Fig Tree Institute

Fig Tree Institute Fig Tree Institute exists to re-establish the Hebraic roots of Judeo-Christianity

https://youtu.be/mgq3IwqST3U
05/02/2018

https://youtu.be/mgq3IwqST3U

In every culture, past and present, the language is closely connected to the culture of the people. If you remove the language or culture from the people, th...

10/05/2017

Fig Tree Institute is pleased to announce the availability of 'Messianic Prophecies in Historical Succession' by Franz Delitzsch for free download via the institute's website resources page -http://figtreeinstitute.org/Download/Messianic%20Prophecies%20in%20Historical%20Succession.pdf

It is undeniable, and is universally recognized, that in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, One divinely anointed, a Messiah, who is to go forth from Israel, is promised and hoped for, who makes His people victorious and powerful, and who from them extends His dominion to a world dominion. The Jews still look for this Messiah; Christianity sees the promise fulfilled in Jesus. This Jesus is regarded by Christians as the promised Messiah. Christianity is the same as the religion of the Messiah, the religion which has the Christ, who appeared in Jesus, as its principle and center.

Christianity claims to be the religion which is being prepared in the history and word and writing of the Old Testament. Even when we call it the New Testament religion, we thus recognize that it is the religion of a covenant which has taken the place of the old, but not without having the old as a first step, and not without standing in connection with it as the fruit with the tree, the child with the mother.

This is a delightful theme, a joyful work, in which the author proposed to be absorbed. The Messiah is in the process of coming in the Old Testament, in drawing near, in proclaiming His appearance, and we design to transport ourselves into this Old Testament period, and follow the steps of the One who is coming, pursue the traces of the One who is drawing near, seek out the shadows which He casts upon the way of His Old Testament history, and especially seek to understand the intimations of prophecy respecting Him.

08/12/2017

MESSIANIC PROPHECIES IN HISTORICAL SUCCESSION - FIRST EFFECTS AND VERIFICATIONS OF THE PRIMITIVE PROMISE

A first echo of the divine word, received in faith concerning the victory of mankind, is the name חֿוּה (Septuagint, ζωή), which Adam gives his wife ; for — as the narrator explains (Gen 3:20b) the meaning and propriety of this name — she became " the mother of all living ;" that is, in spite of death, the mother of each individual of the race, which is destined to live, to whom the victory over the power of the evil one is promised, and hence as mother of the Seed of the woman who is to crush the head of the serpent.

We consider as a second echo the language of Eve when she became mother for the first time. Although this cannot possibly be understood as an expression of the belief that her first-born was the incarnate Yahweh, — for the terms of the primitive promise do not give any occasion for such an expression, — but must rather indicate that, with Yahweh as helper and giver, she has brought forth a man-child, which she has received as her own, nevertheless her exclamation stands related to Gen 3:15, since she designated God with the name of Yahweh, and in any case as the God of the promised salvation, for this Hebrew name of God belongs to the later period of the origin of the peoples. Through the marvel of this first birth she is placed in a joyful amazement, which is powerfully increased, because that thus the promise of the victory of the Seed of the woman appeared to be realized. But her first-born was the murderer of his brother; Cain was εκ τού πονηρού (1 John 3:12), he took his position on the side of the seed of the serpent. The religious congregation which was formed at the time of Enosh, the son of Seth, could already name one of their members as a martyr. When it is said, Gen 4:26, that at that time men began to call on and to call out the name of Yahweh, — that is, to pray together to God as Yahweh, and publicly to recognize Him as such, — this, too, stands in connection with 3:15, for this historical notice is designed to indicate that men at that time joined a congregation which worshipped the God of the promised salvation. But if mankind is ever to be free from the bo***ge of sin, as is promised in 3:15, they must likewise be free from the curse of death. The end of Enoch's life, the seventh from Adam in the line of Seth, shows that man, if he had proved true in the probation of free will, could have gone over into another stadium of existence without death and corruption. Death is, indeed, since the fall a law of nature ; but God, who has enacted this law of nature, can also make it inoperative when He will through the exertion of His almighty power. The translation of Enoch, as well as of Elijah, is a prophecy in act of the future end of death (Isa. 25:8; 1 Cor. 15:54), The primitive promise includes this end of death in itself, for the crushing of the serpent is the disarming of him "who has the power of death" (Heb 2:14)

