Infoassa Think Tank

16/06/2026

The Constraints of Military and Economic Might in Iran
The temptation for a great power to embrace the “iron laws of the world,” as a White House senior advisor once put it, and pursue a strategy of might makes right can be seductive. Indeed, geopolitics today is increasingly defined by a more unilateral and kinetic brand of foreign policy. As I’ve written previously, the United States is now part and parcel of this trend, having concluded at least for the time being that significant elements of the rules-based system, which we created and upheld, had become more of a constraint on national power than a tool to exercise it.

But hard power is not without its constraints. It’s one thing to execute Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela and extradite a leader such as Nicolás Maduro—an operation which, while quite complex, was limited in ambition. It’s quite another to try, at arm’s length, to reshape the geography of power across an entire region. The latter experiment—Operation Epic Fury in Iran—is now playing out in real time. The results lay bare not only the limits of military force, but also the chaos that the old rules of the game (for all their faults) kept at bay.

While at times it feels we’re an audience to a reality TV show, “Deal or No Deal,” there are at least three broader ramifications of the current conflict with Iran that bear watching: the implications for freedom of navigation, the innovations of asymmetric warfare, and the implicit assumptions underlying alliances and partnerships.

Enforcing freedom of the seas in international waterways has been one of the fundamental cornerstones of international order—and a core mission of the U.S. Navy—ever since there was a concerted effort in the nineteenth century to rid the world of piracy. It’s also been a primary concern for the United States in the Middle East dating back to the tanker war in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s.

The Strait of Hormuz was open and free prior to the start of this phase of the conflict with Iran on February 28. Now, reopening it is the top issue and central sticking point in the negotiations with Iran. As Foreign Policy analyst Keith Johnson put it, “Hormuz isn’t closed anymore. But it’s not fully open, either.” Earlier this week, U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that the United States has been quietly sneaking 100 million barrels of oil through the Strait of Hormuz without being detected. “Do you know we’ve been taking out millions of barrels of oil? Nobody knows it. You know who doesn’t know about it? Iran—until right now.”

These ships are sailing “dark,” without lights or navigational “transponders,” through the Strait under the watchful eye of the U.S. Navy. As the old rules weaken, it’s ironic that the United States is now taking a page out of the playbook of China, Russia, North Korea, and even Iran, whose so-called “dark fleets” pioneered these techniques precisely to evade U.S. and UN sanctions.

Still, those clandestine strait transits, reported to be as many as fifteen oil and gas tankers per day, would pale in comparison to the pre-crisis status quo of more than fifty. Even if vessel transit volumes in the strait return to normal levels, it now appears plausible if not likely that some type of toll (or “environment fee”) will be imposed on these vessels. This could be an expensive lesson in the value of the rules-based system, particularly if it proves contagious as a source of deterrence, leverage, or finance by other countries who are blessed by geography to sit astride a strategic passage: Indonesia and the Strait of Malacca, Morocco and the Strait of Gibraltar, or maybe even England and the Strait of Dover, to name just a few.

That brings me to the second complication of this current moment: the issue of asymmetric warfare. Technological supremacy is no guarantee of military victory. The United States prosecuted a massive strike campaign against Iran, resulting in significant damage to its naval, missile, drone, and air defense capabilities—not to mention the deaths of regime leaders, including top military brass. It was by all accounts a triumph of modern air power. And yet, even in its weakened state, Iran’s deployment of relatively inexpensive drones, mines, and missiles has managed to wreak havoc on one of the world’s most critical waterways, countries throughout the Gulf, and select U.S. military assets.

But it is not just the Iranians who have been innovating on the battlefield. As in the case of the Russia-Ukraine war, the conflict with Iran has reinforced the enthusiasm for autonomous warfare, both as a way of keeping more expensive and vulnerable systems in reserve and as a means of keeping troops out of harm’s way.

Just this week, the U.S. 5th Fleet’s Task Force 59 deployed an unmanned surface vessel in combat for the first time—in this instance, to rescue two service members. This mission should rightfully be heralded as a successful demonstration of how these new sophisticated autonomous systems developed by the United States can be effectively deployed. But the incident also highlights the extent to which attritable systems fielded by less sophisticated adversaries can threaten exquisite U.S. platforms—in this case, an Apache helicopter being hit by an Iranian drone.

