Philippine World War II Memorial Foundation

19/03/2026

Bataan, March 1942

As the US-Filipino and Japanese forces retreat to their respective lines, both forces looked into their situation. The Japanese realized that Bataan was not the mop-up as they hoped for while the USAFFE waited and hoped that help from the US will arrive to relieve them.

Both forces suffered more casualties from malaria (from the Anopheles mosquito specie) than actual battlefield causes. By early March both forces were down to 35% effectiveness. An example on the Japanese side is that they were down to 3,000 effective troops while 16,000 were down with malaria. Cases on both sides were running at 750 cases a day. Submarines came in and surfaced in Corregidor Island and brought some medical supplies but the quantities are not enough to sustain the daily requirements. Efforts were also made to bring atabrine and quinine tablets using light planes from Australia and Mindanao and with efforts to produce quinine from local trees. Despite these efforts they can only accommodate treatment for 10,000 patients. Around 758,000 quinine tablets were received and together with another 600,000 on stock at the medical depots, it was still far short from the required 3,000,000 tablets per month to curb malaria.

On the food and nutrition aspect, while both sides we affected by shortages, the Japanese advantage is that they can source rice and food from local sources in their occupied territories while the USAFFE were rationing food thru their dwindling stocks. While there were supply runs made from islands in the Visayas and other areas it was not enough to sustain the garrison. The Japanese also blocked the sea lanes and attacked the supply ships bringing the operation to a halt. To compensate for the food shortages, all remaining live-stocks in Bataan including the horses and 48 pack mules of the 26th Cavalry Regiment were slaughtered for their meat. The last of these animals were consumed by March 15. Fish and marine life caught by fishermen augmented the food situation. They were fishing almost 12,000 pounds of catch a day until Japanese artillery disrupted the fishing activity and stopped. Rice became substitute to wheat and every edible plant and berries in the peninsula were gathered. On the unit level, every living thing like lizards, small reptiles, birds, monkeys and other stray animals were made edible and ended up in the soldiers stomachs.

The food situation affected the defenders ability as a fighting force. Malnutrition due to lack of fats and vitamins led conditions such as Beri-Beri, skin ulcers, dysentery and even brain fogging. Poor sanitation also resulted into a series of intestinal problems. Lack of field medical supplies often caused gas gangrene and cause a number of amputations in certain cases.

On the other hand, the Japanese were being reinforced and resupplied with additional troops replacing the ranks lost in the previous fighting. Additional artillery forces arrive and ammunition were arriving in large quantities. By the end of March, the Japanese were ready to launch their final offensive in Bataan.

27/02/2026

ON THIS DAY: FEBRUARY 27, 1945

The admiral knew he had reached the end. In the three weeks since MacArthur’s forces had charged into Manila, Iwabuchi had presided over one of the most barbaric massacres of World War II. His troops had wantonly slaughtered tens of thousands of men, women, and children in some of the most cruel and horrible ways. Survival was not an option.

And he knew it.

Iwabuchi summoned his last remaining forces inside the battered Agriculture Building. He apologized for leading them to doom. “If anyone has the courage to escape, please do so,” he instructed them. “If not please take your lives here.”

The forty-nine-year-old admiral retreated to his quarters on the main floor in the northwest side of the building. Armed with a knife, Iwabuchi slit open his belly.

Japanese marines attempted to escape under the cover of darkness, only to fall prey to American guns; seventy-five were killed on the night of February 27. Seven managed to slip through the lines and tried to swim out to a sunken ship but were also killed. Artillery meanwhile continued to hammer the Agriculture Building, including a three-hour barrage that began at eight a.m. on February 28. “After the number of rounds fired into this building during the past few days, it did not seem possible that any soul could be living in such a mass of rubble and twisted steel,” noted the Fifth Cavalry’s report. “The entire northeast corner had been blown away leaving a gaping hole.”