Excerpt from p. 39-41 "Messianic Prophecies in Historical Succession" by Franz Delitzsch

08/29/2016

Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek (Western) Thought -

http://www.hoshanarabbah.org/pdfs/heb_grk.pdf

05/04/2016

LOGOS, A JEWISH WORD
-- JOHN’S PROLOGUE AS MIDRASH (Part 2 of 2)

In the Targumic tradition, the translation of Exodus 3.12–14, the theophany of the burning bush, offers an instructive illustration of the essence of the Memra. The Hebrew text reads, “God said to Moses: ‘I am that I am,’ and he said: ‘Thus shall you say unto them, I am has sent me to you.’” “I am” is here a name of God. The Palestinian Targum translates: “And the Memra of H’ said to Moses: He who said to the world from the beginning, Be there, and it was there, and who is to say [to it Be there, and it will be there]; and he said, Thus shall you say to the Israelites, He has sent me to you.” In other words, the name “I am” is glossed in the Targumim by a reference to Genesis 1.3, “And God said: Let there be”: the Word by which God brought the universe into being is the Memra.

In the next verse in the Palestinian Targum, this name for God, “He who said to the world ‘Be there,’” becomes transformed into a divine being in its own right: “I, My Memra, will be with you: I, My Memra, will be a support for you.”

Targum Neofiti (Ms. 1) confirms this connection between the divine being and the word. In Exodus 3.13, in answer to Moses’ apprehension that he will not be up to the task of going to Pharaoh and persuading or forcing him to allow Moses to bring out the Israelites, God answers: “I will be with you.” Neofiti reads: “I, My Memra, will be with you.” The other Targumim maintain this interpretation but add the element of the Memra as supporter, thus: “And he said: Because my Memra will be for your support.” From here we see how this Memra, revealed to Moses in the declaration “I am,” supports him, redeems the Israelites, and all the rest of the saving activities. In the Targum, as in the Logos theology, this Word has been hypostasized, turned into an actual divine being.

The conclusive evidence for the connection of the Targumic Memra and the Logos of John appears in the Palestinian Targumic poetic homily on the “Four Nights,” probably a liturgical text in which four special nights in sacred history are delineated:

Four nights are written in the Book of Memories: The first night: when the Lord was revealed above the world to create it. The world was unformed and void and darkness was spread over the surface of the deep; and through his Memra there was light and illumination [italics added], and he called it the first night.

This text matches the first verses of John’s Prologue, with its association of Logos, the Word, and light. The midrash of the “four nights” culminates in the coming of the Messiah, drawing even closer the connections between the Targum heard in the synagogue and John’s Gospel. Moreover, the midrash of the “four nights” is most likely a fragment of Paschal liturgy, suggesting even more palpably its appropriateness as a text for comparison with John’s Gospel, where Jesus is compared to the Paschal offering. In order to see this, however, we must pay attention to the formal characteristics of Midrash as a mode of reading Scripture. One of the most characteristic forms of Midrash is a homily on a scriptural passage or extract from the Pentateuch that invokes, explicitly or implicitly, texts from either the Prophets or the Hagiographa (Gk “holy writings”: specifically, very frequently Psalms, Song of Songs, or Wisdom literature) as the framework of ideas and language that is used to interpret and expand the Pentateuchal text being preached. This interpretive practice is founded on a theological notion of the oneness of Scripture as a self-interpreting text, especially on the notion that the latter books are a form of interpretation of the Five Books of Moses. Gaps are not filled with philosophical ideas but with allusions to or citations of other texts.