The third complication this conflict poses is to the United States’ sprawling network of alliances and partnerships. Prior to Operation Epic Fury, the United States stationed some forty thousand troops across at least nineteen sites throughout the Middle East. These bases flanked and in some cases encircled its adversaries in the region. They also bound the host countries to the United States, not only militarily but politically and economically. This arrangement has been critical to sustaining deterrence and U.S. influence in the region.

But it also reflected a social compact under which the United States would provide for the security of its allies and partners in exchange for bases. That compact has been tested by this conflict, as the current war revealed that these bases and alliances also make targets of the United States’ friends in the region. Six U.S. servicemembers died while stationed defending these allies when an Iranian drone struck a U.S. operations center at Kuwait’s Shuaiba port. And that is to say nothing of the damage to the allies themselves: Iranian missiles and drones struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas complex, refineries in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, fuel tanks at Kuwait’s international airport, and a desalination plant in Bahrain, along with three Amazon data centers in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, not to mention hundreds of other targets including civilian apartment blocks.

The United States’ allies in the region are less than thrilled at having become collateral damage, particularly as the security compact now appears to be less ironclad than assumed. In 2019, an incident in which Iran attacked Aramco facilities and the United States did not retaliate sent shockwaves through Saudi Arabia. More recently, the president has tended to downplay the significance of Iran’s attacks on non-U.S. assets in the Gulf, raising concerns that partnering with the United States increases the risk that they will come under attack precisely at the same time that the U.S. commitment to their security is potentially wavering.

As a result, the United States may emerge from this war facing the prospect of diminished basing rights, and of longtime allies hedging their bets—whether by inviting in other powers like Russia and China or by striking their own accommodations with Iran that ensure their security at the expense of U.S. interests and influence.

Whatever the weekend brings—deal or no deal, new strikes or a new ceasefire, a relatively open strait or a closed one—it is one thing to change the rules of the game, and quite another to win it.

16/06/2026

15/06/2026

Evaluating a US-Iran Agreement: Six Pivotal Factors for a Potential Ceasefire
The United States and Iran are reportedly close to a long-awaited agreement, but it remains to be seen whether it resolves their major differences—including nuclear and missile programs, the Strait of Hormuz, and Israel’s war with Iranian proxies.
President Donald Trump said on Thursday that the United States and Iran were nearing an agreement to settle a three-and-a-half month-long conflict that has closed the Strait of Hormuz, sent oil shocks through the world, and affected global growth projections. Neither country has shared the terms that could be included in a potential agreement, and the president said he was not “100 percent” certain they had reached a deal—but there were several indications of progress.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Friday that the two sides have “never been closer” on terms. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who has acted as a mediator between Tehran and Washington, claimed in a social media post the same afternoon that “a final, agreed upon text of the peace deal has been reached.” Neither the United States nor Iran have officially confirmed Sharif’s claim, though Trump has accused Iran of leaking aspects of the deal.

While the United States and Iran are likely to frame any agreement as beneficial to their side, an initial pact will not be the end of the negotiations. The expectation is that this deal—a memorandum of understanding (MOU)—would extend the ceasefire for at least sixty days and open the Strait of Hormuz, a choke point for nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas supply. Meanwhile, the two sides would continue to negotiate several important issues, including the future of Iran’s nuclear program.

“We have been here before only to discover the parties cannot bridge the remaining gaps,” said Steven Cook, a senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Even if they do and an MOU is announced, negotiations on the outstanding issues, especially on Iran’s nuclear program, will be long and difficult.”

While the specific terms of the deal remain contested, below are six topline items that have been central to the U.S.-Iran talks since the start of the war.

