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Qaran-Hage, Hargeisa (2026)

20/05/2026

“A Nation Is Not a Rotation: Somaliland Youth and Leaders Must Demand Stable, Competent Government”

We Somalilanders are proud of something real: we built peace and institutions when many said we could not. But we must be honest—our politics still carries a sickness that blocks the future: frequent reshuffles and clan-first appointments.

Let’s start with the law we all share. Our Constitution is not shy about this. It says citizens must not be given precedence because of clan, and discrimination based on clan affiliation is prohibited.
It even says political parties cannot be based on clanism.
So when we vote or argue like government is a clan trophy—and when leaders appoint ministers mainly to satisfy sub-clan arithmetic—we are not being “traditional.” We are breaking the social contract we claim to defend.

Now let’s talk about reshuffles.

Yes—sometimes a leader must remove a minister. A minister may fail. A minister may be corrupt. A minister may not deliver. But what we see too often is different: reshuffles that look like political bargaining, not performance correction. Official dismissal letters in our gazettes even normalise it by saying national office is “a rotation.”
If leadership becomes a rotation, then governance becomes a marketplace: everyone enters office thinking, “My time is short—take what you can.” That is how corruption becomes rational. That is how public service becomes a hustle.

And the damage is not theory. It has a name: policy discontinuity.

When ministers change repeatedly, plans reset. Projects stall. Teams learn, then are replaced. A new minister arrives, cancels the previous priorities, starts again, and wants quick wins before the next reshuffle. Academic research across many countries shows that minister turnover matters: even when a government remains in power, individual ministers can churn quickly—and that churn can weaken performance.

In Somaliland, youth feel this in the most painful place: jobs.

A serious study using Somaliland survey data reports youth unemployment rates above 70% among 15–24 year olds.
This is not just “bad luck” or “global conditions.” It is also the result of weak delivery systems: inconsistent investment policy, disrupted education and skills programmes, and ministries that keep changing direction.

Some will say: “But our leaders have the legal right to reshuffle.” True. The Constitution gives the President power to appoint and remove ministers.
But the Constitution also sets rules to protect the nation from abuse. It requires parliamentary confirmation of ministers.
And it contains a powerful anti-corruption safeguard: when a minister is dismissed, they must stay until a successor takes over—and while waiting, they must not make new appointments or sign agreements for the ministry.
That is the Constitution recognising a danger that every Somali understands: the “last days in office” are risky days.

So the question is not “Can leaders reshuffle?” The question is: Will leaders govern like builders—or like brokers?

To Somaliland’s leaders: stop using ministries as negotiation chips. Your legacy will not be the number of people you appointed. Your legacy will be the number of children educated, the number of mothers receiving health care, the number of water systems maintained, and the number of young people employed.

To Somaliland’s youth: stop rewarding clan performance and punishing national performance. If we clap for appointments that satisfy “our side” instead of competence, we are training leaders to ignore merit. If we vote for the loudest clan talker instead of the best problem solver, we are voting for instability.

What should we demand?

First, real confirmation hearings in parliament—where ministers present plans, qualifications, and measurable targets, and where the public can watch. The Constitution already gives parliament a confirmation role.
Let’s make it meaningful.

Second, stability windows for core ministries. We should demand that the most important ministries—finance, security, education, health, water—are not reshuffled every year unless there is clear cause.

Third, enforce handovers. The Constitution already bans signing agreements during handover.
We must insist that this is enforced, audited, and publicly reported.

Fourth, protect civil servants from political purges. Ministers may change; the professional state must remain.

Finally, we must fight the “clan-first reflex” not with insults, but with a better identity: citizenship. The Constitution demands equality; it demands parties not be clan vehicles.
We do not honor Somaliland by protecting clan privilege. We honor Somaliland by protecting national institutions.

Somaliland youth: your power is not only in elections. It is in standards. Ask one question whenever there is a reshuffle: “What problem did this solve—and what results will you deliver in the next six months?” If leaders cannot answer, then reshuffle is just movement, not progress.

