 ceasefire.

Without controls, their stockpiles could follow existing trafficking routes to Niger, Chad and the Lake Chad Basin. After Gaddafi’s fall in 2011, looted weapons fuelled the Malian crisis and Boko Haram’s expansion.

Rather than wait for the political crisis to be resolved, the UN and AU should add a weapons mechanism to the agreement, ensuring weapons are collected before militias are integrated into a unified army. And UNSMIL’s mandate could be expanded to include disarmament.

ISS Today by Hassane Koné https://issafrica.org/iss-today/libya-s-arsenals-are-a-blind-spot-in-the-tripoli-agreement

14/10/2026

𝐊𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐚’𝐬 𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐥𝐲 𝐥𝐚𝐮𝐧𝐜𝐡𝐞𝐝 𝐅𝐑𝐍 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐓𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐬𝐞𝐤𝐞𝐝𝐢’𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐫𝐝-𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐦 𝐛𝐢𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐧 𝐃𝐑𝐂 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐩𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐞 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐆𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭 𝐋𝐚𝐤𝐞𝐬 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐨𝐧

🔷 Former president Kabila launched the FRN, a political-military coalition with M23, to challenge Tshisekedi. Its impact will depend on his ability to control the rebellion and expand alliances beyond North and South Kivu, but a further escalation is likely.

🔷 Rwanda’s role remains central. But the FRN-M23 alliance further entwines the eastern DRC war with national power struggles, confirming Kabila’s turn to armed opposition. Peace efforts must confront both Rwanda’s involvement and the domestic political crisis.

🔷 DRC’s democratic backsliding, including a third-term push, opposition crackdown and exclusion of key actors from political dialogue deepen this crisis. Weak internal legitimacy creates openings for Rwanda and M23, while narrowing space for peaceful political contestation.

🔷 DRC has seen Rwanda-backed rebellions and domestic crises over presidential term limits before. What is particularly telling now is that both are unfolding simultaneously and increasingly intersecting. Kabila’s new coalition makes that convergence explicit.

🔷 This could derail Doha talks, already struggling to deliver on agreements. Regional and international efforts must intensify: a wider war across DRC would have devastating consequences for the country and region.

The first deployment of the monitoring mechanism is positive, but current conflict conditions should temper expectations.

14/10/2026

𝐇𝐞𝐥𝐩𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐈𝐄𝐂 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭 𝐒𝐨𝐮𝐭𝐡 𝐀𝐟𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐚’𝐬 𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬

ISS is working with South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to strengthen the monitoring and prevention of election-related protests and violence ahead of the 4 November local government polls.

Through its Protest and Public Violence Monitor, ISS is providing historical data and real-time analysis to help identify potential flashpoints. ISS is also supporting conflict resolution coordinators across all nine provinces with training in early risk detection.

The partnership aims to prevent violence, support peaceful campaigning and protect the integrity and security of South Africa’s elections.

Read the ISS Spotlight: https://issafrica.org/impact/spotlight-helping-the-iec-protect-south-africa-s-local-elections

13/10/2026

𝐀𝐟𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐚 𝐦𝐮𝐬𝐭 𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐀𝐈-𝐩𝐨𝐰𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐜𝐲𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐬 𝐚𝐭 𝐬𝐜𝐚𝐥𝐞

Anthropic’s recent threat report reveals how AI is making cyberattacks, surveillance and influence campaigns faster, more scalable and harder to detect. Case studies include Kenya, the Central African Republic, DRC, Sudan and Mali.

Africa is especially exposed. Interpol says 55% of reported cybercrimes on the continent are AI-enabled. Some 45 African governments now run digital systems to improve service delivery, raising the risks. South Africa, which leads the continent in indigenous AI innovation, lacks an AI strategy, and its state agencies invest two-thirds less than corporates in cybersecurity.

Basic AI usage policies and systematic intelligence sharing between governments and the private sector are an important starting point.

ISS Today by Karen Allen https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africa-must-prepare-for-ai-powered-cyber-threats-at-scale