Strait of Hormuz
Many eyes are on whether or not Iran will lift its hold on the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian news agency Mehr reported that the reopening would occur within thirty days. Tehran would clear the mines and not be allowed to collect tolls, and Washington would remove its naval blockade. The official Iranian state outlet, IRNA, said that the draft terms do not include Iran relinquishing its control over the strait. “Iran makes no commitment in this text to cede the management of the strait or the restoration of conditions that existed prior to the American and Israeli military aggression,” IRNA said.

The United States and Iran issued conflicting statements about the waterway, with Iran maintaining that Hormuz was closed to all traffic yesterday and the United States claiming on Wednesday that they had been moving vessels through nonetheless.
“How the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is managed will be something to watch closely. While Iran may agree to not charge ‘tolls,’ service fees and other mechanisms have been floated,” said Elisa Ewers, a senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Getting as close as possible to status quo ante will be important for global commerce, for allies to avoid setting dangerous precedents for other waterways, and for regional partners, who will need to live with the arrangements.”

The Iranian blockade, which has been mostly in effect since the war’s outbreak in late February, has severely limited global energy supplies, sending oil prices into disarray and diminishing some countries’ power generation capacity. The price of oil dropped to its lowest point in weeks on Friday after Trump’s announcement that a deal was close.

Iran’s nuclear program
The Iranian nuclear program has been one of the most contentious issues. Its facilities were the target of major U.S.-Israeli strikes in 2025 and the Trump administration cited it as an initial reason for pursuing the current war. Iran insists that its nuclear program is peaceful, despite its history of noncompliance with the UN nuclear watchdog and its enrichment of uranium to near weapons-grade.
Since Trump formally withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear deal, on-again, off-again negotiations between Washington and Tehran on a new nuclear agreement have been unsuccessful. The United States wants to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon, which includes Iran giving up its enriched uranium and putting a moratorium on its program. The Islamic Republic has resisted these demands.

Nevertheless, the draft MOU includes pledges from both countries to further negotiate the enrichment program’s suspension and stockpile removal. Iran would, however, commit to never pursuing a nuclear weapon—a commitment it made and crossed before. Trump claimed on Thursday that Iran has already committed to these terms.

The deal on the table, according to multiple news sources, is that Iran would agree to a fifteen- or twenty-year halt on enrichment, and the dismantling of its nuclear sites, but this is deferred to the sixty-day follow-on negotiations rather than up front. “The details matter here,” Ewers said, in terms of what the inspection and verification regime will be, what dismantlement entails in the context of facilities that were targeted in June 2025’s bombings, and several other provisions.

The IRNA said that Iran would negotiate on the nuclear issue “solely within the framework of the Islamic Republic’s fundamental principles,” and wouldn’t be willing to give up enrichment—which will make a verification system critical.

“By building many small workshops containing advanced centrifuges, Tehran can challenge the prying foreigners to find them all,” Ray Takeyh, a CFR senior fellow for Middle East studies, wrote last month. “If any escape detection, the regime has a safer path to bomb production.”

Iranian proxies
The web of militant groups across the Middle East that are supported by Iran have contributed to the escalation of several conflicts in recent years, including the Israel-Hamas war that broke out after the October 7, 2023, attacks and the Iran war. The Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon have been the primary nonstate actors involved: the Houthis launched missiles at Israel on March 28, and Israel and Hezbollah were locked in conflict for several weeks in connection to Israel’s initial strikes on Iran in February.

The draft U.S.-Iran deal would stipulate that hostilities from all sides would cease, and this would include on the Israel-Hezbollah front. Iran would also agree to not fund terrorist groups—a reference to Iran’s proxies—a U.S. official told the BBC. Iran has not yet made any statements about whether they would agree to this. In the past, it has both opposed negotiation about its proxy network and supported stopping Israeli hostilities in Lebanon—which Cook said is part of Iran’s “effort to save Hezbollah and keep Lebanon from normalizing ties with Israel.”

Israel’s military, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), announced an evacuation notice for civilians in southern Lebanon on Friday, citing “Hezbollah’s violation of the ceasefire agreement.” Israel is not part of the draft MOU between the United States and Iran, but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said today that he and Trump had spoken on the matter last night and were in “complete agreement.”

