Res Publica

01/06/2026

[EN]: Solving the Drone Dilemma

Drones are powerful — and can cause chaos. Remedies are urgent to deploy them safely.

A busy commercial airport cancels all flights twice in quick succession. The trigger? Small, remote-controlled, low-flying objects. Safety concerns over drone activity and the defensive measures in place to deal with drones caused chaos this year at El Paso’s international airport.

Cheap, expendable drones also dominate modern battlefields. They have allowed Ukraine to battle much-larger Russia into a stalemate. Iran has used them to bloody the US and close the critical Straits of Hormuz.

How to benefit from and cope with the drone revolution represents a major security opportunity — and challenge. Existing measures are insufficient. Chinese components flood Western markets and scoop up data. Regulatory approaches to date have focused on imposing bans against Chinese products. They fail to deal with the existing drone fleet or to construct viable alternatives. This must change.

Drones are powerful — and can cause chaos. Remedies are urgent to deploy them safely.A busy commercial airport cancels all flights twice in quick succession. The trigger? Small, remote-controlled, low-flying objects. Safety concerns over drone activity and the defensive measures in place to deal w...

29/05/2026

[EN]: Georgian Dream’s Failed Pivot

How Georgia’s billionaire Ivanishvili misread Moscow, and why Washington shouldn't reward his overtures.

Bidzina Ivanishvili / Source TV
Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze flew to Yerevan in May, shook hands with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy after years of poisonous relations, and spoke about the Middle Corridor transport and energy route.

Weeks earlier, the ruling Georgian Dream party had announced the first, belated arrests of law-enforcement officers tied to the brutal 2024-2025 protest crackdowns; an act the regime had previously refused despite extensive video evidence and sustained public outrage.

The regime also attempted to create an opening with the US administration. A Rubio-Kobakhidze call in March, the announcement of a Trump Tower Tbilisi in April, and a visit by Deputy Assistant Secretary Sonata Coulter in May followed. Georgian Dream has framed the engagement as a chance to renew the US-Georgia strategic partnership “from a clean slate.”

Some have read these moves as a westward pivot by a government broadly regarded as toxic by the European Union (EU) and its institutions. But this is not a westward pivot. Instead, it reflects the failure of Georgian Dream to build a better relationship with Russia (which still occupies 20% of Georgian territory) and an attempt by Bidzina Ivanishvili — Georgia’s richest man and de facto ruler — to redirect the same transactional survival tactics toward the West.

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How Georgia’s billionaire Ivanishvili misread Moscow, and why Washington shouldn't reward his overtures.Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze flew to Yerevan in May, shook hands with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy after years of poisonous relations, and spoke about the Middle Corridor...

28/05/2026

[EN]: The Digital Iron Curtain 2.0: how the MAX messenger is reshaping Russia’s communication space

The Kremlin’s intention to control its digital environment is not new. Even Russians’ most widely used messaging app, Telegram, was not spared from it. However, a failed 2018 effort to block the app exposed the limits of direct restriction. Despite regulatory pressure, the platform continued to operate, creating a ‘grey zone’ where even pro-government voices could express limited forms of dissent.

In 2026, this phase appears to be ending. Besides blocking external platforms, the Kremlin is increasingly restructuring the Russian domestic digital environment itself. The ‘national messenger’ MAX, whose creation was ordered by Russian president Vladimir Putin himself, grew from around 2 million users in mid-2025 to over 55 million by November. This rapid growth coincided with the Kremlin deliberately disrupting platforms such as Telegram and WhatsApp. Together, these developments point to a shift from reactive control toward the construction of a managed communication infrastructure.

This transition is supported by recent legislation. In April 2025, the use of foreign communication by state institutions was restricted, while in June 2025 the concept of a national ‘multifunctional information exchange service’ was introduced. MAX was subsequently designated as such a platform. Formally, these measures are framed in terms of security, convenience, and accessibility. In practice, however, they narrow the range of platforms available for institutional communication and create conditions in which domestic solutions – and increasingly MAX – become the default channels.

