06/09/2026
PAKISTAN’S GOVERNANCE CROSSROADS: BRINGING THE STATE CLOSER TO THE PEOPLE
By Sardar Shoukat Popalzai, President - Balochistan Economic Forum
Pakistan is witnessing an unusual and potentially consequential debate about the future structure of its governance. Within a remarkably short period, two senior federal ministers have publicly questioned whether the existing system is capable of effectively governing a country of approximately 260 million people.
Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi initially described the prevailing governance system as having effectively 'collapsed' and called for a fundamental 'reset', including discussion of new administrative units. Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal subsequently went considerably further, presenting two possible directions: approximately 15 additional provinces or around 160 fully empowered district governments.
Naqvi returned to the subject on September 5. While clarifying that his earlier remarks were not directed against any particular political party, he did not withdraw the central argument. Instead, he reiterated the need for governance reform and called upon political parties to sit together and collectively determine how the system should be improved.
This is important because the debate can no longer be regarded merely as an isolated statement by one minister. When the interior minister speaks repeatedly about a governance reset and the planning minister presents specific alternatives for restructuring the state, Pakistan is entitled to ask whether these are personal observations or indications of a broader policy discussion within the government.
There is merit in their diagnosis. Pakistan unquestionably suffers from excessive centralisation, weak municipal institutions, inconsistent local governments, poor public-service delivery and an extraordinary distance between citizens and decision-makers. But there is also something unusual about senior members of a functioning federal government publicly acknowledging such fundamental weaknesses in the very governance structure they are presently responsible for administering.
Pakistan has an elected National Assembly, Senate, four provincial assemblies, federal and provincial cabinets, political parties, parliamentary committees and the Council of Common Interests. If the system has reached a stage where senior ministers believe fundamental restructuring is necessary, why has this issue not formally originated within these institutions?
Governance reform cannot become governance by announcement. A matter potentially involving the territorial and constitutional structure of Pakistan deserves Parliament, the provincial assemblies and the people at the centre of the discussion.
Ahsan Iqbal has nevertheless introduced some striking figures that deserve serious consideration. According to the minister, approximately 260 million Pakistanis are represented through only around 1,170 elected public offices. He has argued that genuine grassroots democracy requires approximately 150,000 to 200,000 public offices through an effective local-government structure.
He has also pointed towards perhaps the most important weakness in Pakistan's devolution experience. Following constitutional reforms in 2010, 17 subjects were devolved by the federation to the provinces, but comparable political, administrative and financial authority did not travel sufficiently from provincial capitals to elected local governments.
His warning 'If politicians will not do anything, the events will take over' should therefore be understood in the context of a widening gap between citizens and government.
But Iqbal's own figures produce an interesting question. Do they demonstrate that Pakistan requires another 15 provinces, or do they actually demonstrate that Pakistan has failed to establish an effective third tier of government?
If approximately 260 million people are served through around 1,170 elected public offices while 150,000 to 200,000 may be required, another dozen or more provincial assemblies cannot possibly bridge that enormous democratic deficit. District governments, municipalities and Union Councils can.
Likewise, if the principal problem after 2010 was that authority travelled from Islamabad to Quetta, Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar but largely stopped there, the failure may not principally be geographical. It is a failure of incomplete devolution.
Article 140A of the Constitution already provides the direction by requiring provinces to establish local-government systems and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to elected local representatives. Pakistan therefore possesses the constitutional foundation for bringing government much closer to its citizens.
This does not mean the concept of new provinces should be rejected without examination. Pakistan's population, cities and economic geography have changed enormously. There may be regions where smaller administrative units could genuinely improve governance. If an objective national study establishes that a new province is economically viable, administratively necessary, supported by its population and beneficial to the federation, there should be no taboo against discussing it.
But creating a province is not synonymous with decentralisation.
A new province requires another assembly, cabinet, secretariat, bureaucracy and administrative machinery. Unless authority subsequently travels downward, Pakistan could simply replace four highly centralised provincial governments with a larger number of highly centralised provincial governments.
Poor governance divided into smaller geographical units remains poor governance.
Nowhere does this debate require greater caution than Balochistan.