Military limits
The limits that the United States would like to place on Iran’s missile program are, perhaps, among the most difficult sticking points to negotiate. Iran has cast changes to its missile program as an intractable red line. Araghchi wrote a post on his Telegram channel after talks in February that said his country’s program was “never negotiable,” calling it a “defense issue.”

Iran’s counter-proposal, as reported by Iranian state media, focuses exclusively on nuclear issues, sanctions relief, and economic compensation—making no mention of its ballistic missile program. But Israel has continued to push hard from the outside to force the issue, and the United States has maintained that any deal should address Iran’s missile capabilities to ensure regional security.
Some analysts and experts believe that this U.S. and Israeli demand has quietly diminished as negotiations have proceeded, even as U.S. intelligence sources estimate that Iran retains 70 percent of its prewar missile stockpile and roughly 70 percent of its mobile missile launchers. There are further concerns that Iran is using the current ceasefire to steadily rebuild its military base faster than expected.

Iran has also indicated that it would like to limit U.S. power in the region as part of a deal by requiring U.S. forces to withdraw from Iran’s periphery. Trump has said he “can’t imagine” accepting that demand.

Compensation and sanctions
Iran entered the war negotiations with financial grievances due to U.S. and Israeli attacks in recent months. The Islamic Republic has called for reparations, and Iranian officials have claimed $270 billion in direct and indirect war damage since February 28. While the United States has rejected the reparations framing, there is an expectation that an agreement could include financial incentives for Iran, possibly in the form of unfrozen assets and sanctions relief.

The sequencing of a potential release of funds and sanctions relief could be at issue. Iran has reportedly asserted that it should be able to gain access to about $24 billion that the United States and its allies have frozen soon after a deal is signed, while officials in Washington have typically argued that assets should remain frozen until Tehran meets certain standards and there is a final, verifiably implemented agreement. In May, top Iranian negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reportedly called for half that fund to be released at the signing of the MOU, with the other half released within sixty days.

Neither side has shown flexibility on the timeline for sanctions relief and releasing assets. Vice President JD Vance said in a social media post on Friday “that if the Islamic Republic of Iran meets its obligations, then economic benefits will flow to them and to the entire region. This deal has the potential to remake the region and lead to lasting peace.” Iran’s economic needs are great, especially if it would like to address economic concerns that led to widespread protests earlier this year and stabilize a wartime economy running at nearly 70 percent of annual inflation.

Israel’s war in Lebanon
The conflict in Lebanon has functioned as both a pressure point for Iran and a persistent complication for U.S. diplomacy with the Islamic Republic. Iran has explicitly linked Israel’s war on its neighbor to any potential ceasefire between Tehran and Washington. The Islamic Republic even briefly suspended negotiations earlier this month in response to Israeli operations in Lebanon. The Lebanese Health Ministry reported more than 3,400 killed in Lebanon since fighting escalated in early March; the toll continues to rise, and includes both civilians and combatants.

Israel has framed its Lebanon campaign as a separate and ongoing objective—one it has pursued with or without U.S. support. Netanyahu said in March that Israel was focused on “dismantling Hezbollah” as part of its wider campaign against Iran, saying the IDF had “fundamentally changed” the situation and that any Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon would be contingent on Hezbollah’s disarmament.

“Including Lebanon in this understanding between Iran and the United States, as Iran has demanded, is not ideal even if it was inevitable,” CFR’s Ewers said. “For the Israeli government, halting its fight against Hezbollah is a tall order, especially with upcoming elections and while Washington negotiates with Tehran on the thorny issues. For the Lebanese government, which is fractured itself, it underscores that [Lebanon] could not deliver fully on disarmament commitments while Hezbollah continues to shoot at Israel.”

A U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon took effect on April 16. It has been extended twice since, but both sides have repeatedly accused each other of violations. Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon and Beirut have continued, prompting a heated confrontation between Trump and Netanyahu that underscored how much the Lebanon front is complicating the broader Iran deal.

“Hopefully, the negotiation track between Israel and Lebanon continues apace, and Hezbollah abides by whatever restraints Tehran places on it in the context of the next sixty-plus days of negotiations,” Ewers added. “Still, it will take real time and political commitment—including from Washington—to continue to keep the Lebanon-Israel process progressing.”

