15/10/2025
[COMMENTARY] China’s Strategic Push for the Duterte Candidacy in 2028
I’ve been following the growing tension between Manila and Beijing for years, and lately, something about it feels more deliberate.
The signs point to a quiet but well-coordinated effort from China to influence the 2028 presidential race — specifically in favor of Vice President Sara Duterte.
It’s not paranoia. It’s documented.
From money trails to disinformation networks, the pieces form a picture that looks less like random interference and more like a calculated attempt to bring back the China-friendly environment that existed during her father’s time.
🟥 Documented Financial and Operational Support
I remember watching the Senate hearings last April when Senator Francis Tolentino dropped what looked like the most direct evidence yet of Chinese involvement.
He presented documents linking the Chinese Embassy in Manila to a local marketing firm called InfinitUs Marketing Solutions Inc.
The payment was specific — PHP 930,000 — for the creation and management of troll farms meant to shape Filipino opinion online.
Those troll farms were made up of 330 Facebook accounts and 30 X accounts (what used to be Twitter), all run by 11 operators pretending to be ordinary citizens.
Their goal was simple: push pro-China and pro-Duterte content while attacking President Marcos and his administration.
The timing matched the controversies surrounding the Philippine Maritime Zones Law, passed in November 2024.
Fake posts compared Marcos to his father, calling him another dictator, while defending China’s presence in the West Philippine Sea.
I checked the data from that hearing — over 53,000 real users had interacted with these accounts.
That’s not a small number. It’s proof of reach, and more importantly, influence.
Security analysts like Chester Cabalza later said what many of us already suspected: Chinese operatives are betting on who will be our next president.
They’re ready to spend campaign money to get their preferred outcome.
Intelligence reports describe a “vast network” of agents operating across the country — from Batanes to Sulu — some of them fluent in Filipino and integrated within local Chinese communities.
It’s not the kind of infiltration you’d easily spot unless you’re already looking for it.
🟥 Strategic Positioning and Policy Convergence
China’s support for Sara Duterte doesn’t come from nowhere.
It’s built on her own public stance on foreign affairs.
I remember her remarks in June 2025, criticizing the deployment of U.S. Typhon missile systems in the Philippines.
She said it violated our “independent foreign policy,” and insisted we should “stay in the middle” between the U.S. and China.
That sounded almost identical to her father’s diplomatic balancing act.
Her position on the South China Sea is the same story.
She acknowledges the 2016 arbitral ruling that favored the Philippines, but often says it shouldn’t define our entire relationship with China.
She prefers diplomacy over confrontation.
Beijing, of course, prefers that too — bilateral talks, no international rulings involved.
What’s most telling to me is her silence.
She rarely speaks about Chinese harassment in our waters, but she’s quick to criticize the current administration’s foreign policy.
Even lawmakers have noticed that her public statements often align with Beijing’s tone.
It’s a pattern — selective criticism that spares China while going after local policies seen as pro-U.S.
🟥 Espionage and Intelligence Operations
Then there’s the espionage side of it.
Over the past year, several Chinese nationals were caught conducting surveillance on Philippine military installations.
Five of them were arrested using drones to take aerial footage of naval and coast guard assets in Palawan, especially near Ulugan Bay where the Western Command operates.
They had tracking software, photos, and coordinates of sensitive areas like Subic’s naval base in Zambales.
It didn’t stop there.
Another Chinese national, Tak Hoi Lao, was arrested near the Commission on Elections office in Manila carrying an IMSI catcher — a device that can intercept mobile phone signals.
That was just weeks before the 2025 midterms.
Authorities couldn’t ignore the timing.
Other arrests involved Chinese operatives using LiDAR mapping tools near military zones, including sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement where U.S. troops are based.
These aren’t harmless gadgets. They’re used to gather terrain data and monitor movement — useful information if you’re planning influence or defense strategies.
🟥 Information Warfare and Narrative Shaping
If the espionage angle feels like something out of a spy film, the information warfare part feels far more familiar — because we see it every day online.
Reuters once traced how the Chinese Embassy in Manila hired local firms to run fake social media pages.
These weren’t random trolls.
They were well-funded operations promoting China’s image while undermining the Philippines’ alliance with the U.S. and mocking Western vaccines during the pandemic.
One propaganda outlet stood out: “Ni Hao Manila.”
It posed as a Filipino-run media page but was filled with pro-China videos — military showcases, criticisms of U.S. defense deals, and glowing commentaries about “Asian friendship.”
What caught my attention was how unnatural the engagement looked. Hundreds of likes, barely any real comments.
Artificial amplification at work.
Later, analysis from tech firms confirmed that roughly one-third of pro-Duterte accounts on X were fake.
Many pushed both pro-China and anti-Marcos content — a hybrid strategy that fed off the Duterte-Marcos feud.
Divide the base, influence the voters. It’s clever, if not dangerous.
🟥 Economic Leverage and Historical Precedent
I’ve always said that China’s playbook in the Philippines isn’t just political — it’s economic.
During Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency, China promised $24 billion in loans and infrastructure investments, much of it tied to the Belt and Road Initiative.
Not all projects were completed, but they built relationships that mattered.
There was even that revelation from Duterte himself: Xi Jinping had offered him a 60% stake in joint oil and gas exploration deals if he’d ignore the 2016 arbitral ruling.
That’s how Beijing works — money in exchange for silence or policy leniency.
Projects like the Kaliwa Dam and the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project were touted as development wins but also served to reinforce local political ties.
Those projects had political weight, not just economic value.