Troops firing bazookas and flamethrowers finally cleared it out on March 1, leaving only a few underground bunkers. American patience, however, was over. “A last minute appeal to surrender was made,” logged the cavalry’s report. “After waiting a few minutes without an answer, drums of gas and oil were poured into the opening and set afire. This last opening was then blown shut with satchel charges.”

Iwabuchi's remain would never be found.

RAMPAGE
MacArthur, Yamash*ta and The Battle of Manila
by James M. Scott

16/02/2026

25/01/2026

THE BIG GUNS ROAR INTO ACTION
The Japanese landed at a number of points on the western coast of Bataan from January 22 to Feb 3 in an attempt to outflank and disrupt the rear of the USAFFE positions. One such landing was made at Longoskawayan Point by about 300 Japanese troops on Jan 22-23, 1942 advanced to the slopes of Mt. Pucot. After a fight with the defenders composed of a motley crew of US Navy servicemen fighting as infantry, constabulary troops and other service troops, they were able to drive the enemy back to Longoskawayan Point where the Japanese entrenched themselves. Major-General Edward P. King, then the Artillery Officer of the USAFEE, made a request to Major-General George Moore of the Harbor Defense Command for heavy fire support. Moore ordered gave Colonel Paul D. Bunker, the Seaward Defense Commander the authority to fire his heavy guns and Battery Geary with eight (8) 12-inch seacoast mortars and Battery Greer with a single 14-inch disappearing gun were selected for the mission.

At 12:36am on January 26, Battery Geary fired 12 rounds using 700lb high explosive shells with instantaneous fuses and Battery Geer fired 16 rounds using 1.560lb shells modified for land targets against the Japanese at Longoskawayan Point. This marked the first time that major caliber seacoast guns were fired against an enemy target since the US Civil War. On the morning of the 27th of January, Battery Geary and this time with Battery Hearn fired a combined 24 rounds of high explosive shell with delayed fuses against the Japanese to root out those hiding in the caves at Longoskawayan Point. The result of the shooting was deemed effective as one Japanese prisoner mentioned: “We were terrified. We could not know where the big shells or bombs were coming from; they seemed to be falling from the sky. Before I was wounded, my head was going round and round, and I did not know what to do. Some of my companions jumped off the cliff to escape the terrible fire.”

10/01/2026

PhilWar advisory board member and battlefield explorer Tony Feredo shares with us some insights on the Japanese infantry movements at Mt. Natib and Mt. Silangan during the first phase of the Bataan Campaign.

https://shellwings.wordpress.com/2025/12/03/the-japanese-infantry-movements-at-mt-natib-and-mt-silangan-during-the-bataan-campaign-january-9-to-25-1942/

09/01/2026

ON THIS DAY: JANUARY 10, 1942

General MacArthur visits Bataan

6:45 A.M. on January 10, 1942, the General, Sutherland, Huff, and an antiaircraft officer crossed to Mariveles in one of Bulkeley’s PT boats. A dusty Ford sedan took them on a tour of foxholes and field hospitals. Buoyant and genial, MacArthur assured everyone that “help is definitely on the way. We must hold out until it comes.” One young captain inquired about his savings account in Manila’s Philippine Trust Company, and MacArthur replied that he would be seeing both the bank and his money soon. He asked Wainwright about his artillery and was told that two 155-millimeter fieldpieces were nearby, awaiting inspection. The General said jovially, “Jonathan, I don’t want to see them. I want to hear them!” Back on Corregidor he told Quezon that there was “no reason for immediate worry,” that morale was actually “high,” and that he was confident he could keep Homma at bay “for several months without outside help.”

AMERICAN CAESAR: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964
by William Manchester

08/01/2026

ON THIS DAY: JANUARY 09, 1945: LINGAYEN INVASION

S-DAY (9 January 1945)

OPERATIONS OF I COPRS

I Corps commenced landing operations at H-Hour, O93OI, on 9 January 1945 in the Mangaldan - San Fabian - Mabilao area of Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, following a naval bombardment previously unequalled in southwest Pacific warfare. The 6th Division on the right landed on beaches in the Mangaldan area. The 43d Division on the left landed on beaches in the San Fabian - Mabilao area. There was no enemy opposition on the beaches. The force of naval air and gunfire preparations had apparently caused any enemy forces occupying beach defenses in the area to withdraw.