The first five verses of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel fit this form nearly perfectly. The verses being preached are the opening verses of Genesis, and the text that lies in the background as interpretive framework is Proverbs 8.22–31. The primacy of Genesis as text being interpreted explains why we have here Logos and not “Wisdom.” In an intertextual interpretive practice such as a midrash, imagery and language may be drawn from a text other than the one under interpretation, but the controlling language of the discourse is naturally the text that is being interpreted and preached. The preacher of the Prologue to John had to speak of Logos here, because his homiletical effort is directed at the opening verses of Genesis, with their majestic: “And God said: Let there be light, and there was light.” It is the “saying” of God that produces the light, and indeed through this saying, everything was made that was made.

Philo, like others, identifies Sophia and the Logos as a single entity. Consequently, nothing could be more natural than for a preacher, such as the composer of John 1, to draw from the book of Proverbs the figure, epithets, and qualities of the second God (second person), the companion of God and agent of God in creation; for the purposes of interpreting Genesis, however, the preacher would need to focus on the linguistic side of the coin, the Logos, which is alone mentioned explicitly in that text. In other words, the text being interpreted is Genesis, therefore the Word; the text from which the interpretive material is drawn is Proverbs, hence the characteristics of Wisdom:

1. In the beginning was the Word, And the Word was with God,
2. And the Word was God.He was in the beginning with God.
3. All things were made through him,and without him was not anything made that was made.
4. In him was life, and the life was the light of men.
5. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not receive it.

The assertion that the Word was with God is easily related to Proverbs 8.30, “Then I [wisdom] was beside him,” and even to Wisdom of Solomon 9.9, “With thee is wisdom.” As is frequently the case in rabbinic midrash, the gloss on the verse being interpreted is dependent on a later biblical text that is alluded to but not explicitly cited. The Wisdom texts, especially Proverbs 8, had become commonplaces in the Jewish interpretive tradition of Genesis 1. Although, paradoxically, John 1.1–5 is our earliest example of this, the form is so abundant in late antique Jewish writing that it can best be read as the product of a common tradition shared by (some) messianic Jews and (some) non-messianic Jews. Thus the operation of John 1.1 can be compared with the Palestinian Targum to this very verse, which translates “In the beginning” by “With Wisdom God created,” clearly also alluding to the Proverbs passage. “Beginning” is read in the Targumim sometimes as Wisdom, and sometimes as the Logos, Memra: By a Beginning—Wisdom—God created.

In light of this evidence, the Fourth Gospel is not a new departure in the history of Judaism in its use of Logos theology, but only, if even this, in its incarnational Christology. John 1.1–5 is not a hymn, but a midrash, that is, it is not a poem but a homily on Genesis 1.1–5. The very phrase that opens the Gospel, “In the beginning,” shows that creation is the focus of the text. The rest of the Prologue shows that the midrash of the Logos is applied to the appearance of Jesus. Only from John 1.14, which announces that the “Word became flesh,” does the Christian narrative begins to diverge from synagogue teaching. Until v. 14, the Johannine prologue is a piece of perfectly unexceptional non-Christian Jewish thought that has been seamlessly woven into the Christological narrative of the Johannine community.

“JOHN’S PROLOGUE AS MIDRASH” by Daniel Boyarin, “The Jewish Annotated New Testament” essay

04/26/2016

LOGOS, A JEWISH WORD
-- JOHN’S PROLOGUE AS MIDRASH (Part 1 of 2)

In the first centuries of the Christian era, the idea of the Word (Gk Logos) was known in some Greek philosophical circles as a link connecting the Transcendent/the Divine with humanity/the terrestrial. For Jews, the idea of this link between heaven and earth, whether called by the Greek Logos or Sophia (“wisdom”) or by the Aramaic Memra (“word”), permeated first- and second-century thought. Although monotheistic, Jews nevertheless recognized other supernatural beings who communicated the divine will. The use of the Logos in John’s Gospel (“In the Beginning was the Word/Logos, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” [Jn 1.1]) is thus a thoroughly Jewish usage. It is even possible that the beginning of the idea of the Trinity occurred precisely in pre-Christian Jewish accounts of the second and visible God that we find in many early Jewish writings.