27/12/2025

Somaliland Xaq Ayay u leedahay in Aayahaeeda Mustaqbal katashato. Wax kastoo guul ah oo ay gaadhaana waa wax Somali usoo hoyatay.
Ictiraafka Israaiiludu siisay Somaliland wuxuu u baahanyay in si qoto dheer loo dul istaago.

Suaalaha is waydiinta leh Waxa weeye

1. Somaliland Maxay ictiraafka kaga badalatay yuhuuda?
A. Ma in lasiiyo bada somaliland oo ay dagaal kula gasho Iiraan, xuutiyiinta, Turkey ama Somalida kale.
B. Ma in yuhuuda gurtaan macdanta naadirka ah ee taala Somaliland?
C. Mise in Somaliland diinta islaamka ka tanaasusho oo ku biirto diinta Ibraahiimiyada ee loo yaqaano abraham accord?

Miday doontaba hanoqotee maxaa khatar ku xeeran?
Si dawladu ma is waydiisay oo is barbar dhig maku samaysay faaidada iyo khatarta inoo leedahay hada ama mustaqbalka.

A. Saaxiibtimo lasamayno yuhuuda? Seh yuhuudu ma aaminsantay adoo muslima inay saaxiib inaga dhigato?

ولن ترضى عنك اليهود ولا النصارى حتى تتبع
ملتهم)

B. Hadii aynu siino badeena oo dagaal kula galaan xuutiyiinta, Malaga yaabaa khatar inay inagu keento oo xitaa dakada Berbera la burbiriyo sidoo kalena hargeisa ay duqeeyaan? Dagaalkaasi ma noqonayaa mid guul inoo ah.

C. Hadli somaliland ogolaato in Palatine ta Dagan Qassa loosoo raro deegaanka Somaliland, Khatar intee leeg ayay inagu tahay?
Malaga yaabaa inay noqoto sidii Yuhuuda loogu soo raray dhulka falastiinta kadibna sida falastiinta dhulkoogii looga qaaday inagana inooga qaadaan.

Suaalahaygu maaha inaan kasoo horjeedo in Somaliland ictiraaf hesho. Seh waa in dawladu kajawaabto suaalahaas sidoo kalena dastuurka hor keento si umadu ula socdaan uma ogaadaan Waxaynu ictiraafka ku badalanay iyo in ladarsay khataraha ay inoo keeni karto.

18/05/2025

Our Destiny, Not Theirs: A Somali Youth’s Plea on Foreign Influence

Part 6 - New Entrants: China’s Principle and Israel’s Interest

In the last few years, two unexpected players have entered the Somalia/Somaliland arena in different ways: China (and its rival Taiwan), and Israel.

A. China

Traditionally had limited involvement in Somalia beyond occasional aid and diplomatic niceties. But when Somaliland made a bold move in 2020 to establish formal ties with Taiwan (the island China claims as a renegade province), Beijing took notice – and action. Somaliland and Taiwan opened reciprocal representative offices, effectively recognizing each other to a degree.
This was a breakthrough for Somaliland (Taiwan is one of the few entities that would treat it as a country, given Taiwan itself knows the pain of non-recognition). Taiwan brought development assistance and hopes of investment to Somaliland. Many Somalilanders celebrated this as a step out of isolation.

China, however, was furious. To China, this was an intolerable provocation in its own backyard struggle with Taiwan. China firmly warned Somaliland not to strengthen ties with Taiwan and doubled down on supporting Somalia’s claim over Somaliland. Essentially, Beijing fused its “One China” policy with a “One Somalia” stance. Chinese officials pressured Somaliland to drop the Taiwan deal (to no avail), and at the same time wooed the Somali federal government with promises. In 2020, Somalia’s President reaffirmed adherence to One China and cut ties with Taiwan (not that Somalia had official ties, but it was symbolic). China likely offered more development projects in Mogadishu as a reward. Indeed, in 2022 China announced plans to support port development in Mogadishu and other infrastructure – a clear message: China will help Somalia, while Somaliland gets nothing if it aligns with China’s adversary.