15/06/2026

12/06/2026

Kharg Island: The Iranian Oil Lifeline Under Trump's Threat
The small island in the Persian Gulf serves as Iran’s primary oil terminal, handling roughly 90 percent of the country’s crude exports. Recently, it has become a high-value target in the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran.
Kharg Island, a small coral island in the northern Persian Gulf responsible for handling approximately 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports, has become a flash point in the United States and Israel’s widening conflict in Iran.

President Donald Trump issued a threat on June 11 that the United States intended to hit Iran “VERY HARD” later that night and seize Iran’s energy base on Kharg Island as part of that effort. “At some point in the not too distant future, we will be taking Kharg Island, and other oil infrastructure points, and assume total control of their Oil and Gas Markets,” he wrote about Iran on Truth Social. Trump called off the strikes in a later post, claiming that peace negotiations had progressed with high-level Iranian leaders and other regional powers—Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other countries.

“The Naval Blockade will remain in full force and effect until this Transaction is finalized,” he wrote in a Truth Social post. “Time and place of the signing to be announced shortly.”

The threats and the walkback that followed come after the United States and Israel exchanged strikes with Iran over the course of two days, exposing cracks in a tenuous ceasefire first negotiated in April. U.S. Central Command said it had launched a barrage of “self-defense strikes” this week, targeting military, surveillance, and radar sites. Iran’s foreign ministry said the U.S. attacks rendered the negotiated ceasefire “practically meaningless.”

The two-month truce had been on shaky ground since it was first struck, with U.S.-Iranian negotiators unable to find common ground on major sticking points like the Iranian nuclear program and the blocked Strait of Hormuz. Iran announced on June 11 that it had closed the critical waterway, but U.S. Central Command refuted this claim. Trump alleged earlier this week that the United States had secured 100 million barrels of oil by having the U.S. military covertly move ships past Iran’s chokehold.

As the clampdown on the strait has roiled energy markets, Kharg has become an even more high-profile target for the United States. The president has previously suggested that the United States could seize the island, and the U.S. military did strike the island in March and April. Trump had said at the time that he’d chosen not to “wipe out” the island’s oil infrastructure—despite his well-documented threat late in the conflict that “a whole civilization will die tonight” if Iran did not agree to U.S. terms. He later walked back this threat as well.

While the United States has ramped up its military presence in the Middle East, experts say an attack or invasion of Kharg Island could further drive up global oil prices by curbing Iran’s oil exports, provoke retaliation, and endanger the lives of U.S. military personnel who could be deployed to the island.
Where is Kharg Island?
The island is situated in the northern Persian Gulf, approximately 21 miles off the coast of Iran. Known as the “Forbidden Island” due to its role as a critical energy hub, Kharg Island measures only roughly 8 square miles—about one-third the size of Manhattan—and is heavily guarded by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, with strict limitations on who can enter.

Why is Kharg Island important?
Kharg Island has been Iran’s primary oil export hub for nearly seven decades and is considered a lifeline for the Iranian economy. It handles the majority of the country’s crude oil shipments, most of which are destined for Asia—predominantly China. The island’s deepwater, high-capacity terminals can accommodate very large crude carriers, known as supertankers, which cannot dock on much of Iran’s shallow mainland coast.

A 1984 declassified CIA document [PDF] described the island’s oil facilities as “the most vital in Iran’s oil system,” noting that “their continued operation is essential to Iran’s economic well-being.” On March 7, shortly before the U.S. attack, Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid wrote on social media that destroying the island’s oil infrastructure “will cripple Iran’s economy and topple the regime.”

As some analysts argue, if the United States were to occupy the island, it would gain leverage over the Iranian regime and could pressure it to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. military “could kill two birds with one stone: remove an economic lifeline for the regime—and perhaps lower its chances of survival—and stabilize global energy markets,” Bilal Y. Saab, associate fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, wrote for War on the Rocks.