Philo, writing in first-century CE Alexandria for an audience of Jews devoted to the Bible, uses the idea of the Logos as if it were a commonplace. His writings make apparent that at least for some pre-Christian Judaism, there was nothing strange about a doctrine of a manifestation of God, even as a “second God”; the Logos did not conflict with Philo’s idea of monotheism.

Philo and his Alexandrian Jewish community would have found the “Word of God” frequently in the Septuagint (LXX), where it creates, reveals, and redeems. For example, speaking of the exodus, Philo writes:

whereas the voice of mortals is judged by hearing, the sacred oracles intimate that the words of God (logoi, the plural) are seen as light is seen, for we are told that all of the people saw the Voice [Ex 20.18], not that they heard it; for what was happening was not an impact of air made by the organs of mouth and tongue, but the radiating splendor of virtue indistinguishable from a fountain of reason. . . . But the voice of God which is not that of verbs and names yet seen by the eye of the soul, he [Moses] rightly introduces as “visible.” (Migr. 47–48)

This text draws a close connection between the Logos and light, as in John 1.4–5: “In him was life, and the life was the light of all people. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not overcome it.”

Further, for Philo as for the Gospel of John, the Logos is both a part of God and also a separate being:

To His Word (Logos), His chief messenger (archangelos), highest in age and honor, the Father (Pater) of all has given the special prerogative, to stand on the border and separate the creature from the Creator. This same [i.e., the Word] both pleads with the immortal as suppliant for afflicted mortality and acts as ambassador of the ruler to the subject. He glories in this prerogative and proudly proclaims, “and I stood between the Lord and you” [Deut 5.5], that is neither uncreated by God, nor created as you, but midway between the two extremes, a surety to both sides. (Heir 205–6)

Philo oscillates on the point of the ambiguity between separate existence of the Logos, God’s Son, and its total incorporation within the godhead. Philo’s Logos is neither just the Wisdom (Gk sophia; Heb hokhmah) of the Bible, nor is it quite the Platonic logos, nor the divine Word (Heb davar), but a new synthesis of all of these.

Although this particular synthesis is as far as we know original to Philo, he develops it, as is his wont, by biblical allegories:

The Divine Word (Theios Logos) descends from the fountain of wisdom (Sophia) like a river to lave and water the olympian and celestial shoots and plants of virtue-loving souls which are as a garden. And this Holy Word (Hieros Logos) is separated into four heads, which means that it is split up into the four virtues. . . . It is this Word (Logos) which one of Moses’ company compared to a river, when he said in the Psalms: “the river of God is full of water” (Ps 65.10); where surely it were absurd to use that word literally with reference to rivers of the earth. Instead, as it seems, he represents the Divine Word (Theios Logos) as full of the stream of wisdom (Sophia), with no part empty or devoid of itself . . . inundated through and through and lifted up on high by the continuity and unbroken sequence from that ever-flowing fountain. (Dreams 2.242–45)

Other versions of Logos theology, namely notions of the second god as personified Word or Wisdom of God, were present among Aramaic-, Hebrew-, and Syriac-speaking Jews as well. Hints of this idea appear in Jewish texts that are part of the Bible such as Proverbs 8.22–31, Job 28.12– 28, as well as those not in the Hebrew Bible (but included in the Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical books): Sirach 24.1– 34, Wisdom of Solomon 7.22–10.21, and Baruch 3.9–4.4. Especially common is the Aramaic word Memra (“Word”) of God, appearing in the Targumim, the early Aramaic translations and paraphrases of the Bible (e.g., Targum Onqelos, Targum Neofiti), where it is used in contexts that are frequently identical to ones where the Logos has its home among Greek-speaking Jews.