The Kremlin’s intention to control its digital environment is not new. Even Russians’ most widely used messaging app, Telegram, was not spared from it. However, a failed 2018 effort to block the app exposed the limits of direct restriction. Despite regulatory pressure, the platform continued to ...

27/05/2026

[EN]: Ukraine’s Robot Warriors and a Behind-the-Lines Blitz

Ukraine’s mid-range strike capacity is growing and smashing Russian supply lines, with autonomous systems taking the lead.

At the turn of 2026, Russia appeared to pose the greater mid-range threat. Its forces were striking Ukraine’s rear with drones at will, using satellite links, including Starlink, to bypass electronic warfare.

It had also increased its use of cheap Molniya medium-range strike drones, with varied control frequencies making them harder to jam and forcing Ukraine to look for new defenses.

Moscow’s advantage was disrupted after restrictions limited its use of satellite systems, but while that helped, it wasn’t enough. There remained a clear need for Ukraine to close the gap in mid-range capacity.

Since January, Kyiv has scaled up its mid-range strikes, with its drones now hitting Russian logistics nodes, supply routes, command posts, and units behind the frontline.

Ukraine’s mid-range strike capacity is growing and smashing Russian supply lines, with autonomous systems taking the lead.Source: General Staff of the Armed Forces of UkraineAt the turn of 2026, Russia appeared to pose the greater mid-range threat. Its forces were striking Ukraine’s rear with dr...

26/05/2026

[EN]: The UK faces a dilemma over potential troop deployments to Ukraine. France can help

As Ukrainian and Russian delegates take stock of resuming peace talks—temporarily on a “situational” hold amid the US conflict with Iran—there is growing agreement among Kyiv’s partners that, after an agreement is reached, Western troops will be needed in Ukraine to monitor and enforce it. Several Western states have already committed to contribute forces, with the United Kingdom and France recently announcing their willingness to deploy troops to Ukraine in a peacekeeping role following a ceasefire. While French and British officials did not offer specifics about the size of the potential deployment, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested that each country would contribute a brigade of around five thousand troops.

It’s not clear if a deployment of that size is sustainable. Some analysts have warned that for the United Kingdom to sustain such a presence over time would require up to 20,000 personnel, once training pipelines, recovery cycles, logistics, and enabling functions are factored in. With its relatively limited number of around 147,000 full-time active-duty personnel, the British military could be stretched thin by such a deployment.

London has acknowledged its manpower pressures, including in its 2025 Strategic Defence Review, which called for faster recruitment, improved retention, and gradual increase in regular personnel. But these reforms will take time to produce operational effects and highlight the importance of deepened complementarity between allies’ contributions in the near term.

Likely in an attempt to get ahead of questions about future deployments to Ukraine, British defense officials have already raised the United Kingdom’s current military commitment in Estonia as a potential source of personnel to be redeployed to Ukraine. But shifting British troops from Estonia to Ukraine would itself carry risks. How Britain and its allies ultimately address this issue of manpower will have major implications for security on the European continent.

Washington—As Ukrainian and Russian delegates take stock of resuming peace talks—temporarily on a “situational” hold amid the US conflict with Iran—there is growing agreement among Kyiv’s partners that, after an agreement is reached, Western troops will be needed in Ukraine to monitor an...

25/05/2026

[EN]: Russian Influence Drains Away in the South Caucasus

Armenia is building closer relations with the EU, underlining Russia’s diminishing influence in the South Caucasus.

For decades, Moscow’s power in the South Caucasus rested on military presence, conflict-management formats, energy leverage, and economic influence.

This is now under visible strain. Armenia is actively engaging the European Union (EU), Azerbaijan has grown significantly more assertive in its foreign policy, while Georgia is deepening selective economic links with China and the Middle East, while abstaining from restoring diplomatic ties with Russia.

Yet of the three countries, this trend is most visible in Armenia. It is Armenia that was closest to the Kremlin right up to the point when its supposed friend stood idly by during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the eventual fall of the entity in September 2023. The logic had been that Armenia needed Russian aid should something happen to Karabakh, a logic that evaporated after defeat.