This dynamic puts Somaliland in the crossfire of the US-China global rivalry too. The US, as mentioned, quietly liked the Taiwan-Somaliland connection (common values of democracy, etc., plus it irked China). Some US lawmakers even cite Somaliland’s Taiwan ties as a reason to boost U.S. engagement – to show support for those who side with the West over China. Somaliland’s representative in the US proudly noted that partnering with Taiwan improved Somaliland’s image in Washington.

For Somalia’s government, China has become an even more vital ally to keep. China is a U.N. Security Council member that will block any attempts to recognize Somaliland. It also can invest in big projects – something Somalia needs. Recently, China mediated in the Ethiopia conflict and is active in Djibouti (where it has a military base). So, Somalia values Chinese friendship as a counterweight to Western influence. Interestingly, when Ethiopia struck the port deal with Somaliland, Somalia’s President got strong backing from Egypt and China to oppose it.

In short, China’s involvement reinforces the status quo bias internationally. Somaliland’s recognition bid now faces the informal veto of a superpower (China). And China will use Somalia/Somaliland issues in its chess game with the West and Taiwan. If Taiwan’s presence in Somaliland grows, China might respond by further empowering Somalia’s central government with investment and possibly security cooperation, so that Somaliland remains isolated.

Somalis again risk being pawns: do we really want to become a bargaining chip in U.S.-China competition? Our conflict should not be another arena for them to score points. Let’s not forget, these giants will shake hands in a summit far away and trade us off if it suits them. We must assert our own agency.

B. Israel

Now, Israel is another intriguing actor. Officially, Israel has no relations with Somalia (a Muslim-majority country historically supportive of Palestine). Somaliland, however, has quietly courted Israel for years, seeing parallels – a small democracy in a hostile region looking for recognition. Israel actually was one of the countries that recognized independent Somaliland in 1960 before it unified with Somalia. In recent times, there have been growing murmurs of Israel getting involved – not out of love for Somalis per se, but out of strategic interest.

Reports surfaced in 2024 that Israel is considering establishing a military presence in Somaliland – possibly a naval base – with the encouragement of the UAE. The logic: Somaliland’s coast is prime real estate overlooking the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab al-Mandab strait which leads to Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat. With Houthi in Yemen (who are anti-Israel) and Iranian influence in the Red Sea, Israel would love a vantage point to monitor and respond to threats. An Israeli base in Somaliland could help “counter Iranian arms shipments” and guard maritime routes. In exchange, Israel might offer what Somaliland craves – diplomatic recognition and economic investment. There’s even talk this could be brokered as part of the broader Abraham Accords trend (where UAE, Bahrain, etc., normalized with Israel – perhaps Somaliland could be slotted in as well with Gulf help).

Imagine the impact: Israel formally recognizing Somaliland would be a game-changer, likely encouraging some Western nations to follow. Somaliland would gain a powerful military ally and investor. But the backlash would also be fierce: Somalia’s government and many citizens (sympathetic to Palestine) would see it as a betrayal. Muslim countries that currently fence-sit might double-down against Somaliland recognition to avoid angering their own publics. It could inflame religious and nationalist sentiments.

Also, as the Rio Times report noted, Israel doing this could “strain its relations with Somalia and other Muslim-majority African nations”. Would Israel care? Perhaps not much, if the benefit outweighs that. Israel also likely calculates that with Sudan (another nearby country) normalizing relations and Ethiopia friendly, adding Somaliland would strengthen an Israel-Ethiopia-UAE axis in the Red Sea. Indeed, analysts mention a “trilateral axis” emerging there that.

So here again, Somalia/Somaliland becomes part of a larger strategic puzzle – this time the Middle East security puzzle. For Israel (and UAE), enabling Somaliland’s independence might be worthwhile to secure a Red Sea foothold. For Egypt and maybe other countries, it’s something to thwart (Egypt has firmly said it won’t allow anyone to threaten Somalia’s unity, partly because Egypt sees Somalia as a partner against Ethiopia). We end up a proxy in not just one, but multiple overlapping rivalries – Gulf vs. Gulf, West vs. China, Israel/UAE vs. Iran/Egypt.

