09/01/2026
Austintown’s Flock Contract: What We Know So Far
We obtained Austintown Township’s Flock records through Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, which allows “any person” to request records maintained by Ohio public offices. The law is what makes it possible for residents, journalists, researchers and watchdogs to examine how public money is being spent and what governments are authorizing in our name.
The Austintown records show that the township approved six Flock Safety license plate reader cameras at a cost of $18,000 per year, or $3,000 per camera annually. The June 1, 2026 township minutes describe a three-year contract totaling $54,000 and state that the price was the same as an earlier quote, with a $3,900 discount. The resolution passed with two trustees voting yes and one absent.
The actual Order Form confirms a 36-month initial term and more importantly, a 36-month renewal term. So Austintown did not simply authorize one isolated yearly purchase. The paperwork contemplates a three-year subscription followed by another three-year renewal period unless the agreement is ended under its terms.
The cameras are identified as Flock Safety LPRs, formerly called Falcon and the product description says they use Flock’s proprietary Vehicle Fingerprint technology. That is worth emphasizing because these systems do more than simply photograph a license plate. Flock’s own description refers to capturing vehicle characteristics through proprietary machine-learning technology.
That raises the same larger question we have encountered in Youngstown, Boardman, Poland and Canfield: what exactly does the software behind the cameras allow the police department to search, share and access?
And here Austintown’s packet leaves an important gap.
Unlike some of the other regional Flock records we have obtained, this contract packet does not contain a populated FlockOS Features & Description table identifying Austintown’s actual software and network entitlements. The records therefore do not tell us whether Austintown currently has features such as statewide plate searches, nationwide network searches, direct access to other law-enforcement cameras, community-network access, custom hot lists, analytics or other FlockOS capabilities.
We should not assume Austintown has those features simply because another jurisdiction does. But that is precisely why the missing information is important and suspicious.
Another important detail concerns when the contract actually begins. The Flock agreement ties the subscription term to the installation of the hardware rather than simply to the date the township voted or received an invoice. Austintown Contract.pdf The June 2026 invoice calls this “Year 1 of 36 Month Term” but the records provided do not establish the precise first installation, validation, activation or go-live date for the six cameras.
That date is significant because it determines when the initial three-year term actually expires and when any renewal decision becomes relevant.
There is also a documentary issue worth following up on. Austintown Police Chief Valorie Delmont electronically signed the Order Form and Master Services Agreement but the copies provided appear to leave Flock’s corresponding signature and date fields blank. That does not mean there is no valid contract. There may be another countersigned copy or DocuSign completion certificate that was simply not included in the production. But we would like to ask for the fully executed agreement and complete DocuSign audit trail.
The Master Services Agreement also incorporates or references additional materials, including implementation guidance and other contractual documents that are not reproduced in the 19-page packet itself. Austintown Contract.pdf That is another reason why asking only for “the contract” can fail to reveal the full documentary relationship between a municipality and Flock.
The township minutes themselves are strikingly brief. They document the number of cameras, annual cost, term, and vote but the page provided contains no discussion of Vehicle Fingerprint technology, interagency data sharing, network searches, retention, privacy safeguards, machine learning, audit requirements, or the larger Flock software platform. That does not establish that none of those subjects were ever discussed elsewhere. It establishes that they are not documented in the minutes we were given.
There is also a useful transparency lesson in the invoice production itself. The final page contained Flock’s banking information, including an account number and routing/SWIFT information. We redacted that information before sharing the document publicly because it has no bearing on the public-interest questions we are investigating. Public-records reporting is not about indiscriminately publishing every character on every page; it is about making governmental decisions visible while protecting genuinely sensitive information that is irrelevant to the story.
And Ohio law draws another important line around Flock itself. R.C. 149.43 generally provides access to government records but it specifically excludes images and data captured by an automated license plate recognition system that are maintained in a law-enforcement database from the statutory definition of a public record.
So there is an interesting transparency paradox here:
The public can use Ohio’s records law to investigate the contracts, invoices, resolutions, policies, expenditures and administrative machinery surrounding an ALPR system but the actual ALPR images and data maintained in a law-enforcement database are specifically shielded.
That makes scrutiny of the surrounding contracts and policies even more important.
For Austintown, what we know so far is straightforward: six Flock LPR cameras, $18,000 per year, a three-year initial term, a three-year renewal term and explicit Vehicle Fingerprint technology.
What we still need is equally important: the actual installation and validation date; the complete FlockOS feature and entitlement list; network and sharing permissions; camera deployment records; incorporated implementation documents; retention and access policies and a fully countersigned ex*****on package.
The larger regional pattern is becoming harder to miss. These systems are purchased municipality by municipality but their capabilities cannot be understood by counting cameras alone.
The cameras are local. The network may not be.