It’s the same formula China could reuse for Sara Duterte’s campaign — tie development to loyalty.
🟥 Intelligence Community Assessments
What worries me most is that even our intelligence agencies have started saying the quiet part out loud.
In April 2025, National Security Council officials confirmed that Chinese state-sponsored information operations were already active in the country and interfering with our elections.
Investigators traced at least ten Filipino influencers, some based here and others studying in China, who were amplifying Beijing-friendly content.
And with troll farms now using AI tools, a handful of people can simulate massive online movements.
It’s a digital army that never sleeps.
Former Senator Panfilo Lacson, once a police intelligence chief, called it a “whole network of espionage operations” — including sleeper agents and even members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army embedded in civilian life.
It’s infiltration with a purpose, meant to shape the outcome of the 2028 elections.
🟥 Strategic Implications and Future Projections
Beijing’s backing of Sara Duterte signals a plan to realign the Philippines’ foreign policy with its own interests.
If she wins, we could see a major change in direction — starting with the South China Sea issue.
Expect softer policies, maybe even the revival of joint exploration talks that put Chinese interests ahead of our maritime claims.
Then there’s the matter of defense.
The U.S.-Philippine alliance could weaken, especially if a Duterte-led administration limits access to bases or slows down EDCA projects.
It wouldn’t be a full break, but it would change the balance of power in the region.
Economically, the country could tilt back toward China’s Belt and Road framework, reviving projects that were suspended under Marcos.
Infrastructure money, joint ventures, “friendship” loans — all of it returning under the familiar promise of cooperation.
When I piece everything together, it’s clear that Beijing sees the 2028 elections as a pivot point.
Financial, informational, and operational investments are already in motion.
The question is whether we’ve learned anything from the last time this happened.
The outcome will depend on more than just politics.
It will depend on how aware Filipinos become of this interference, how the government counters it, and whether Sara Duterte can hold her ground despite her ongoing impeachment and her father’s ICC troubles.
The coming election will reveal something deeper—how fragile our democracy has become under foreign influence, especially if it falls under the hands of a low-quality politician like Sara Duterte.
🟥 SOURCES:
1. Reuters – How China waged an infowar against U.S. interests in the Philippines
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-china-waged-an-infowar-against-us-interests-philippines-2025-10-06/
2. Senate inquiry brings up China-funded 'troll farm' - Global News
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/274275/senate-inquiry-brings-up-china-funded-troll-farm
3. Manila Times – Inside the troll farm: China's secret campaign to sway Philippine opinion and undermine Marcos
https://www.manilatimes.net/2025/10/08/news/national/inside-the-troll-farm-chinas-secret-campaign-to-sway-philippine-opinion-and-undermine-marcos/2196262
4. ABS-CBN – Chinese spies to pour campaign funds during 2028 presidential elections
https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/nation/2025/8/28/chinese-spies-to-pour-campaign-funds-during-2028-presidential-elections-analyst-1412
5. Manila Standard – Chinese spies trying to influence 2028 presidential polls
https://manilastandard.net/news/politics/314635536/chinese-spies-trying-to-influence-2028-presidential-polls-analyst.html
6. Philippine News Agency – Chinese-funded trolls, other espionage threats bared in Senate hearing
https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1248654
7. Foreign Policy – The Philippines Is a Petri Dish for Chinese Disinformation
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/07/14/china-philippines-disinformation-elections/
8. South China Morning Post – Will Sara Duterte revive her dad's softer China stance if she wins 2028 Philippines vote
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3314363/will-sara-duterte-revive-her-dads-softer-china-stance-if-she-wins-2028-philippines-vote
9. Philippine Star – Not 'pro-China'? House leaders say VP Sara's silence on West Philippine Sea tells different story
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2025/06/26/2453501/not-pro-china-house-leaders-say-vp-saras-silence-west-philippine-sea-tells-different-story
10. Global Nation Inquirer – Palace on Sara Duterte's remarks: 'Expected from a pro-China'
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/282096/palace-on-sara-dutertes-foreign-policy-remarks-expected-from-a-pro-china
11. ABS-CBN – Sara Duterte acknowledges arbitral win vs China, says PH must be friend to all
https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/nation/2025/6/23/sara-duterte-acknowledges-arbitral-win-vs-china-says-ph-must-be-friend-to-all-1243
12. Crisis Group – Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines' Military Modernisation Effort
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia-pacific/south-east-asia/philippines-china-united-states/349-riding-unruly-waves-philippines-military-modernisation-effort
13. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism – Espionage Trials: Beijing’s Suspected Spies in the Philippines
https://pcij.org/2025/10/05/espionage-trials-beijing-china-suspected-spies-philippines/
14. Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania – China’s Disinformation Narratives in the Philippines
https://perryworldhouse.upenn.edu/news-and-insight/chinas-disinformation-narratives-in-the-philippines/
15. Foreign Policy – The Philippines May Turn Its Back on the U.S. Again
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/07/09/philippines-sara-duterte-china-election-us-alliance/
16. Security expert warns vs. Chinese sleeper agents, campaign funding
https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/957488/security-expert-cabalza-china-sleeper-agents-2028-elections/story/
17. Modern Diplomacy – China’s Covert Infowar in the Philippines: How Beijing Weaponized Social Media Against U.S. Interests
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/10/06/chinas-covert-infowar-in-the-philippines-how-beijing-weaponized-social-media-against-u-s-interests/
18. Senate Bill S. No. 862 – Philippine Senate
https://web.senate.gov.ph/lisdata/4743143435!.pdf