This is dangerous terrain. It means escalation in our region could occur not due to Somali needs, but due to unrelated conflicts. Already, we saw hints: Egyptian troops in Somalia, Ethiopian troops to the border – these movements in 2023–24 were less about us and more about their feud over the Nile and Red Sea access. Likewise, if Israel and Iran’s shadow war heats up, would Somaliland become a target because of an Israeli base? Would Houthi fire missiles at our port because foreign warships docked there? These scenarios are no longer far-fetched – Houthis have already threatened all ships heading to Israel and struck vessels in the Red Sea.

We, the youth, must ask: Is this the future we want?

To potentially become collateral damage in global conflicts? Somalis are tired of wars that are not our own. We suffered during the Cold War when the superpowers fought through our proxy war with Ethiopia. We suffered in the war on terror when international jihadists and counterterror forces clashed on our soil. We shouldn’t have to suffer in an Iran-Israel or China-Taiwan proxy conflict next.

Israel’s interest, if genuine, might bring some short-term gains for Somaliland, but we must weigh it against long-term consequences. An alignment with Israel could isolate Somaliland from much of the Muslim world; it could also harden Somalia’s stance even further, making any reconciliation impossible. Conversely, if Somalia embraces allies like Egypt and China to counter this, it might militarize the situation more. This is a precarious path.

15/05/2025

Our Destiny, Not Theirs: A Somali Youth’s Plea on Foreign Influence
Part 5 - Western Powers and Big Players: Principles or Pragmatism?

B. The United Kingdom and Europe: Colonial Legacies and New Engagements

The UK has a special historical connection to this issue – it was the colonial ruler of Somaliland (British Somaliland) before 1960, while Italy colonized the south. Indeed, in June 1960 Britain granted independence to Somaliland as a separate nation, which then voluntarily unified with the south a few days later. Because of this history, Somaliland’s argument for recognition leans on the idea that “we were once independent and entered a union that failed.” Some in Britain feel a sense of responsibility or at least a unique position to weigh in.

The UK’s official stance today, like others, is not to recognize Somaliland unilaterally. British diplomats say they encourage dialogue and that any change in status must be decided between Hargeisa and Mogadishu. However, the UK has been relatively sympathetic to Somaliland’s case in subtle ways:
The UK allows Somaliland’s representatives in London to operate openly (though not as an official embassy). Many members of the Somali diaspora in Britain hail from Somaliland and advocate for its recognition.

The British government has given significant aid directly to Somaliland for development and even security capacity-building, treating it as a distinct region for aid purposes. This support has helped Somaliland strengthen its institutions. Importantly, British parliamentarians have periodically taken up the cause.

In January 2022, the UK Parliament held a historic debate on recognizing Somaliland. Several MPs, including a former Cabinet minister, argued passionately that Somaliland deserves independence and that Britain should lead the way in the international community. They lauded Somaliland’s democratic progress and said waiting decades more would be futile.

Somaliland’s leadership publicly thanked these MPs for raising the issue. In that debate, the British government minister responded cautiously, reiterating support for continued talks between Somaliland and Somalia rather than recognition. Still, the mere fact such a debate occurred – and again in the House of Lords in 2024 – signals a growing sentiment in the UK to “face reality,” as one MP put it.

If a critical mass of countries ever move to recognize Somaliland, the UK might be among the first, owing to both moral arguments and an influential Somaliland diaspora lobbying from within. For Somalia, Britain remains a key ally too.

The UK is one of the largest donors to Somalia’s state-building and humanitarian efforts. It co-chairs international forums on Somalia’s future. London hosted major conferences to support Somalia in 2012 and 2017. The UK provides training to Somali forces (recently British troops have trained anti-terror units in Somalia). So, Britain also values a unified, stable Somalia for security reasons – remember, terrorist attacks in Somalia (like the 2019 Mogadishu bombing) killed a dual British-Somali citizen MP, so the threat can touch them too. This puts the UK in a bit of a dilemma: its heart (and Parliament) sees justice in Somaliland’s aspirations, but its strategic mind sees the chaos that a rushed recognition might unleash.

For now, it walks a middle line. Somalis should note: unlike the Gulf or Ethiopia who act out of narrow interests, the UK’s approach at least tries to uphold an international principle (don’t redraw borders violently) while acknowledging democracy. It may not satisfy either side completely, but it comes off as more principled than, say, the UAE’s blatant dual dealings.

