12/22/2016
Binkleys Cave rescue report.
Most times are approximate. All are EST. I want to caution people about armchair quarterbacking. I know it is natural, but even those of us who were part of the management and who have thousands of hours training for these events and who had as much information as possible are still working with incomplete information and we can always second-guess decisions made and hindsight is always perfect. We are conducting an extensive after action review and will make the next one better based on lessons learned. One can always second-guess the actions of the people who went in the cave based on that perfect hindsight, and this is true of every life situation that happens to each and every one of us.
Some people will be mad they didn’t get called, or used the way that they thought they should be used. I want to stress that those kinds of reactions don’t help during an operation and really don’t contribute afterwards. We have limited resources during a rescue and part of management is using those resources as efficiently as possible. Rescues can be a lot of "hurry up and wait." During a rescue people often want to help so badly because it is their fellow cavers in trouble, but when we encourage training which will make people more useful (and make their caving safer) the interest is gone.
A big thanks goes out to all who did respond or who prepared and standing by. This was a situation which, while I was 98% certain would have a positive outcome, especially because the in-cave crew was so strong, and had people who had had rescue training, had the potential for a disaster on a scale that has rarely been seen in caving. Those who were on scene overheard us working on contingencies for if that was the case. I didn’t believe those would be needed, but as a rescue manager I have to be prepared for them. Most of these people in the cave were friends of mine, but when you are running an operation you have to be dispassionate about that because that is what gives you the highest likelihood of success.
12/17 20:28 I received a call that there was a crew in the Binkleys Cave system and Gary R had reported that there had already been two inches of rain and it was still raining and he was worried about the crew who had gone in at noon as the river in the cave was rising. The initial forecast for rain was for less than an inch. That crew was due out at 3am. For the next two hours I contacted key people including Don P and advised them of the situation and started the caver’s network for gearing up for a rescue response. I had personnel on site put in a gauge in the stream to monitor the water response and advised everyone to wait. We did not want to send personnel into the flooding cave and put more people at risk. Either they were alive and in a safe place or they were dead and there would be nothing we could do that would change that outcome. I limited the number of people I put on standby to allow people to get a good night’s sleep and to limit the number of people who felt compelled to go to the scene in spite of the fact that there was nothing that could be done. Temperatures that night were going to fall to below freezing and we did not need the additional logistical load.
At the time Jess D and I were in Grayson Kentucky where I elected to stay to get some sleep and head to the cave in the morning if the crew did not emerge at their due out time. I got periodic updates on water levels and rain from the on-scene personnel. By about 4am the rain had stopped and the gauge at Indiana Caverns (commercial part of the Binkley system) said they had received over 4” of rain.
12/18 ~06:30 Jess and I start heading towards Corydon. The in-cave crew had not reported out. Jess worked the phones while I drove and advised. Joe K reported that the river in the cave was 4-5’ above low water levels and was very “angry.”
12/18 09:06 I contacted Conservation Officer Jim Hash with the IDNR to advise him of the situation and that we were now officially in rescue mode and that I was contacting him as a Responsible Agency. He said he would contact the Harrison County officials to let them know of the situation and would get the IDNR response team ready. Joe K reported that the water was going down very slowly. Cavers might ask why we contacted the IDNR. The answer is twofold: first, all rescues fall under the jurisdiction of an Authority Having Jurisdiction (Responsible Agency). If we as civilians undertake to perform a rescue on our own without working under a RA (this does not apply to self rescue in a cave if someone is injured) then we open ourselves up to HUGE liability and even potentially criminal liability. Second, the IDNR Conservation Officers in southern Indiana have worked hard to get cave rescue training and have become proficient at it. They have an understanding of their limitations and work very well with the cavers who have trained in rescue. This is a relationship that has been very carefully cultivated on both sides and has been paying off big time in the last few incidents we have had. They have the ability to bring in resources we as civilians do not have access to, and they have the legal authority to do things like keep the media off private property or remove disruptive people.
