08/04/2026
GENERAL KING DECIDED TO SURRENDER JUST BEFORE
MIDNIGHT ON APRIL 8.
His conference at 2300 hours confirmed his views on the situation. He had a choice of launching a counterattack as ordered by Wainwright and seeing his men slaughtered, or he could, against orders, surrender. At 0600 hours Wainwright learned of King's decision when Lieutenant Colonel)esse T. Traywick, assistant operations officer on Corregidor, told him that King had sent an officer to the Japanese to arrange for cessation of hostilities. Wainwright could not recall any conversation with King that might have led King to believe he had authority or permission to surrender. Nor had King mentioned the possibility to Wainwright. Shocked by the news, Wainwright told Traywick, "Go back and tell him not to do it."1 But it was too late. Nor would receipt of such an order have changed King's mind. Wainwright courageously fulfilled his orders by refusing Luzon Force permission to surrender. Equally courageously, King disobeyed. Wainwright radioed the bad news to MacArthur.
โAt 6 o'clock this morning General King commanding Luzon Force without my knowledge or approval sent a flag of truce to Japanese commander. The minute I heard of it I disapproved of his action and directed that there would be no surrender. I was informed it was too late to make any change, that the action had already been taken. Enemy on east had enveloped both flanks of the small groups of what was left of the Second Corps and was firing with artillery into the hospital area which undoubtedly prompted King's action. In order to relieve the pressure on the right, last night I ordered the First Corps to attack to the north with its ultimate objective Olongapo but the attack did not get off. Physical exhaustion and sickness due to a long period of insufficient food is the real cause of this terrible disaster. When I get word what terms have been arranged I will advise you. Fearing just what happened, I endeavored last night to withdraw some of the Philippine Division and other regular units but only succeeded in getting out some scattered mixture of individuals. I will endeavor to hold Corregidor.โ
At King's headquarters Colonel Everett C. Williams and Major Marshall H. Hurt, King's chief of artillery and assistant operations officer, both bachelors, volunteered to make first contact with the Japanese. King gave Colonel Williams a piece of paper requesting a meeting with the Japanese officer commanding the Bataan army and gave Williams authority to negotiate if the Japanese declined to see King. Williams and Hurt decided to leave while it was still dark and arrive at the front lines at daybreak when destruction of equipment would be nearing completion. They started forward at 0330 hours in a Tank Group reconnaissance car with a motorcycle es**rt. But because of the jammed roads, they abandoned the car and split up. Colonel Williams climbed onto the back of a motorcycle. Major Hurt continued forward on foot. Williams and Hurt soon rejoined and acquired a jeep and driver in which they continued their journey. The trio then reached the Lamao river and met an American delay force with a few tanks and two self-propelled 75mm guns. Curious artillerymen watched the jeep approach. Colonel Williams told the artillerymen why he was there. At 0530 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Ganahl's delay force rumbled south, an hour and a half before the first Japanese reached the river. When the sky brightened, the three men drove north into Japanese territory.
Without warning, thirty Japanese with leveled bayonets rushed the jeep. The two Americans each frantically waved a bed sheet from a bamboo pole and stepped out with raised hands. A Japanese sergeant arrived at this dangerous moment, and Colonel Williams showed him his letter of instruction and conveyed his desire to see the sergeant's commanding officer. Getting back into the jeep with the Japanese sergeant, they drove north for three miles until they met General Kameichiro Nagano. A very poor Japanese interpreter read Colonel Williams's letter and, after a brief discussion, General Nagano agreed to meet with General King near the front lines at the experimental farm station near Lamao. Nagano sent Major Hurt back to Luzon Force headquarters to bring King to the meeting. The Japanese required Colonel Williams to remain with them. Williams, now relieved of the possibility of having to negotiate in the absence of General King, was worried the Japanese might find King's letter authorizing him to do just that. Williams, hand in pocket, slowly shredded the letter.
A few minutes after nine, immediately after Major Hurt arrived with the news, King and his party, Colonel Collier, Major Wade R. Cothran, Captain Tisdelle, and Major Hurt headed north. Just before leaving, Captain Tisdelle cut a bedsheet into halves and his orderly tied them to two separate bamboo poles. They then drove up the road in two jeeps with the white flags prominently displayed. King felt like General Lee who surrendered to General Grant the same day, April 9, seventy-seven years earlier. King believed that were he to survive the war, he would be court-martialed for surrendering the largest force the United States had ever lost.