The wider European Union (EU) similarly supports Somali unity officially. The EU has funded Somali government programs and the African Union peacekeeping mission, and it diplomatically backs the federal government. Yet, European nations also engage Somaliland practically.

Several EU countries have set up “liaison offices” in Hargeisa to supervise aid projects and maintain communication. None recognize it, but they treat it almost as an autonomous territory. The EU is caught between legal norms (they generally don’t favor secession movements) and on-ground effectiveness (Somaliland uses aid money more effectively than the rest of Somalia in many cases). One European angle deserves mention: the issue of piracy a decade ago. Somali pirates were hijacking ships off the coast (mostly based in Puntland, not Somaliland). An international naval force had to patrol the Indian Ocean.

Somaliland cooperated with the EU on anti-piracy, even handing over suspects. This showed that Somaliland could be a useful partner for international security despite its undefined status. The experience likely warmed some Europeans to the notion that Somaliland is a responsible actor. However, the African Union (AU) remains a tougher audience. The AU has a core principle: no redrawing of colonial-era borders, to prevent endless secessionism in Africa. Somaliland’s case tests this principle because technically it is reverting to a colonial border (the old British Somaliland boundary).

In fact, years ago an AU fact-finding mission acknowledged Somaliland’s unique case, noting it was not a typical “secession” since it had been separated at independence. Yet the AU has never formally endorsed recognition, fearing a domino effect (Biafra in Nigeria, Ambazonia in Cameroon, etc., might all reignite). So AU members, including powerful ones like South Africa and Nigeria, have so far sided with Somalia’s government in international forums. It was notable that when Ethiopia attempted its port/recognition gambit, the AU quickly reaffirmed support for Somalia’s unity– a rare open statement, probably to dissuade others from breaking ranks. The Arab League similarly backs Somalia’s claim over Somaliland (Arab states reflexively avoid dividing a member state).

This means Somaliland faces an uphill battle diplomatically: some Western voices sympathize, but formal intergovernmental bodies do not.

For young Somalis, especially in Somaliland, this could be frustrating – seeing your successful democracy held back by rigid continental politics. And for youth in Somalia, it might be reassuring – knowing that the AU, Arab League, UN, etc., have your country’s back. But we should question: are these bodies defending unity for our sake or just their own precedent? Probably both. It’s a reminder that Somalis must ultimately persuade other Africans and Arabs that Somaliland’s case can be resolved without destabilizing the region. That could mean a negotiated settlement everyone accepts, rather than a unilateral recognition that ruffles multilateral feathers.

04/05/2025

Our Destiny, Not Theirs: A Somali Youth’s Plea on Foreign Influence

Part 5 - Western Powers and Big Players: Principles or Pragmatism?

Beyond our region and the Middle East, major global powers and institutions also influence the Somalia-Somaliland question. Chief among them: the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the African Union, and more recently China (with its eye on Somaliland-Taiwan relations) and a quietly interested Israel.

These actors tend to speak the language of international law, stability, and development. Publicly, almost all of them adhere to the principle of Somalia’s territorial integrity – meaning they do not officially support Somaliland’s independence. Yet behind closed doors, or in their actions, some also hedge and make unique engagements.

A. The United States: Counterterrorism First, Unity Second

For the U.S., Somalia has historically been viewed through the lenses of humanitarian concern and security threat. Images of starving Somali children in 1992 prompted a U.S.-led relief mission (which ended tragically with Black Hawk Down). Years later, the rise of Islamist militias and pirates made Somalia a “hotspot” for U.S. counterterrorism. The U.S. helped stand up the current Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in the 2010s and has been a key sponsor of the African Union forces fighting al-Shabaab. In 2013, the U.S. formally recognized the Somali government for the first time since 1991 – implicitly reaffirming support for a unified Somali republic including Somaliland.

So, on paper, America is a champion of one Somalia. U.S. officials often urge dialogue but stress that recognition of Somaliland is not on the table unless Somalia agrees. The U.S. has backed U.N. resolutions affirming Somalia’s unity and supported the African Union’s stance against redrawing boundaries. Many Somali unionists take heart in this, thinking “the superpower is on our side.”