Although official rabbinic theology sought to suppress all talk of the Memra or Logos by naming it the heresy of “Two Powers in Heaven” (b. Hag. 15a), before the rabbis, contemporaneously with them, and even among them, there were many Jews in both Palestine and the Diaspora who held on to a version of monotheistic theology that could accommodate this divine figure linking heaven and earth. Whereas Maimonides and his followers until today understood the Memra, along with the Shekhinah (“Presence”), as a means of avoiding anthropomorphisms in speaking of God, historical investigation suggests that in the first two centuries CE, the Memra was not a mere name, but an actual divine entity functioning as a mediator.

The following examples from the Targumim suggest that the Memra has many of the same roles as the Logos:

Creating: Gen 1.3: “And the Memra of H’ (a form of abbreviation for the Divine Name, the Tetragrammaton) said ‘Let there be light’ and there was light by his Memra.” In each of the following verses, it is the Memra—intimated by the expression “and he said”—that performs all of the creative actions.

Speaking to humans: Gen 3.8ff.: “And they heard the voice of the Memra of H’. . . . And the Memra of H’ called out to the Man.”

Revealing the Divine Self: Gen 18.1: “And was revealed to him the Memra of H’.”

Punishing the wicked: Gen 19.24: “And the Memra of H’ rained down on S***m and Gomorrah.”

Saving: Ex 17.21: “And the Memra of H’ was leading them during the day in a pillar of cloud.”

Redeeming: Deut 32.39: “When the Memra of H’ shall be revealed to redeem his people.”

These examples show that the Memra performs many, if not all, of the functions of the Logos of Christian theology (as well as of Wisdom).

“LOGOS, A JEWISH WORD --- JOHN’S PROLOGUE AS MIDRASH” by Daniel Boyarin, “The Jewish Annotated New Testament” essay

03/21/2016

GODFEAR (Part 2 of 2)

How did these Jews manage? Our inscriptional and papyrological evidence in particular should caution us against taking at face value the confluence of classical ethnographers’ complaints of Jewish ἀσέβεια and ἀμιξία, rabbinic prescriptions in Avodah Zara, and modern notions of “orthodoxy” or of “monotheism.” Different Jews negotiated their responsibilities differently. The ephebes Jesus son of Antiphilos and Eleazar son of Eleazar appear in a first-century inscription that was itself dedicated to Heracles and Hermes, the gods of the gymnasium. A papyrus fragment of roughly the same period alludes to an athlete whose “Jewish load” (circumcision) publicly emphasized his Jewish identity precisely when his prowess in foot racing publicly expressed his Greek identity. One inscription, a synagogue manumission, invokes the God of Israel at its beginning while closing with the witness of Zeus, Gaia, and Helios; another, marking a tomb, likewise commemorates funds to be distributed on Passover, Pentecost/Shavuot, and Kalends. Jews in the city of Miletus reserved seats in the theater; they turn up elsewhere in hippodromes and odeons; they both watched and acted in pantomime performances. These sites host divine–human interactions as well as intra-human ones.

If we find Jews in pagan places, we no less find pagans in Jewish places. Some traveled to the temple of the Jews’ God in Jerusalem, where they collected in the largest courtyard (i.e. the court of Gentiles at temple mount in Jerusalem). Others, closer to home, appear variously engaged in diaspora Jewish activities, most specifically in and around the Jews’ “ethnic reading houses,” their prayer-houses or synagogues. These pagans range across a broad spectrum of activity, from occasional contact, to the voluntary assumption of some Jewish ancestral practices, to major benefaction and patronage. The first point to note about these crossover activities is that they seem to have been ad hoc, voluntary, and not all that unusual: after all, the pagan–Jewish foot traffic went in both directions. The second point to note is that such mutual and fluid arrangements—pagans (and, eventually, gentile Christians) in Jewish places and Jews in pagan (and, eventually, in gentile Christian) places was on the evidence both extremely widespread and extremely socially stable: for centuries into the Common Era, well into the post-Constantinian period, ideologues of separation—Christian literati, bishops, emperors, and rabbis—all still complain about it. In the cities of Mediterranean antiquity, it seems, often if not always, no fences made good neighbors.