As. the jeeps turned onto the East Road, a flight of Japanese planes spotted them and dove in for an attack. "We were not amatures [sic] at that game," recalled Colonel Collier. "We were displaying a white flag but this in no way dampened or hampered the zest of the chase for the next three kilometers." The road was one curve after another with steep cuts in the mountain, and it offered some protection. After each attack the planes made wide circles and flew out of sight. The officers then jumped into the jeeps and sped forward until the planes appeared again as they banked to parallel the road. Collier and Hurt jumped out of their vehicle, signaled King in the next jeep to do the same, and everyone scrambled for cover. After the planes passed or were in a position they could see the jeeps but not shoot, Collier and Tisdelle ran from the ditches, stood in the middle of the road, and vigorously waved their bedsheets in hopes the Japanese would stop their attacks. But the pilots did not recognize the flags or chose to ignore them, because the strafing continued.
Not seeing any results from his work, one pilot dropped out of formation and came in unseen after the regular run. He lined up on a curve and fired just as Collier's jeep rounded the bend. The noise of impacting bullets warned driver Private Bums, and he pulled sharply to the left and jammed against the embankment. Machine gun bullets swept over the men, missing them by inches. After an hour of this deadly game a Japanese reconnaissance plane lazed in at a right angle to the road, dipped its wings, and the pilot waved. When the pilot leveled his plane and waved, King's party knew the chase was finally over. The aircraft kept other planes away, and the Americans proceeded safely and entered Japanese lines. King's last clean uniform, coated by the brown Philippine dust so similar to the red dust of Georgia, was now as wrinkled and dirty as the one he left behind. The Japanese received the Americans courteously at the Lamao River bridge, allowed them to keep their pistols, and es**rted King's party to a house at the experimental farm station in front of which sat General Nagano and Colonel Williams. Nagano motioned for King to take a seat. Through an interpreter, Nagano explained that he commanded an infantry division but that he himself had no authority to arrange terms. A representative from 14th Army would soon arrive. Nagano communicated this information on a piece of paper because the interpreter spoke English very poorly.
A few minutes later, at 1100 hours, Colonel Motoo Nakayama, senior operations officer for the 14th Army, arrived in a commandeered Cadillac with his interpreter, a captain. Captain Tisdelle, a 32-year-old Chicagoan, a lieutenant of cavalry before the war, recognized the car as belonging to a friend of his, Juan Elizalde. General King rose, but resumed his seat after Nakayama ignored him. Nakayama took a seat at a long table just outside the front door of the house facing the Americans; no salutes were exchanged, nor did anyone shake hands. Nakayama sat sideways, facing his interpreter at the far end of the table, ignoring King. King sat erect with his hands clasped in front of him on the table. Tisdelle wrote later, "I never saw him look more like a soldier than in this hour of defeat." Colonel Williams and Major Cothran stood near the table with Japanese staff officers and curious onlookers.
Nakayama had arrived without instructions as to terms. The Japanese captain, Nakayama's aide, spoke a few words to Nakayama and then spoke crisply to King, "You are General Wainwright!โ
"No. I am General King, commander of all forces on Bataan." When the Japanese told King he must get Wainwright, King explained he did not command all the forces in the Philippines, but rather only the forces on Bataan. He could not get Wainwright because he had no means of contacting him. The Japanese did not like this arrangement. They wanted to avoid a piecemeal surrender. They wanted all the Philippines. After further discussion, the aide turned to King and asked why he had come.
King answered he had come to secure terms for his Bataan army. Another discussion between the aide and Nakayama resulted in the same demand, but phrased differently. "You'll have to get General Wainwright. The Japanese cannot accept surrender without him.โ
King then rephrased his answer. He asked that he be allowed to send couriers to tell his forward elements of the collapse. He asked that the Japanese remain in their present positions to prevent further loss of life. King explained that his army was badly disorganized and incapable of resistance, that his men were sick, starving, and exhausted. He asked for an armistice and an end to aerial bombardment. King concluded by saying he had saved sufficient vehicles to evacuate his army to any point on Luzon designated by the Japanese. He asked to be allowed to make this move under his American officers. This was a point King and his staff had discussed earlier, and they had saved specific vehicles and fuel to move the men. Nakayama rejected both the armistice and the request for a cessation of aerial activity. He explained the pilots had missions until 1200 hours. They could not be halted until then. "Surrender must be unconditional," the aide stated.