Balochistan cannot be viewed merely as Pakistan's geographically largest province and therefore an obvious candidate for administrative subdivision. Its political geography intersects with Baloch, Pashtun, Brahui and other communities, tribal structures, historical identities, border populations and long-standing questions concerning representation and distribution of resources.
An administrative boundary conceived in Islamabad could acquire a very different meaning on the ground. It could immediately generate questions about which population controls which territory, which community becomes a majority or minority, how NFC resources and employment quotas are distributed, and which political unit controls strategically important mineral-producing districts.
This becomes particularly sensitive because Balochistan contains Gwadar, Reko Diq, Saindak and other important mineral and energy assets and provides Pakistan's strategic territorial connection with Iran and Afghanistan.
Any territorial restructuring could therefore become intertwined with questions of mineral ownership, royalties, coastline, economic corridors and political representation.
At a time when Balochistan already confronts insurgency, political alienation, developmental disparities and disputes surrounding natural resources, an inadequately considered territorial restructuring could create new fault lines rather than repair existing ones.
This does not mean Balochistan should remain administratively frozen. Quite the opposite. Its enormous distances provide one of the strongest arguments in Pakistan for genuine decentralisation.
A resident of Gwadar, Turbat, Zhob, Chaman or Chagai should not depend excessively upon Quetta for decisions concerning everyday public services. Strong district governments could bring administration, resources and accountability substantially closer to communities without immediately disturbing sensitive provincial boundaries.
Pakistan therefore has a relatively simple option worth testing before embarking upon major territorial restructuring.
Fully implement Article 140A. Establish genuinely empowered district governments. Provide them predictable financial transfers through effective Provincial Finance Commissions. Transfer responsibility for primary healthcare, schools, water, sanitation, municipal infrastructure, local roads and significant development expenditure closer to the communities receiving those services.
If Ahsan Iqbal believes approximately 160 empowered district governments are a viable alternative, that proposition deserves a serious national pilot rather than remaining part of a speech.
Islamabad itself provides an excellent starting point. The government's proposed restructuring envisages an Islamabad Capital Territory Government and a 27-member elected ICT Assembly, including 21 directly elected members, five women on reserved seats and one minority representative. With a population of approximately 2.6 million, the capital could become Pakistan's governance laboratory.
Implement the reform carefully and measure the results: service delivery, education and healthcare outcomes, administrative costs, municipal performance, revenue generation, accountability and citizen satisfaction. Pakistan would then possess evidence rather than assumptions upon which to design wider reforms.
There should also be an independent National Commission on Governance and Devolution involving Parliament, provincial governments, constitutional experts, economists, local-government specialists and representatives of affected communities. It should examine both models - stronger districts and additional provinces - against objective criteria including administrative efficiency, economic viability, fiscal cost, public consent, demographic implications and national cohesion.
Mohsin Naqvi's September 5 call for political parties to sit together provides the correct political starting point. Such a dialogue should not begin with the predetermined objective of either creating new provinces or defending existing boundaries at all costs.
It should begin with a simpler question: what structure of government will work best for Pakistan's citizens?
The deeper governance problem may ultimately not be that Pakistan has too few provinces. It may be that too much authority is concentrated in too few places.
If 260 million citizens have access to only around 1,170 elected public offices, democracy is too distant. If 17 subjects were transferred to the provinces but meaningful authority stopped at provincial capitals, devolution remains unfinished. If increased provincial resources have failed to sufficiently improve social indicators, accountability and expenditure effectiveness must also be examined.
None of these realities should be used either to automatically justify or automatically reject new provinces.
Pakistan requires reform, and the recent interventions by Mohsin Naqvi and Ahsan Iqbal may have performed an important service by opening a discussion that has been postponed for too long.
But particularly in Balochistan, administrative efficiency must never be pursued at the cost of social cohesion, constitutional stability or national unity.
Pakistan should first take government closer to the people. Whether that eventually requires stronger districts, additional provinces, or a carefully designed combination of both should be decided through evidence, constitutional process and genuine public consensus.
The objective should neither be to protect the existing map nor to redraw it merely for the sake of change. The objective should be to build a state that works better for its citizens.....