The 6th Division landed with two RCT's abreast, the 20th Infantry RCT on the right, the 1st Infantry RCT on the left. Advancing rapidly inland without meeting enemy opposition, the division seized and secured the Dagupan. River crossing at Dagupan and occupied Dagupan and Mangaldan. By dusk on 9 January 1945, the division had secured a beachhead approximately 6000 yards in depth and 8000 yards in width extending generally in an arc from Dagupan to Mangaldan, Advance reconnaissance elements had reached Calasiao and Buenlag, each approximately 9000 yards inland, without enemy contact.). Major General Edwin D. Patrick, Commanding General, 6th Division, assumed command of his forces on ashore at 1530I on 9 January 1945.

The 43d Division landed with two RCT's abreast, the 103d Infantry RCT on the right, the 172d Infantry RCT on the left. There was no enemy opposition to the initial landing. Early in the afternoon, enemy artillery fire ranging in caliber from 75mm to 30 cm, which began falling on the landing beaches, hampered unloading and necessitated the retraction of some landing craft. The division encountered no opposition to its immediate front and advanced inland rapidly. The 172d Infantry, on the division left flank, sent one battalion north along the coastal highway toward Rabon. The only enemy resistance encountered during the day was in the sector of this battalion which was held up by heavy enemy fire at a point on the coast approximately 1500 yards north northeast of Mabilao. By the close of the day the division had occupied a beachhead 8000 yards in depth and 8000 yards in width extending in an arc from Mangaldan, where it had contact with elements of the 6th Division on its right, through San Jacinto and Binday to a point on the coast approximately 1500 yards north northeast of Mabilao. Major General Leonard F. Wing, Commanding General, 43d Division, assumed command of his forces ashore at 14301 on 9 January 1945.

OPERATIONS OF XIV CORPS

Following a preparatory naval air and surface bombardment equal in intensity to that delivered in support of I Corps, XIV Corps landed at H-Hour, O93OI, on 9 January 1945, on beaches in the Lingayen - Binmaley area, Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, with two divisions abreast, the 40th Division on the right landing on beaches in the Lingayen area, the 37th Division on the left landing on beaches in the Binmaley area. There was no enemy opposition on the beaches. Pre-S-Day estimates that there were no enemy defensive positions in this area were confirmed. The force of the naval air and gunfire bombardment apparently caused any Japanese who might have been in this area to withdraw.

The 40th Division landed at O93OI, 9 January 1945. with two RCT's abreast, the 185th Infantry RCT on the right, the l60th Infantry HCT on the left. The division advanced inland unopposed, seized Lingayen Airfield (found to be over 5000 ft long and in excellent condition, though requiring filling of a few shell holes to make it serviceable), seized and secured Lingayen Town and crossed the Basina River just south of Lingayen. Elements advancing west along the coast reached Samat while other elements reached a point 5000 yards west of Estanza, sending reconnaissance elements across the Agno River at a point approximately 3000 yards south of Estanza, By the end of the day, the division had secured a beachhead 6000 yards deep and approximately 9000 yards wide. Major General Rapp Brush, Commanding General, 40th Division, assumed control of his forces ashore at I615I, 9 January 1945

The 37th Division landed with two RCT's abreast, the 145th Infantry RCT on the right, the 129th Infantry RCT on the left. There was no enemy opposition as the division pushed inland and secured Binmaley. The division secured a crossing of the Calmay River at a point approximately 2500 yards southeast of Binmaley and a crossing over the Dagupan River at Gayaman. By the close of the day, the division had established a beachhead 6000 yards deep and 5000 yards wide. (Major General Robert S. Beightler, Commanding General, 37th Division, assumed command of his forces ashore at 1445I 9 January 1945.