How do we identify all these ancient actors as they comfortably cross these ethnic/cultural/“religious” lines? And do the data themselves give us any assistance in this effort? Some ancient formulations emphasize the “ethnic” aspect, though what we think of as “religious” behaviors would also be entailed: Jews can act “gentilely” or “paganly” (ἐθνικῶς) and pagans can act “Jewishly” (Ἰουδαικῶς) (Gal 2:14); non-Jews can “Judaize” and Jews can “Hellenize.” Other formulations emphasize the “religious” aspect, but they thereby entail an ethnic aspect as well. In this second category, in first- and second-century Hellenistic Jewish literary sources, we find pagans who “fear god;” and in later inscriptions, third through fifth century (and most dramatically in Aphrodisias), we find non-Jews who are identified as “godfearers.”

As with the English, so with the Greek: sometimes “godfearing” simply means “pious,” indicating nothing particularly about ethnicity. But sometimes, and especially in Jewish contexts, “godfearing” indicates what we might elsewhere find designated as “Judaizing” (e.g., as in Josephus, J.W. 2.18.2). Its “religious” cast notwithstanding, “godfearing” also connotes “ethnic” behaviors. This is all to say that we are looking at, and endeavoring to speak about, ancient Mediterranean phenomena; and in that cultural context, gods and humans formed family groups, and cult is another expression of ethnicity.

When can we as historians know which kind of “godfearer”—a pious person full stop, or a voluntarily Judaizing pagan—our ancient evidence bespeaks? As usual, we have to consider critically each case, without expecting complete agreement among our different interpretive arguments. Sometimes the “ethnicity”—thus, also, the “religious” orientation—of an inscription or (especially) of an incantation will elude us, thus reinforcing the larger social-historical interpretive point: different peoples mixed with and borrowed from each other. But sometimes we will find in our evidence a Roman synagogue benefactor (such as Julia Severa) or a Septuagint-celebrating pagan (Philo, Life of Moses 2.41–42) or a non-Jew who rests on the Sabbath (as in Juvenal’s satire). Such pagans are “sympathizers” or (to use another contemporary term) “Judaizers.” The particular inscription or mosaic or literary reference itself might not designate these Judaizing non-Jews specifically as “godfearers.” But as historians, might we?

I think so. “Godfearing” is one of those terms, like “Judaizing,” that is both emic and etic: that is, one of its ancient cultural definitions maps closely onto its modern, academic one. Historiographically, “godfearing” can serve us as an identifier for a long-lived and internally various sub-group that evinced a broad range of behaviors (pious, political, practical) across this specific ethnic divide: the one between Jewishness and everything else.

Of course, “to Persianize” (Μηδίζειν) or “to Egyptianize” would likewise indicate crossover behavior between “everything else” and a particular ethnic/religious group. “Godfearing” specifically—that is, pagan Judaizing—is significant to historians of ancient Mediterranean religions, however, because of the ways that it complicates our conceptualization both of Roman-period Judaism and of ancient Christianity. If so many and such different diaspora Jewish communities over so great a stretch of time so readily accommodated such a broad range of interests and involvements from pagan neighbors, a standing separateness cannot be presupposed, for example, to account for Paul’s remarks in Galatians 2, or for “Peter’s” in Acts 10. Pauline communities need not be imagined as having the sort of biblical literacy crash courses that would be the envy of modern Methodists. And the later gentile Christian pattern of keeping Saturdays as the Sabbath, or of fasting on Yom Kippur, or of taking oaths before Torah scrolls need not be explained by appeal to a sudden interest, via the “Old Testament,” in Jewish practices, but can be seen for what it is: a long-lived social pattern within the Greco-Roman city.