Extensive engagement with the EU should be seen from this perspective, with the events of early May in Yerevan only underlining the trend. Armenia hosted the European Political Community summit on May 4, followed by the first-ever EU-Armenia summit on May 5. The sides launched a €200m ($232m) partnership, while EU investments in Armenia under the Global Gateway strategy are expected to reach €2.5bn.

This matters because Moscow’s traditional leverage over Armenia has depended on the absence of viable alternatives. The EU’s engagement changes this equation. Brussels cannot replace Russia as a hard-security guarantor, yet it can provide greater access to its market, investments, and transport and infrastructure cooperation — areas where Moscow is less competitive given its forever war against Ukraine. The Kremlin’s reaction was swift. It accused Armenia of entering the EU’s “anti-Russian orbit” and warned of political and economic consequences.

Armenia is building closer relations with the EU, underlining Russia’s diminishing influence in the South Caucasus.Source: Nikol Pashinyan on XFor decades, Moscow’s power in the South Caucasus rested on military presence, conflict-management formats, energy leverage, and economic influence.This ...

22/05/2026

[EN] Bulgaria is unlikely to become Putin’s new proxy within the European Union

In early May, former Bulgarian president Rumen Radev was appointed as the country’s new prime minister, potentially bringing one of Europe’s longest-running political crises in recent years to an end.

Radev’s recently formed Progressive Bulgaria party is the result of complicated domestic political dynamics arising from institutional paralysis, rather than any firm ideological commitment to illiberalism. Nevertheless, some observers have speculated that following the recent electoral defeat of Hungary’s long-serving pro-Kremlin PM Viktor Orban, Bulgaria under Radev could now take on the role of Putin proxy within the European Union.

These concerns are rooted in the fact that throughout the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Radev has advocated for a more cautious and pragmatic European approach toward Moscow. He has consistently opposed sending military aid to Kyiv, and has criticized aspects of EU sanctions policy. Inevitably, Radev’s stance has been compared to Orban’s position on the Russia-Ukraine War. However, these comparisons become far less convincing when viewed in the context of Bulgaria’s internal political dynamics.

The new government in Sofia is now attempting to reassure international observers that Bulgaria’s Euro-Atlantic orientation will remain intact. Newly appointed Foreign Minister Velislava Petrova-Chamova, a Cambridge University-educated technocrat with experience working at the World Bank and World Health Organization, has emphasized that Bulgaria’s foreign policy will maintain a “clear direction” within the framework of the country’s existing alliances.

Likewise, the country’s new parliamentary leader Petar Vitanov has directly rejected speculation about a major geopolitical shift or pro-Kremlin realignment. “There will be no radical, extreme shift in foreign policy. For nine years, Rumen Radev has held very clear positions, and almost all European leaders have moved closer to them,” he commented.

In early May, former Bulgarian president Rumen Radev was appointed as the country’s new prime minister, potentially bringing one of Europe’s longest-running political crises in recent years to an end.Since 2021, Bulgaria has endured a prolonged period of political instability marked by fragmente...

21/05/2026

🔥 The Battle for People and Identity: How Ukraine Can Destroy the Russian Imperial Paradigm from Within

Since the beginning of Russia's hybrid aggression in 2014, the propaganda thesis about "one people" has always seemed rather artificial. Artificial — because Russia has never actually sought equality or brotherhood. It aimed to erode Ukrainian identity in order to more easily impose its own narratives and cognitively influence the population of the country against which it waged a multi-year war.

The stronger Ukraine demonstrates its own subjectivity — military, technological, political, and moral — the more people within Russia itself begin to emerge from the imperial delusion. The myth of Russian "greatness" is cracking at the seams.

In recent years, it has become clear: there are people in Russia who formally have Russian citizenship, but internally no longer want to be part of the imperial model. Some of them are ready not just to sympathize with Ukraine, but to act on its side — risking their freedom, status, and sometimes even their lives.

The imperial model relies on a vast number of suppressed identities — from small nations to people who simply no longer want to live in a system of lies, fear, a cult of hatred, and endless war.

And here, for the first time in many centuries, Ukraine can start acting not as an object of imperial politics, but as a subject that itself forms a new model of attraction.