However, U.S. policy has not been entirely one-note. In practice, Washington has developed quiet ties with Somaliland too. Why? Because Somaliland is stable, relatively democratic, and strategically located – useful for U.S. interests! American diplomats and military personnel have frequented Hargeisa in recent years. There’s no U.S. embassy (since that would imply recognition), but there is engagement. In 2020, reports emerged that U.S. military even evaluated Somaliland airfields for potential use against al-Shabaab. In 2022, the head of U.S. Africa Command made an unprecedented visit to Somaliland, meeting its leadership. Congressional staff delegations have also toured Somaliland. All this signals a growing U.S. willingness to work directly with Somaliland, treating it almost like a separate partner short of legal recognition.

Moreover, American political voices have increasingly spoken up for Somaliland. Conservative think tanks and some Republicans in Congress argue that recognizing Somaliland would reward a pro-West democracy and secure a foothold against terrorist groups and even against Chinese influence. In fact, under the Trump Administration (2017-2020), several key officials were in favor of recognizing Somaliland. They saw it as “acknowledging reality” and perhaps gaining an African ally that Taiwan (a U.S. friend) already partners with. President Trump did not go so far as to change the policy (and lost re-election), but interestingly, there were recent reports in late 2024 that if he returned to office, Trump was poised to recognize Somaliland. This was floated as part of a strategy to deepen U.S. ties in the Horn of Africa, boost democracy, and counter China.

Such a move would be revolutionary – breaking with decades of U.S. stance. But even those who advocate it warn of downsides: it could destabilize Somalia, embolden al-Shabaab (taking advantage of government infighting), anger other allies like Turkey or the African Union, and set a precedent separatist elsewhere might cite. The U.S., being a global leader, has to weigh those consequences carefully. For now, the official line remains to help Somalis reconcile Somaliland’s status internally, rather than jump to recognition.

However, U.S. interests might slowly trump its hesitations. Somaliland’s location along the Gulf of Aden and near the entrance to the Red Sea is extremely valuable. Hundreds of ships pass that coast, carrying oil and goods to America’s allies. With Yemen in conflict and Iran-backed threats in the Bab al-Mandab chokepoint, the U.S. would love more eyes and facilities in the area. A stable port or airfield in Somaliland could complement the big U.S. base in Djibouti (which is currently very congested with multiple foreign forces). This is why some analysts say deepening a partnership with Somaliland “even without full recognition” could still benefit U.S. strategic goals. Indeed, cooperating with Somaliland allows the U.S. to monitor conflicts in the Horn (like in nearby Ethiopia or Sudan) and project power in the Red Sea, all while keeping an eye on al-Shabaab from another angle.

From Somaliland’s perspective, these are positive developments – they feel seen by the U.S. at last. In 2024, Somaliland held a democratic election (a new president was peacefully elected), and the U.S. Ambassador even attended the inauguration, saying “you have many friends in the international community”. Such gestures boost Somalilanders’ morale and standing. The new Somaliland president has pledged closer ties with the U.S. and also Taiwan. We can sense momentum building.

From Somalia’s unity perspective, this is worrisome. The Somali government relies on U.S. military aid to fight terrorists and build the national army. If the U.S. tilts too far toward Somaliland, Mogadishu fears losing crucial support. However, so far, the U.S. tries to balance – increasing engagement in Hargeisa while still funding and training Somalia’s forces and reaffirming official support for the federal government. It’s a delicate dance.

For Somali youth on both sides, the key point is America will do what serves American interests in the end. Right now, that interest calculation is in flux. The U.S. supports unity in principle but also hedges by befriending Somaliland’s administration – a foot in both camps. We should neither overestimate the U.S. as a savior nor assume they will always back one side. If tomorrow an independent Somaliland aligned with U.S. goals (like hosting a base or recognizing Israel perhaps), Washington might shift dramatically in its favor. Conversely, if unity is seen as more stabilizing or if Somalia offers equal strategic benefits, they’ll stick with one Somalia.