SIXTH UNITED STATES ARMY
Report of the LUZON CAMPAIGN
9 January 1945 – 30 June 1945
Volume 1

06/01/2026

ON THIS DAY: JANUARY 07, 1945

Thomas B. McGuire, Jr. CO of the 431st FS, 475th FG, USAAF Jr. lost his life on January 7, 1945 after his flight of four P-38 Lightnings engaged two Japanese fighter planes over Fabrica and Manapla (Carolina) Airfields in Northern Negros Island. McGuire was the 2nd highest US fighter ace of WWII with 38 aerial victories. At the time of his death, he was only 24 years old and was posthumously awarded the Medal Of Honor.

06/01/2026

ON THIS DAY: JANUARY 06, 1942

Delaying Action at Layac, Bataan

USAFFE considered it of the utmost importance to delay the Japanese and give the Fil-American forces more time to entrench along the main battle position. South of the Layac covering force, I and II Philippine corps were working along the main battle position trying to settle units into place and prepare for the Japanese. General Clyde A. Selleck, commander of the 71st Division, received actual responsibility for establishing the Layac Line. He was given four (4) regiments, the 31st Infantry (US), 26th Cavalry (PS) and two Philippine Army Regiments (71st and 72nd) from Selleck’s own 71st Division (PA). Selleck's divisional artillery consisted of two two-gun 75mm batteries and one four-gun 2.95-inch pack howitzer battery, a total of eight guns in his 71st Artillery. The artillery staff, battery commanders, and battalion commanders were all Filipino-the only Americans were the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Halstead C. Fowler, and three assistants. The Scout 1st Battalion, 23rd Artillery was in direct support of the 31st Infantry with two batteries of 75mm's. In general support of Selleck's line were two batteries from the Scout 1st Battalion, 88th Artillery armed with 75mm guns. At the rear is the Provisional Tank group and supported by halftracks with mounted 75mm guns.

At 10:00hrs on the 6th of January, the Japanese “Imai Detachment” named after Colonel IMAI, Hifumi was coming down to Layac from San Fernando via Route 7 These soldiers were built around the 1st Formosa Infantry Regiment, a company of the 7th Tank Regiment, two battalions of 75mm guns from the 48th Mountain Artillery, and eight big 150mm howitzers from the 1st Field Artillery Regiment. As the Japanese came closer at around 10:30 hours, two batteries of 75mm guns, portee, from Lieutenant Colonel Hanford N. Lockwood's 23rd Artillery, opened the action and were followed by eight 75mm guns of the 88th Artillery. The first rounds impacted squarely on the road, an admirable reflection of Scout training. The guns immediately changed to rapid volley fire and walked bursting projectiles up and down the road, scattering several Japanese horse-drawn mountain guns with attendant animals, caissons, and gear. This was the first time the Japanese had experienced the effects of Scout artillery, and they were obviously unprepared for it.

Japanese artillery not caught in the initial rain of shells hustled forward and quickly rolled into action. Drivers angled off roads, bounced over small earthen dikes, and swung onto hard, flat rice paddies. Gunners unhitched their cannon, observers climbed trees, and crewmen laid their guns. When they fired their first rounds to determine the range, they hit the bivouac of the 26th Cavalry, killing eight horses and wounding three Scouts. Japanese 75mm and 150mm shells, directed and corrected by aerial spotters, who dropped as low as 2,000 feet in their search for targets, began to fall near the defending artillery .Little escaped their attention, and Japanese artillery grew more and more accurate. Because the Model-4 150mm howitzers firing 10,500 yards ,outranged the smaller Filipino 75mm's, they were untouched by Filipino counterbattery fire. II Corps' failure to place any 155mm's near Layac for counterbattery proved to be the most significant mistake made by American artillery in the entire campaign.

