China-CEE Institute

17/06/2026

This paper examines ’s position under the Pact on and , focusing on the implementation of the solidarity mechanism and its political implications. The Pact, adopted in 2024 and entering into force in 2026, allows member states to contribute through relocation, financial payments, or alternative support. Lithuania opted for a mixed 50/50 model, committing to accept 58 asylum seekers and contribute €1.14 million.

The analysis argues that Lithuania’s decision was driven less by economic or public preference considerations and more by a political emphasis on demonstrating EU solidarity. In contrast, neighboring countries such as , , and have secured exemptions or alternative arrangements, raising concerns about unequal obligations and unclear criteria for determining “migratory pressure.”

The paper highlights a lack of transparency in the European Commission’s classification system and questions Lithuania’s relatively passive negotiating stance. It finds limited evidence of domestic political scrutiny or public consultation in shaping the decision.

Finally, the paper discusses potential implications for border security, particularly in the context of ongoing hybrid migration pressure from Belarus. It concludes that Lithuania’s approach reflects broader tensions between EU-level solidarity commitments and national interests.
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https://china-cee.eu/2026/05/22/lithuania-monthly-briefing-the-eu-migration-pact-vague-criteria/
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Justas Karčiauskas

17/06/2026

and , two focal and members, have established a unique geopolitical alliance, centered on a comprehensive bilateral defense agreement first signed back in 2021 as the Strategic Partnership for Cooperation in and . In April 2026, the two countries have moved their alliance further by signing the Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The two sides have turned their cooperation into an indefinitely renewable agreement and expanding the bilateral cooperation in additional fields, beyond security. Greece and France are thus increasing their deterrence capabilities, project power in the Mediterranean and safeguard regional stability in the focal region of the southern flank of Europe. Moreover, the Greek-French military cooperation functions as an example for European strategic autonomy, a prerequisite if Europe wishes to become really relevant on the world stage.
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https://china-cee.eu/2026/05/22/greece-monthly-briefing-greece-and-france-a-unique-geopolitical-alliance/
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Ioannis E. Kotoulas

16/06/2026

The 2026 EU–India Free Trade Agreement is a major step for –India economic relations, as it will reduce or eliminate tariffs on 96.6% of EU exports and improve access to India’s large and fast-growing market. In 2025, Latvia’s trade with India was clearly imbalanced: exports to India were USD 56.49 million, while imports from India reached USD 202.56 million. Latvia mainly exported electronics, wood products, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, while imports were dominated by electrical equipment, mineral fuels, rubber, textiles, and plastics. This relationship creates both challenges and opportunities for Latvia. Expanding exports to India could help reduce the trade gap, strengthen Latvian companies, diversify export markets, and support GDP growth. Overall, reflecting broader dynamics between 2020 and 2025, Latvia’s total foreign trade turnover has experienced significant fluctuations peaking at EUR 47.77 billion in 2022 before growing again in 2025 to reach EUR 42.73 billion. This five-year trajectory shows that international trade remains an important driver of Latvia’s economic development.
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https://china-cee.eu/2026/05/22/latvia-monthly-briefing-latvia-india-economic-cooperation/
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Institute of Economics of the Latvian Academy of Sciences LZA Ekonomikas Institūts

15/06/2026

Watch the Sneak Peek of the new China Watch ⬇️
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kSDZ2s0NbIM

Global Biodiversity Finance: Real-World Challenges, Governance Pathways, and China’s Response
by:
Liu Zhiyang

China Watch Vol. 6, No. 25, June 2026title:Global Biodiversity Fi...

15/06/2026

The long-awaited elections took place on March 22. The last weeks of the political campaign were very intense, very conflictual and full of different scandals. The two largest parties remained the Freedom Movement and the Slovenian Democratic Party, but the support for the first did, expectedly, decline since the elections for the National Assembly in 2022. The two smaller current government coalition parties, the Social Democrats and The Left, did pass the 4 % treshold, but they did not manage to improve their election result when compared to the elections in 2022. However, two new right wing parties entered the National Assembly, the party Resni.ca and the Democrats of Anže Logar, signalling important changes in the political arena and also among voters in Slovenia. Nevertheless, the election results and the very high voter turnout – more than 70 % – show that there is a more stable repoliticisation of the society and increased interest in politics. Moreover, the results show that there is a shift towards the political right in Slovenia.
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https://china-cee.eu/2026/05/18/slovenia-monthly-briefing-the-slovenian-post-election-political-conundrum/
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The Slovenian post-election political conundrum

12/06/2026

Recent regulatory changes in suggest a gradual shift in governance practices toward greater executive flexibility and reduced procedural constraints. While these changes have received limited public attention, they reflect a broader pattern in which formal institutional mechanisms—particularly those related to policy evaluation and transparency—are being recalibrated. In the short term, this may enable more efficient decision-making and facilitate large-scale economic projects. However, over the medium term, the weakening of procedural safeguards could affect policy consistency, public accountability, and Serbia’s alignment with European governance standards. These dynamic highlights an emerging trade-off between administrative efficiency and institutional robustness, particularly in contexts where policy-making increasingly intersects with the interests of large economic actors.
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https://china-cee.eu/2026/05/18/serbia-monthly-briefing-shifting-governance-practices-in-serbia-between-formal-institutions-and-executive-flexibility/
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Ivona Lađevac

11/06/2026

Sneak Peek of the new China Watch ⬇️
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIYCIg1nJa8
✍️Yu Hongyuan
📖The EU’s Green Energy Strategy and China-EU Green Energy Cooperation

rajongók

China Watch Vol. 6, No. 24, June 2026title:The EU’s Green Energy ...

