31/12/2024
THE KNOWLEDGE-BELIEF SUBSET CONTESTABILITY
I think knowledgè does not consist of nor need believe whatsoever or wheresoever, for if it does, it is no longer knowledge.
Even when we think that we believe what we know, we are actually recalling the fact that we were once at the level of believe, or being emphatic of our knowledge; and not necessarily believing in our knowledge. Believe might be a process of knowledge at the grassroot of pursuit of knowledge, but when knowledgè is matured or apprehended, believe disappears.
It is just like a child that became a man, he can actually recall that he was once a child and could even be emphatic about it, but would not necessarily become a child again.
Does all knowledgè has to navigate through a process of believe? In this order, empirical, experimental and experiential knowledge might,; but spontaneous, intuitive and rational knowledge might not.
In essence the contestability of "if believe is a subset of knowledge or if knowledgè is a subset of believe" could actually be better situated within the context of empirical epistemic practicability, and not of rational epistemic justification or critical thoughtfulness.
ISN-ODP/FMP: Nebeolism-Igweism
(2024/12/28)