So, my fellow youth, I urge: Do not outsource our decision to Washington. American friendship is welcome, but our destiny is ours. Let’s lobby and make our cases to them, sure – but in the end, we should solve our dispute in a way that we can live with, because foreign powers will adapt to whatever outcome we produce. If we unite, we must unite on our own terms, and if we separate, let it be by our own agreement – not as a concession in someone else’s global chess move.

27/04/2025

Goaaminta Masiirka Umada inagaa leh ee Shisheeye malaha: Baaq Dhalinyaro Soomaaliyeed oo ku saabsan Faragelinta Shisheeye

Dhalinta Soomaaliyeed ee qaaliga ah, meel kasta oo aad joogtaan – Muqdisho, Hargeysa, ama meel kasta kale – waxaan idinka codsanayaa inaynu is dul taagno oo caqli fayaw ku eegno duruufaha madaw ee soomaalidu ku jirto.

Yaa Kataliya oo haya furayaasha mustaqbalkeenna?

Muddo tobanaan sano ah, Soomaaliya iyo Somaliland waxay ku jireen loollan adag oo u dhexeeya midnimo iyo kala-go’.

Somaliland, waqooyiga Soomaaliya, waxay ku dhawaaqday madaxbannaanideeda sanadkii 1991 kaddib Burburkii Dawladii Siyaad Barre.

Soomaaliya, oo ka soo kabaneysa burbur dowladeed, waxay ilaa hada ku adkeysaneysaa in dalku midaysan yahay oonay ictiraafin Dawlada Somaliland.

Arrintan dib-u-midaysiga ama kala-go’a rasmiga ah waa arrin dareen weyn leh oo u baahan caqli iyo aragti dheer in lagu xaliyo, waxay ku saabsan tahay taariikhdeenna, aqoonsigeenna, iyo himilooyinkeenna nabadeed iyo mustaqbal.

Laakiin intay Soomalidu doodeyso, waxa xusid mudan in awoodaha shisheeye faro galin qaawan ku hayaan masiirka iyo aayo katashiga Soomaalida.

Laga soo bilaabo waddamada deriska nala ah sida Itoobiya iyo Kenya, ilaa wadamada Bariga Dhexe sida Imaaraadka Carabta (UAE), Turkiga iyo Qatar, iyo sidoo kale awoodaha waaweyn ee caalamiga ah sida Maraykanka, Ingiriiska – xitaa dalal fog sida Shiinaha iyo Israa'iil – dhammaantood waxay leeyihiin dano kala duwan oo ku xiran haddii Soomaaliya sii midaysnaato ama Somaliland hesho madaxbannaani.

Waxay noo soo bandhigaan kaalmo, heshiisyo, iyo xitaa taageero militari. Waxay ka hadlaan “xasillooni,” “amniga,” iyo “horumarka.” Laakiin inta badan, mid waliba wuxuu raadinayaa dantiisa gaarka ah.

La Soco Qaybaha Dambe

Waxaan idiin qorayaa anigoo ah qof dhalinyaro Soomaaliyeed ah, oo wadaagaya ra’yigayga shakhsi ahaaneed iyo digniin qalbigeyga ka soo go’day: Aayaha dalkeenna ma aha wax lagu gorgortamo ama ciyaar loogu jiro dano shisheeye. Innaga, dhalinyarada Soomaaliya iyo Somaliland, waa inaan fahamnaa sida faragelintan shisheeye ay u qaabeyso khilaafkeenna – waana inaan annagu go’aansannaa sida aan uga jawaab celin lahayn.

Miyaan nahay shax lagu ciyaaro oo kaliya oo lagu ciyaaro miiska siyaasadda adduunka, mise waxaan noqon karnaa dad u madaxbannaan inay masiirkooda go'aamiyaan? Aan si taxadar leh u eegno kuwa ciyaartan ku jira, isla markaana aan isweydiinno su’aalo adag oo aan nafteenna ku xisaabtanno intaan waddadan ku jirno.

Qaran-Hage

20/05/2026

27/12/2025

18/05/2025

15/05/2025

04/05/2025

27/04/2025

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