Diaspora Jewish involvement in pagan cult and culture also needs to be seen, and to complicate our conceptualization of Roman-period Judaism and of ancient Christianity. We do not have a contemporary term for this ancient (and entirely unremarkable) Jewish behavior in the way that we do, with “godfearing,” for the corresponding pagan behavior. Terms such as “assimilated” or “not orthodox” come from much later periods of European Jewish history, and inevitably embody anachronistic value judgments. (And “Hellenized” seems too non-specific: after Alexander, what eastern Mediterranean culture was not to some extent “Hellenized”?) Still, the nonexistence of an ancient term for “paganizing Jews” does not, it seems to me, require that we let go of an existing ancient term for “Judaizing pagans.”

These normal Jewish negotiations with the majority culture should also complicate our construction of what it meant for a pagan to “become” an “ex-pagan”—a “convert” in our modern terms, a προσήλυτος (and that only eventually) in Hellenistic Greek. If native Jews (such as, perhaps, Pothos [Ameling, Inscriptiones Judaicae Orientis, 1:303–7]) summoned lower gods to witness synagogue manumissions, or if one (such as Moschos son of Moschion [Ameling, Inscriptiones Judaicae Orientis, 1:177–80]) placed inscriptions honoring foreign gods in foreign temples while identifying himself as “Ἰουδαῖος,” how uninvolved with his former gods need a προσήλυτος actually have been? And what would it mean, via ritual actions, to change ancestors and ethnic groups? What, indeed, would it mean in antiquity “to convert”?

These are important and interesting questions, none of which I can address in the space remaining here. But, given the difficulties that we have when speaking of all these mixing and mingling gods and humans, it seems overfastidious to shelve our hybrid emic/etic term that can still work, should we choose to let it, to identify some of these ancient actors: a “godfearer” is a pagan who voluntarily assumes (like the sympathizing father in Juvenal’s Satire 14), or who supports (like the patron Julia Severa, who builds the οἶκος for Acmonia’s Jews [Ameling, Inscriptiones Judaicae Orientis, 2:348–55]), or who utilizes (like the adept who invokes “the God who was a pillar of fire by night” in order to work his spell, PGM 11.3,007–85) some aspects of Jewishness, which eo ipso implies some degree of contact both with (local) Jews and (thus and also) with their god. As an identifying category, such a term may indeed be “sweeping,” but so is the phenomenon that it names.

For all the reasons reviewed above, then, but especially for this last one, I would not give up the “godfearers.”

“If It Looks like a Duck, and It Quacks like a Duck . . .”: On Not Giving Up the Godfearers - Paula Fredriksen, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

03/11/2016

GODFEARS (Part 1 of 2)

With her characteristic concern for terminological clarity and methodological rigor, Ross Kraemer has recently issued a swingeing critique of the use of the term “Godfearer” in academic discussions of Roman antiquity’s “interstitial Gentile persons” who engaged in some way with Jewish practices. The meanings of θεοσεβής vel sim. are various, she argues, as well as ambiguous and uncertain, the category itself undertheorized, its utility fatally compromised by its confusions. I continue to think that the term is both useful and usable, its range of meanings fittingly elastic, its attestation in ancient evidence of various sorts as secure as our evidence usually gets. Rather than turn the present essay into the second half of a dialogue between a lumper and a splitter, however, I propose to reframe “god-fearing” with a different set of considerations. In the cities of Roman antiquity, how did gods and humans interact ?

My Ph.D.—like that of my alta soror, Ross—is in a specialization that, in antiquity, did not actually exist: the ancient Mediterranean knew no such thing as “religion.” In Greco-Roman antiquity, gods and humans formed vertically integrated family groups, and what we think of as “religion”— relations between divinity and humanity— ancients saw as a set of protocols inherited across generations, “ancestral custom.” From the “micro”-level of the family to the “macro”-level of the city, ancient gods ran in the blood. For this reason, pantheons coincided with (variously sized) human groups, from the individual domestic unit to the wider γένος or ἔθνος. Proper awareness of and appropriate deference to superiors within this numinous-human hierarchy were deemed pietas or εὐσέβεια; one’s πίστις or fides expressed one’s loyalty to these bequeathed practices and to the divine–human and intra-human relationships that they articulated. Harmonious relations—showing respect, and being seen to show respect—began at the hearth and extended outward to the city, to the larger empire and, thence, to the cosmos itself. Enacting these arrangements at the micro-level was pious common sense; at the macro-level, it was tantamount to safeguarding the pax deorum.

