12/25/2025
The record confirms that the "State" (the Prosecutor) was not the party invoking the court's jurisdiction instead,the party invoking the court's jurisdiction instead, it was a rogue
agency acting in defiance of the State's own legal representative see ( Because the May 30 mandate from the Special Deputy Prosecutor legally disqualified the CCSO and
required a "neutral Outside Agency," Deputy Boudrieau was no longer a “peace officer" authorized to represent the State in this
specific Investigation see (App. Ex. B, F)
By bypassing the mandated outside agency and the prosecutor,Boudrieau exercised "unilateral control" over judicial power.
Under Article I, § 7, a warrant obtained by an official who has been legally divested of authority lacks the "authority of law"
and is void. The warrants are not merely "voidable" but void ab initio because the applicant (Boudrieau) lacked the legal status
to invoke the court's power under the specific constraints of the May 28 Special Appointment and the May 30 Mandate.see
(App. Ex. B, C, D) Once a prosecuting authority is disqualified and a special prosecutor is appointed, law enforcement has no
legal standing declare a case “open and active” for prosecutorial purposes or to control its disposition. That authority rests exclusively with the prosecutor as a constitutional officer exercising independent judgment.
Discovery obligations underscore this division of power. CrR 4.7 places the continuing duty to
disclose squarely on the prosecutor, not law enforcement. The prosecutor must ensure disclosure of all material and information within the possession or control of the prosecutor’s
staff and of others who participated in the investigation. Bradyv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Under Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995), the prosecutor is personally responsible for the integrity of the entire evidence pool; if law enforcement is permitted to act as a "gatekeeper" to the
prosecutor, a due process violation is inevitable.
See (App. Ex. I, J, K).
While law enforcement may gather evidence, it may not curate discovery, determine the scope of disclosure, or act as the final arbiter of information once a prosecuting authority is in
place.Discovery obligations underscore this
division of power. When law enforcement controls evidence custody, dictates discovery dissemination, and asserts primary
authority over case status, it usurps core prosecutorial functions reserved by statute and constitutional structure.
See (App. Ex. G, H, I, J, K)
The record here establishes a structural violation of separation of powers. Although a special prosecutor was nominally appointed, CCSO investigators retained effective control overevidence, discovery flow, and case direction. Investigators declared the cases “open and active,” directed that all communications be routed to themselves, curated discovery through law-enforcement platforms, and determined what
materials would be transmitted. Deputy Prosecutor acknowledged and ratified this arrangement by forwarding communications rather than exercising independent judgment
or supervisory control.
Because charging decisions and discovery management are core prosecutorial functions, their assumption by law enforcement
constitutes an ultra vires usurpation of executive authority. This defect is structural, not procedural. It infects the proceedings in
their entirety, compromises the integrity of the adversarial process, and cannot be cured by after-the-fact ratification.
Dismissal is therefore required as a matter of law