Iran is a major oil producer, holding roughly 12 percent of global oil reserves. Despite severe international sanctions, primarily led by the United States, Iran accounted for approximately 4 percent of global oil supplies in 2023, placing it among the top ten oil producers worldwide. Analysts say the current conflict has actually driven a surge in oil revenues, likely in the “hundreds of millions of dollars,” as Iran still controls access through the Strait of Hormuz.

According to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, roughly half of Iran’s government revenue comes from oil and gas, meaning any destruction or loss of Kharg Island would deal a major blow to a critical revenue source for Iran. But the Trump administration recently eased sanctions on Iranian oil, and any disruption to Kharg Island could further reduce global supply at a time when energy markets are already experiencing a significant shock triggered by the outbreak of war.

How difficult would it be for the U.S. to occupy Kharg Island?
If Trump were to attack the island, that operation—whether by air or sea—could pose a threat to U.S. security. Kharg Island’s proximity to Iran’s mainland means it could be targeted by drones and short-range missiles; should U.S. troops be deployed to the island, they would be susceptible to Iranian attacks. Indeed, Iran’s parliamentary speaker warned that the country would “rain down fire” on U.S. forces attempting to invade the island. Iran’s mountainous coast makes it difficult for U.S. radar to pick up on any assault quickly enough to neutralize it, experts say.

It would also be a challenge for the United States to resupply troops stationed on Kharg Island, especially as the waterways near Iran, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, have become highly securitized. The nearest major U.S. military bases are in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, which are all more than 100 miles away from Kharg, leaving any ships traveling that distance vulnerable to attacks, too. Iran and its proxies could also lay land mines or strike ships in the Persian Gulf using its so-called mosquito fleet, composed of small attack craft armed with drones, missiles, and rockets.

Iran could also retaliate against oil and gas facilities in the region, further driving up prices. Several nearby sites have already suffered damage.

In terms of the legality of a potential U.S. invasion or seizure of Kharg Island, international law allows attacks on civilian infrastructure only if the military edge gained outweighs the civilian harm done. There are at least eight thousand civilians living on the island, which could raise the legal stakes of a potential invasion or occupation.

Are there other strategic targets around the Strait of Hormuz?
Several other islands in the area could be targets in the war. Nearby Kharg Island is Qeshm, the largest island in the Persian Gulf where Iran is suspected to house underground missile and drone sites. It is also home to desalination plants that serve as a crucial water source for water-stressed Iran.

Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb are a trio of islands right off the Strait of Hormuz; they are all occupied by Iran but are claimed by both Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Larak Island, too, sits just offshore from the critical Bandar Abbas port, a point through which Iran currently has all tanker vessels pass for checks. Together, this constellation of islands off Iran’s coast gives the United States multiple potential targets to disrupt the shipment of Iranian oil.

A maritime blockade against ships carting Iranian oil out of the Gulf—further from the coast—could be another alternative and, perhaps, safer option if it is out of reach of many of Iran’s weapons.

11/06/2026

John F. Kennedy’s “Strategy of Peace” Speech and the Push to Limit Nuclear Weapons
A 1963 commencement address at American University helped usher in the era of nuclear arms control.
Commencement addresses have figured prominently in U.S. foreign policy. Whether it was Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940 ending the pretense that the United States would remain rigidly neutral in World War II in a speech at the University of Virginia, or George W. Bush warning Americans in 2002 of the growing need for preemptive (actually, preventive) action abroad in an address at West Point, major foreign policy turning points are sometimes announced on college campuses.

So which of the many foreign-policy themed commencement addresses was the most significant? My money is on Secretary of State George C. Marshall’s 1947 address to Harvard’s graduating class—it unveiled the Marshall Plan. But others might give the nod to a commencement address given sixteen years later: John F. Kennedy’s “A Strategy of Peace” speech on June 10, 1963, to the graduating class of American University. It helped usher in the era of nuclear arms control.

A New Vision

Kennedy’s address to American University’s graduates did not offer any memorable lines, certainly nothing that could compete with “ask not what your country can do for you” rhetoric of his inaugural address. The speech was instead significant because it asked Americans to rethink U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and to support finding ways for the two countries to co-exist peacefully.