These relations were conceived of “realistically”: deference was a public and observable behavior as much as an attitude or an idea. At the micro-level the bride, entering her husband’s household, assumed responsibility for what were for her new ancestors and new gods. So too with an adopted son. At the polis-level, citizens were imagined as blood relations (thus, outsiders were αλλόφυλοι); when negotiating treaties with other cities, common ancestors were discovered, so that the parties under agreement themselves became “kin.” At the level of empire, this family organization also held sway: positioning himself as the empire’s pater, Augustus through the worship of his genius, turned his new political unit into a single, vast, multiethnic οἶκος or domus or “family.”

The city itself, post-Alexander, was thus a sort of family-based “religious” institution. Urban well-being depended on heaven’s beneficence, and thus the organs of city government were in effect media for showing respect to the presiding god(s). These gods structured both urban time and urban space. Dedicated festivals, celebrating seasons sacred to divine patrons celestial and imperial punctuated the civic year. The venues of these celebrations—the town council, the theater, the circus, the stadium— held altars to and images of the gods. Household calendars and domestic space replicated in miniature these civic structures, wherein celebrations of the life-cycle—adulthood, marriages, naming ceremonies—also invoked and honored presiding deities. The gods were everywhere, not only in the public and private buildings of ancient municipalities but also on insignia of office, on military standards, in solemn oaths and contracts, in vernacular benedictions and exclamations, and all throughout the curricula of the educated. It was impossible to live in a Greco-Roman city without living with its gods.

How did diaspora Jews (or Jews in mixed or pagan-majority Palestinian cities) cope in this god-congested environment? Jews knew that these other gods existed: their own sacred Scriptures said as much. “Who is like you, O Lord, among the gods (ἐν θεοῖς)?” Moses asked (Exod 15:11 LXX). True, these other gods were in the Jewish view less exalted than Israel’s god. “The θεοί of the nations are δαιμόνια,” sang the Psalmist (Ps 96:5 LXX): a δαίμων was specifically a lower, cosmic god. But Moses, in Exodus, seemed to counsel that these deities be treated with some courtesy: “Do not revile the gods (θεούς)” (Exod 22:28 LXX). Commenting on this verse, Philo of Alexandria remarked, “Reviling each others’ gods always causes war;” and he went on likewise to encourage respect for pagan rulers, “who are of the same seed as the gods” (QE 2.5). The images of the gods might be nugatory (1 Cor 8:4; 10:19; cf. Wis 7:17; 13:1; 15:2–3), but the gods themselves were real. “Indeed,” Paul noted to his community in Corinth, “there are many gods and many lords” (1 Cor 8:5–6).

Their ancestral traditions put Jews in a potentially awkward situation: Israel’s god famously demanded that his people worship him alone. And, despite dealing daily with all these other gods, Jews in the diaspora— if we can trust the pagan complaints about them—do generally seem to have drawn the line at λατρεία, excusing themselves (to the occasional irritation of their contemporaries) from performing acts of public cult. Nevertheless, whenever they joined in civic social and cultural life—in council meetings, in law courts, and whether as participants in or as spectators at theatrical performances or musical, rhetorical, or athletic competitions—Jews were present when these gods were celebrated, and Jews were members of those bodies whose municipal duties required showing honor, publically, to the gods.

How did these Jews manage?...

“If It Looks like a Duck, and It Quacks like a Duck . . .”: On Not Giving Up the Godfearers - Paula Fredriksen, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

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