Japanese artillery now pounded the areas of the American 31st Infantry Regiment and the Filipino 72nd Infantry Regiments and despite the accurate fire casualties were light. The Japanese that also took heavy fire from the USAFFE organized and were beginning to put infantry across the C**o River at 14:00hrs. Advancing cautiously, Japanese patrols reached the areas between the Filipino 72nd and American 31st Infantries by 16:00hrs. Small arms fire from both sides exchanged and a company of US infantry fell back which the Japanese tried to exploit but were pushed back after an American counter attacked restored the line.

Japanese planes bombed Hermosa , set the town on fire and hit an ammunition dump, and cut communications lines and debris blocked parts of the east road leading south. By this time most of General Selleck’s guns are out of action and if in case of a Japanese breakthrough they Layac Force will be cut-off. Selleck’s mission was to defend the Layac line until it was forced to withdraw. It was not to fight a pitched battle with the enemy but just to delay them as long as possible. By 20:00hrs, Colonel Steel of the US 31st Infantry stressed the need to withdraw and not wait until the following day as the Japanese artillery and planes could bring disaster to Filipino and American forces. Selleck sought permission form USAFFE HQ and was reluctantly granted. At 22:00hrs the Layac delaying force began their withdrawal.

For further reading:
Bataan Our Last Ditch by John W. Whitman
The Fall of the Philippines by Louis Morton

01/01/2026

THIS WEEK ON JANUARY 1945

JANUARY 2 – 6

With the planned invasion of the island of Luzon, the US and allied attack forces began their rendezvous at Leyte Gulf. The first portion of the Luzon Attack Force to leave consisted of the minesweeping and Hydrographic Group (Task Group 77.6) together with a few oilers, ammunition ships, tugs, LCI(G)'s (Landing Craft, Infantry, Gunboats), and screening vessels, all departing about noon on 2 January. Later that day the bombardment and fire support vessels, Task Group 77.2, accompanied by twelve CVE's and escorts from Task Group 77,4, moved out of the gulf. Command of these van echelons was vested in Vice Adm. Jesse B. Oldendorf, who was also the commander of Task Group 77.2.

On January 4, General Douglas MacArthur and his staff boarded the Light Cruiser USS Boise as Task Unit 77.1.2. Admiral Kinkaid and General Krueger went aboard the command ship Wasatch, which, with another two destroyers, formed Task Unit 77.1.1.

During the night of 4-5 January another large element of the Luzon Attack Force moved out of Leyte Gulf into Surigao Strait. In the lead was Task Group 77.3, a close covering group consisting of three light cruisers and six destroyers, accompanied by Task Unit 77.1.2, General MacArthur aboard.

Next came the entire VII Amphibious Force-I Corps convoy with two CVE's providing cover, followed by the III Amphibious Force-XIV Corps LST-LSM groupment. The whole formed a single-convoy over forty miles long. The main body of the III Amphibious Force-XIV Corps convoy left Leyte Gulf on the morning of 6 January, and, making more knots than the preceding elements, soon began to close the distance.

For further reading:

Triumph in the Philippines
by Robert Ross Smith
Center for Military History Publication 5-0-1
United State Army in World War Two (1963)

01/01/2026

ON THIS DAY: JANUARY 2, 1942

THE JAPANESE ENTER MANILA

Friday, January 2, 1942. At 17:45hrs Japanese forces enter Manila from the north and southern approaches. Major-General ABE, Koichi, the IJA 48th Division Infantry Group Commander led a force composed of one battalion from the 1st Formosa Regiment and two battalions from the 47th Infantry Regiment from the north. From the south came one battalion from the 20th Infantry Regiment and the 16th Reconnaissance Regt with tankettes all coming from the IJA 16th Division. They were accompanied by released Japanese civilians who also acted as interpreters. All American and British civilians were ordered to remain in their homes until they can be registered and investigated while the only Caucasians allowed to walk the streets of Manila were Germans, Italians and Spaniards. In the evening, evening Japanese troops occupied key government infrastructures including the National Treasury. Some Japanese officers and enlisted men started taking over private establishment to use them as their quarters.