05/16/2012
I received a note from Mike Dunn today that contained an article regarding the way cost cutting is being viewed in terms of the Air Force. It is reason for concern and we should all be thinking about this and what it means to our country and our Air Force in the future. the article is below.
A variety of individuals—AF leaders, think tank experts, and members of the media—are justifying reductions in the AF fleet by highlighting that such a draw-down correlates with cuts in other branches. I tend to disagree with this line of thinking.
First, it is a mistake to cast the Air Force as a support entity. While it is true that competencies in areas like global mobility, command and control, and ISR empower the entire joint team, the Air Force’s capabilities and associated capacity needs to be assessed in relation to the nation’s overarching security interests. Does anyone honestly think the Army’s end strength should somehow affect fleet management decisions regarding the Air Force’s ability to hold global target sets at risk? Why should a reduction in the Navy’s shipbuilding budget impact the Air Force’s air dominance capabilities? Should a drawdown in Marine end-strength serve as a metric by which space launch capacity is assessed? I think the answer is pretty clear: Air Force mission sets need to be evaluated on their own respective national security merits.
Second, are we sure that the Air Force platforms currently slated for retirement actually represent the wisest reductions when viewed from the macro-DoD perspective? For example, why are we cutting A-10s at the very same time the Army is still buying Apache attack helicopters? A-10s are faster, far more survivable, carry more munitions, have a broader mission radius, and are deployable anywhere in the world within 72 hours. As best I recall, we did not lose a single A-10 to hostile fire in all of OEF or OIF. The same can not be said for the Apache. Looking to intra-theater airlift, why are we cutting C-27s and C-130s at the very same time the Army is buying more CH-47s? Yes, there are instances when a Chinook’s vertical capabilities may prove critical, but across the broader airlift spectrum, fixed wing intra-theater airlifters are often far more effective and efficient than their rotary wing counterparts—especially when empowered by technologies like JPADs. Perhaps the ANG should vocalize these points as they try to save their platforms vs. myopically discussing the cuts within the context of the blue budget. Regardless, such factors highlight the dangers associated with equal monetary cuts levied against the Services. Effective power and efficient solutions are often sacrificed amidst the blunt methods of bureaucratic fleet management.
Third, it is important to highlight that cuts to the other Services often warrant increased Air Force capabilities and capacity. For example, with the Navy’s fleet size at a record low, Air Force aircraft play a key role in shaping important regions—everything from supporting allies through joint training and humanitarian relief missions to routine shows of force and exercises that deter potential adversaries. As the Army’s end strength falls and more forces are moved back to CONUS, the need for strategic airlift actually increases to ensure forces can be deployed in an effective and timely fashion. As DoD jettisons its 2 MCO sizing construct, Air Force assets stand forth as key national assets with the speed, range, and flexibility to project rapid decisive power. An infantry division or carrier battle group simply cannot swing that fast. In an era of defined by rapid developments and tight budgets, we need agile tools that can project effective, efficient power.
Finally, as we look over the past 10 years, I would strongly suggest that it is not in the nation’s interest to secure objectives through brute mass, occupation, and attrition. The nation projected tremendous vulnerability on a variety of fronts--budgetary, diplomatic, and individual personal sacrifice. Reversing this trend requires increased investment in alternate strategies and associated capabilities—many of them afforded by the Air Force—that enable the country to secure its objectives by projecting intelligent strength tied to core interests, not vulnerability and liability. The Air Force’s share of the DoD budget fell by nearly 10 percent over the past decade—to a record low of 21 percent. Equal monetary cuts over the FYDP simply exacerbate such negative trends. While documents such as the new strategic guidance offer encouraging words, such statements must be empowered with a balanced and meaningful shift in resources.
The nation faces major international security challenges. It is up to “air-minded” individuals to articulate strategies that enable leaders to net key objectives in the most effective and efficient way possible. This is not an overt discussion regarding the US Air Force; this is about our nation’s ability to secure national objectives through deterrence, dissuasion, regional shaping, and highly effective combat capabilities.