King then asked if he surrendered unconditionally, would they accept the following terms: He requested his troops be allowed to march out under their own officers, using the trucks and 13,000 gallons of gasoline saved expressly for that purpose. He asked that he be allowed to notify his forward elements of the end of hostilities. He repeatedly requested assurance that his men, both Americans and Filipinos, would be treated according to the Geneva Convention.
To all these requests, Nakayama refused comment except to say he could accept only the surrender of all forces in the Philippines. "I am prepared," Nakayama answered, "to consider negotiations for the cessation of hostilities if the surrender of the entire American Philippine forces in the Philippines is included. However, it is absolutely impossible for me to consider negotiations for the cessation of hostilities in any limited area. If only the American Philippine Forces in the Bataan Area desire to surrender, then each individual or each unit should immediately surrender voluntarily and unconditionally to the Japanese Army confronting him or it. In such an event, the Japanese Army would treat them as Prisoners of War in accordance with international law.
Failing to get agreement on any point, King knew additional delay would only result in more of his men dying. Again, King asked if the Filipinos and Americans would be treated well. The aide answered, "We are not barbarians." Those were the only terms King could arrange. After some talk, the aide turned back to King and asked how many guns King had. King answered that he did not have any guns, that he had ordered them destroyed. A question about tanks brought the same reply. Thinking Colonel Nakayama's comment meant he would accept the unconditional surrender of the Luzon Force, King agreed to surrender at 1230 hours. To the Japanese demand, "You will surrender," King nodded his head. Upon being ordered to turn over his sword, King explained he had left it in Manila. After some excited discussion among the Japanese, King interrupted and persuaded them to accept his pistol. The four American officers placed their side arms on the table and passed into captivity. At no time did Colonel Nakayama look at King. Nakayama stood up, and King rose. Without saying anything more, Nakayama and his aide walked off to their car.
No surrender document was prepared or signed, nor was an effort made to formalize the surrender. King believed he had surrendered his entire command, whereas the Japanese concluded the negotiations had failed. "The surrender of the American Philippine Forces in the Bataan Peninsula," wrote Nakayama later, "was accomplished by the voluntary and unconditional surrender of each individual or each unit. The negotiations for the cessation of hostilities failed."
After Nakayama departed, the Japanese allowed Colonel Collier and Major Hurt to return to American lines to deliver the surrender order. The Japanese drove King and the other officers by jeep to Balanga where cameramen took numerous photographs of the American. Across the road the Japanese prepared the Balanga Elementary School for additional questioning. Colonel Nakayama was again present. King sat on a wooden chair, Colonel Williams to his right and Major Cothran and Captain Tisdelle to his left. The first question concerned the number of Japanese prisoners held by the Americans. When King said there were about sixty, the Japanese seemed surprised there were not more.
"When a force is withdrawing, as our did, it does not have an opportunity to take many prisoners," King answered.
Questions as to the number of guns and tanks received King's reply, "We have none."
Then the questions changed to Corregidor. "How many troops are there on Corregidor?"
"I don't know," King answered.
"How many guns are there on Corregidor?" "I don't know."
The Japanese brought out a map and set it on the small table. "General Kin ; Show me here where the tunnel leads from Mariveles to Corregidor.
"There is no such tunnel," King answered.
"There must be a tunnel," the Japanese insisted. King and Tisdelle finally convinced them there was not.
"Where is the cavern and tunnels where are stored all the large reserves of artillery?" King said there were no such caverns.
"There are such caverns," the interpreter insisted. He pointed to the Manila Bay side of Mariveles on the map. "There are caverns here where artillery is stored. Do not lie! You must have much artillery. It has been destroyed many times and you bring out additional artillery."
When King pointed out that he had saved trucks to move his army out of Bataan, and when he asked where the men should go, no one answered. The Japanese walked away and shouted for guards to lock up King's party in a nearby hut.
For the more than 75,000 soldiers affected by King's decision, the last day of resistance on Bataan was about to begin. Early in the morning the Luzon Force Signal Officer phoned Corregidor and told Colonel Teague at Fort Mills that their conversation would shortly be interrupted; the Bataan side was about to cut the submarine telephone cable linking the peninsula to Corregidor. Breaking into the call, the Luzon Force telephone officer ended the conversation just before a work detail cut through the bulky cable. Signalmen on Corregidor severed their end of the cable, dragged it out of the water, and sealed it.
You can read more of โBataan: Our Last Ditchโ by John Whitman at the PhilWar Library
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