An excellent article by Roman Burko, the founder of the international volunteer intelligence community InformNapalm, about how states in the twenty-first century compete not only for territory. They compete for people, talent, motivation, meaning, and models of the future. And if Ukraine learns how to transform the empire’s human capital into its own strength, this could become one of the most effective instruments for dismantling the Russian imperial paradigm from within.

Read the full article ⬇️

In his interview, Pomerantsev spoke about collective narcissism as one of the foundations of Russian society and imperial thinking. That idea struck me as extraordinarily accurate because it closely resonated with my own experience of living in the post-Soviet space of Ukraine’s border regions.

20/05/2026

🔥 Битва за людей и идентичность: как Украина может разрушить российскую имперскую парадигму изнутри

С самого начала российской гибридной агрессии в 2014 году тезис пропаганды про “один народ” выглядел довольно искусственно. Искусственно — потому что Россия на самом деле никогда не стремилась к равенству или братству. Она стремилась размыть украинскую идентичность, чтобы легче внедрять собственные нарративы и когнитивно влиять на население страны, против которой вела многолетнюю войну.

Чем сильнее Украина демонстрирует собственную субъектность — военную, технологическую, политическую и моральную, — тем больше людей внутри самой России начинают выходить из имперского морока. Миф о российском “величии” трещит по швам.

За последние годы стало очевидно: в России существуют люди, которые формально имеют российское гражданство, но внутренне больше не хотят быть частью имперской модели. Часть из них готова не просто симпатизировать Украине, а действовать на ее стороне — рискуя свободой, статусом, а иногда и жизнью.

Имперская модель держится на огромном количестве подавленных идентичностей — от малых народов до людей, которые просто больше не хотят жить в системе лжи, страха, культа ненависти и бесконечной войны.

И здесь Украина может впервые за многие столетия начать действовать не как объект имперской политики, а как субъект, который сам формирует новую модель притяжения.

Прекрасная статья Романа Бурко, основателя международного волонтёрского разведывательного сообщества InformNapalm, о том, что государства XXI века конкурируют не только за территории, но и за людей, таланты, мотивацию, смыслы и модели будущего — и о том, как Украина может превращать человеческий ресурс империи в собственную силу, разрушая российскую парадигму изнутри.

Читать полностью статью ⬇️

Как Украина может разрушить российскую имперскую парадигму и перетянуть ее человеческий ресурс на свою сторону.

19/05/2026

[EN]: From preschool to adolescence: expanding ideological control in Russian schools

The Kremlin has long injected propaganda into the Russian educational system in order to boost the ‘patriotism’ of Russian youth. Putin’s future ‘child soldiers’ not only take part in regular flag raisings, anthem singings, and meetings with ‘heroes’ of the ‘special military operation’ (‘SVO’) in Ukraine. They also participate in drone assembly and other types of military training. Besides patriotic rituals, the authorities also indoctrinate Russian schoolkids by systematically rewriting schoolbooks on history and social studies. The Kremlin is not hiding its plan to adapt all school and university textbooks to the alternative reality in Putin’s mind.

The situation with ‘patriotic’ indoctrination in Russian schools is portrayed in the Oscar-winning documentary film ‘Mr. Nobody Against Putin’ (2025), where the exiled Russian teacher Pavel Talankin presents footage capturing pro-war indoctrination, including direct justification of the invasion of Ukraine, school visits of the Wagner mercenaries, and grenade-throwing competitions. In March 2026, this movie was banned in Russia for alleged ‘propaganda of extremism and terrorism’. The Kremlin pays particular attention to harsh ideological control over the educational establishments in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine – over 580,000 kids go to local schools there. Moscow clearly wants to bring up the Ukrainian children living in the occupied territories as ‘regular Russians’.

Starting in 2026, the Kremlin will target the youngest schoolchildren with propaganda. Soon Russian authorities will start three new ‘patriotic’ classes: the ‘Good Games’ class for three- to seven-year-olds in preschool, the ‘My Family’ class for Year 1 to Year 4 students, and the ‘Spiritual and Moral Culture’ class for Year 5 to Year 7 kids

https://en.respublica.lt/from-preschool-to-adolescence-expanding-ideological-control-in-russian-schools