12/18 ~10:40 I arrived on scene and started coordinating on scene personnel. Jim Hash arrived shortly thereafter and we discussed and organized the command structure. I went into the cave with Joe K to look at the water levels around 11:30. He reported the water had gone down 3” in the last hour. A little after noon Don P arrived and we discussed tactics and logistics. We knew that this could be a very long operation and as it was currently well below freezing and predicted to stay that way for several days we did not want this to turn into a large operation with personnel waiting around putting pressure to take action which could be ill-advised, and who would add to the logistical load. At this point we had kept it small enough that the media had not arrived and keeping this from becoming a media circus which we knew would happen if the operation went on for an extended period. We wanted to plan for two operational periods with the first one being now until midnight and the next one from midnight to 8am. We would evaluate as we got more data whether to plan for additional operational periods, wanting to stay 2 OPs ahead. Our primary limitation was the number of personnel we had who were familiar with the area of the cave that was the in-cave crew’s objective. We had two who were confident of finding the area and another two who were vaguely familiar with it. I did not want to commit both of the personnel familiar with the area in cave at the same time until we had more data.
12/18 ~13:10 IRT(Initial Response Team) 1 and 2 went into the cave with hypothermia packs and food. IRT 1 was 3 people, one of which was familiar with the in-cave crew’s objective. Their objective was to head to the point furthest in the cave that would hamper the in-cave crew’s exiting due to high water, the D &B Crawl, and report back on the conditions by 23:00. IRT 2 was 2 people, both strong cavers but less familiar with the cave, and their objective was to accompany IRT 1 to the Mountain Room which we considered a high probability for a location for the in-cave crew to be holed up, then split off and report back by 17:00 which would give us guidance planning for the next operational period. The water level was also down another three inches on the gauge. I had accompanied them down to the river to see them off and read the gauge. I then headed out of the cave, discussed the operation with Jim H, Jess D, and Don P. Then Jess and I headed home in order to get wetsuits and rescue gear, planning to return by 17:00.
12/18 16:15 IRT 2 reports back out. No evidence in the Mountain Room but water levels, normally ankle to waist deep, were waist deep to over their heads and fighting the current out had exhausted them. Jim H, Jess D, Don P, and I start planning for operational period two, briefing the people we had on scene and putting off scene people on standby for operational period three. Jim H arranges for the Red Cross to come to help feed people and the Harrison County EMA trailer for us to use as a command post. The property owner opens a section of his barn that is heated for us to use to help warm people. I check the water level hourly. It was initially placed in a rapids section of the cave and while I was gone had fallen below the gauge, or about 29 inches below the initial placement so I relocated the gauge to a calmer section. There it dropped a steady one inch an hour (rate difference partially explained by locational placement). Around 18:00 we got reports that the operation had hit the media so we prepared statements. IDNR sent a Public Information Officer to the scene and I posted on social media.
12/18 22:30 I head into the cave to await IRT 1 at the river. At 22:50 the team leader for IRT 1 and two of the in-cave crew, emerge saying everyone was alive and in good shape though two of them were borderline hypothermic. The rest of IRT 1 stayed behind to assist the remaining in-cave crew with evacuation after they had been fed and hydrated and heated. We notify those outside at 23:00 and a cheer erupts. I take the three into the command trailer to warm up and debrief them on the conditions of the cave and the remaining in-cave crew. The water is still up but easier to navigate as it is falling. The rest of IRT 1 was going to get everyone moving towards the entrance as soon as they were fed which at this point was several hours ago so the team should be moving. Don and I stand down the people we had contacted for OP3 as we felt we had enough personnel on hand for the teams we had already planned to go in cave and extra personnel on the surface in case anything went wrong.
12/18 23:40 We send an evac team into the cave to assist with getting everyone out. Jess D and I head into the cave to evaluate the remaining crew and the evacuation and I assigned Jess to be the medic for the evacuation. We met up with them in the Mountain Room at 01:10 and everyone was in good shape and capable of exiting under their own power, some with assistance. I headed back out to report topside.
12/19 02:20 I met the IDNR crew at the river and informed Jim H of the progress then headed to the surface to inform Don P and the rest of the surface of the ETA to the entrance. 02:40 three of them exited the cave with several of the evac team. I head back in to wrap up the evacuation and by 02:55 the last two were at the surface.
12/19 03:15 we gave a quick debrief and thanking all of the responders and by 04:00 Jess and I headed home. Jim H stayed to oversee the rest of the demobilization and said he didn’t leave the scene until around 6am.
Anmar