That was a bold position to take in 1963. The crushing of liberty in Eastern Europe after World War II, the communist victory in China in 1949, North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 boast that “We will bury you!,” and his subsequent bid to base nuclear weapons in Cuba were just a few of the events that had convinced most Americans that they faced an implacable foe in the Soviet Union.

Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev and President John F. Kennedy in Vienna, Austria, June 3, 1961. U.S. Department of State and John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
Indeed, just two years before speaking to American University’s graduates, Kennedy had told the nation:

Each day we draw nearer the hour of maximum danger, as weapons spread and hostile forces grow stronger ... the tide of events has been running out and time has not been our friend.

Now he was making the case that United States needed to rethink its approach to a dangerous world.

At the Brink

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis explains the change in JFK’s thinking. Having survived a nuclear showdown, his fears of Soviet military superiority had given way worries about the risk of nuclear war, a risk that would grow as nuclear weapons spread. In March 1963, he told reporters:

I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, fifteen or twenty … I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world in which fifteen or twenty nations have these weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger.

In late May, JFK decided to give a speech on the U.S.-Soviet relations and the nuclear threat. He had been considering the idea for a while; a letter from author and peace activist Norman Cousins urging him to give a speech that would “create a whole new context for the pursuit of peace” helped persuade him to move ahead.

The mushroom cloud produced by a U.S. nuclear test detonation on Kiritimati Island in the Pacific Ocean, 1962. Department of Defense Atomic Support Agency
Kennedy tasked his gifted speechwriter Ted Sorensen to write remarks that would both lay out a vision of how the United States could live in peace with its major adversary and help reinvigorate the foundering eight-year effort to negotiate a nuclear test-ban treaty. Kennedy and Sorensen kept the Pentagon and the State Department in the dark about the speech’s content until the last moment, lest they attempt to scuttle it.

As Sorensen worked on the speech, which drew on a draft that Cousins had prepared, White House officials scrambled to find an appropriate venue. They approached American University to gauge its interest. The university had already scheduled Pauline Frederick, a journalist and American University graduate, to be its commencement speaker. But a presidential address is hard to pass up. Ms. Frederick graciously stepped aside.

A Short Trip for a Big Message

Kennedy traveled the four miles from the White House to American University’s campus by helicopter. When he spoke to the graduates, their families, and friends, he did not gloss over the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. But he asked his audience to focus on the common danger facing both countries:

Today, should total war ever break out again—no matter how—our two countries will be the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first twenty-four hours. And even in the cold war—which brings burdens and dangers to so many countries, including this nation’s closest allies—our two countries bear the heaviest burdens. For we are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could better be devoted to combat ignorance, poverty, and disease. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle with suspicion on one side breeding suspicion on the other, and new weapons begetting counter-weapons.

The speech also contained a unilateral offer to the Soviets:

I now declare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so. We will not be the first to resume. Such a declaration is no substitute for a formal binding treaty—but I hope it will help us achieve one. Nor would such a treaty be a substitute for disarmament—but I hope it will help us achieve it.

Kennedy’s speech pleased some Americans and alarmed others. (The Columbus Dispatch called it an “appeasement cue.”) But it made a decidedly positive impression on the one person JFK most hoped to reach: Khrushchev. The Soviet leader subsequently told Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman that it was “the greatest speech by any American president since Roosevelt.”

A Most Important Speech

Ten days later after Kennedy gave his address, U.S. and Soviet negotiators agreed to establish a crisis hotline between Washington and Moscow. The once moribund test-ban talks also picked up momentum. On July 25, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom agreed to the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which barred nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. The foreign ministers of all three countries formally signed the treaty in Moscow on August 5, 1963. That agreement helped open the door to the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and to what would become a decades-long effort to negotiate limits on U.S. and Soviet (later Russian) nuclear stockpiles.

President John F. Kennedy signing the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in the White House Treaty Room, October 7, 1963. White House Photo Archive and John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.
So it is easy to see why Sorensen later called Kennedy’s American University speech “the most important and the best speech he ever gave” and why Time magazine named it one of the top ten commencement speeches.