11/06/2026

has demonstrated a proactive commitment to aligning its judicial framework with international standards, particularly by addressing the ’s recommendations on Justice Laws. These reforms aim to bolster the independence, quality, and efficiency of the national legal system. Key legislative initiatives are currently focused on strengthening safeguards for high-ranking prosecutors and the judicial police, while the Ministry of Justice prepares for a long-term evaluation of the 2022 Justice Laws to ensure institutional stability. Despite fiscal constraints, efforts to replenish human resources and modernize court IT systems have continued, though judicial proceedings have notably slowed in duration.

In the realm of anti- , the 2021–2025 National Strategy remains operative, with a successor framework currently under development. While the prosecution of high-level corruption maintains a positive trajectory, recent Constitutional Court rulings regarding the statute of limitations have led to the closure of numerous cases and the annulment of prior convictions. Furthermore, while the National Integrity Agency continues to manage asset declarations effectively, a recent judicial shift necessitates a comprehensive reassessment of the existing transparency regime. Legislative progress on lobbying and political party financing remains stalled in Parliament, and public procurement continues to be flagged as a high-risk area for fraud.

The media landscape remains a significant concern, characterized by a lack of progress in securing the editorial independence of public service media. The influx of political funding into private media has exacerbated the issue of non-transparent political advertising. Additionally, while the National Audiovisual Council faces resource shortages, journalists continue to grapple with harassment and political pressure, often without the protection of robust self-regulatory mechanisms.

Finally, the constitutional environment has faced recent volatility, most notably with the 2025 re-run of presidential elections following the annulment of the 2024 results. While the government has adopted a new Strategy for Open Government to support civil society, persistent issues regarding legislative unpredictability and the frequent use of emergency ordinances continue to hinder the stability of the regulatory environment.
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https://china-cee.eu/2026/05/18/romania-monthly-briefing-analysis-of-romanias-judicial-and-anti-corruption-framework-in-2025/
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Csongor B. Veress

10/06/2026

The recent amendments to ’s Law on Mineral Resources reopened the public debate over the exploitation of the country’s natural wealth, especially rare and strategic minerals. The debate coincided with the growing geoeconomic importance of critical minerals, highlighted by the April 2026 US-EU memorandum on strategic cooperation for rare minerals. Against this backdrop, ’s ‘strategic dialogue with the ’ increasingly came to include discussions on minerals such as antimony, lithium, and lorandite. Particular attention was given to plans for the exploitation of antimony near the Kriva Palanka village of Luke, which Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski presented as a major strategic investment tied to cooperation with American investors and broader -Macedonian economic relations. Supporters presented this as an opportunity for investment, economic development and stronger geopolitical ties with Washington, arguing that Macedonia could become part of Western supply chains for critical minerals. At the same time, critics viewed the legal changes and the broader mineral agenda as a threat to public control over natural resources. Opposition parties, environmental groups and anti-mining activists warned that the amendments favor private and foreign interests while weakening environmental protections and public oversight. The debate revived memories of earlier anti-mining protests, and reflected a broader political divide: whether Macedonia’s rare minerals should be used as a geopolitical bargaining chip in relations with the US and EU, or protected as public resources belonging to its citizens.
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https://china-cee.eu/2026/05/18/north-macedonia-monthly-briefing-from-strategic-dialogue-to-strategic-extraction-the-new-battle-over-macedonias-rare-mineral-resources/
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Gjorgjioska Marija Adela

09/06/2026

April 2026 reveals a deep contradiction in ’s current political moment. The state is formally entering the final stages of European accession negotiations, while its internal political system is simultaneously returning to identity-based conflicts, political and economic populism, and institutional capture. It is therefore difficult to view seemingly separate processes in isolation: attempts to impose alternative state symbols and deepen identity polarisation; economic vulnerability intensified by the fiscal deficit, pressure on the public sector and the airport concession; pre-election urban-planning populism through the “Velje Brdo” project; and European integration that is advancing more as a result of Brussels’ geopolitical interest than the depth of domestic reforms. The central thesis is that Montenegro’s European path is not merely a technical process of closing negotiation chapters, but a test of the state’s ability to build political loyalty to its own constitutional order, ensure fiscal responsibility and safeguard independent institutions.
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https://china-cee.eu/2026/05/18/montenegro-monthly-briefing-montenegro-between-european-acceleration-internal-destabilisation-and-the-political-economy-of-populism/
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Vojin Golubovic