China-CEE Institute

China-CEE Institute China-CEE Institute is CASS's first think tank independently registered in Europe.

China-CEE Institute was established by CASS, registered as a non-profit corporation in Budapest, Hungary. The Institute of European Studies, CASS is responsible for organizing and managing it. The China-CEE Institute will build ties and strengthen partnerships with academic institutions and think tanks in Hungary and other Central and Eastern European countries. It welcomes scholars and researchers in CEE countries to carry out joint research, field studies, seminars, lecture series, some training programs for younger students, translation, publication, etc. The China-CEE Institute has established the International Academic Committee and invited corresponding academicians and associate researchers. The Institute collaborates with academic institutions and Think Tanks from CEE countries, including a call for joint research.

Slovenian foreign policy is taking an important turn. Two crucial areas where this is visible are the foreign policy tow...
01/10/2026

Slovenian foreign policy is taking an important turn. Two crucial areas where this is visible are the foreign policy towards Israel and, even more importantly, ’s acceptance of all demands for increased spending. These two fields have been at the forefront of Slovenia’s foreign policy since the new government took office in early June 2026. The latest NATO Summit in Turkiye and the open criticism of the former government by NATO officials and by the new government since they allegedly did not spend enough on defence have led to new promises for even larger increases in spending for defence. This new demand for an even larger increase in defence spending is going to result in a specific paradigm of micro-militarism in Slovenia, with very little impact on NATO, but with large impact in Slovenia due to the very clearly indicated spending cuts for welfare state programmes in order to meet the imperialist visions of Trump and NATO.
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https://china-cee.eu/2026/08/31/slovenia-monthly-briefing-slovenia-and-nato-new-promises-and-possible-conflicts/

Bilateral relations between and are at an all-time high, having recently been elevated to a Comprehensive Partnershi...
30/09/2026

Bilateral relations between and are at an all-time high, having recently been elevated to a Comprehensive Partnership during the historic visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Bratislava. While modern ties officially began in 1993 following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the relationship has rapidly shifted from traditional diplomatic goodwill into a robust strategic alliance centered on trade, advanced manufacturing, and technological cooperation. Mutual trade between Slovakia and India has grown exponentially, crossing the €1.6 billion mark. This follows an upward trajectory from €1.28 billion in 2024 and €858.1 million in 2023, and still increasing.

Slovakia is a strong proponent of the broader EU-India Free Trade Agreement, which aims to drastically lower auto tariffs and completely remove barriers on car parts. Indian conglomerate Tata Group owns the major Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) automobile manufacturing plant in Nitra. Other key Indian giants in Slovakia include Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), Kinex Bearings, and Amara Raja Energy & Mobility. Besides, major Slovak investments are prominent in heavy machinery and manufacturing, notably spearheaded by companies like Tatravagonka Poprad. Regarding defense collaboration, both countries are building on a defense MoU framework dating back to 1995, Slovak defense manufacturers are increasingly targeting joint production opportunities within India’s dedicated defense industrial corridors

Relations between Slovakia and Belarus are currently undergoing a diplomatic revival characterized by pragmatic cooperation, following a five-year period of isolation and stagnation. Under the direction of Prime Minister Robert Fico, Slovakia has chosen to bypass broad Western restrictions to rebuild trade, education, and cultural links. After a few years of stagnation and following political shifts in Bratislava and the return of Robert Fico to power, Slovakia has explicitly broken away from the EU’s isolationist policy toward Minsk.

In late 2025, Slovakia restarted the relations after five years of stagnation. Reciprocally, Alexander Lukashenko officially labelled Slovakia a “friendly country”. Bilateral engagement has normalized. High-level political consultations were held between the two foreign ministries to map out concrete cooperation in trade and public diplomacy. The current Slovak approach, spearheaded by Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár, focuses strictly on non-sanctioned, pragmatic fields including agricultural trade, culture, and university student exchanges. Regarding the geopolitical rationale, Slovakia’s government has defended this shift by stating that “space must be given to diplomacy” to help facilitate eventual peace negotiations regarding the neighboring Ukraine crisis.
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https://china-cee.eu/2026/08/31/slovakia-monthly-briefing-slovakias-current-foreign-political-relations-india-and-belarus/
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Peter Csanyi

More than twelve years after the opening of accession negotiations, ’s path towards European Union membership remains f...
30/09/2026

More than twelve years after the opening of accession negotiations, ’s path towards European Union membership remains formally active but politically stalled. The European Parliament’s July 2026 resolution reflects a shift from assessing legislative alignment to demanding measurable democratic and foreign-policy performance. It links further progress to reforms in the rule of law, electoral conditions, media freedom and institutional accountability, as well as to closer alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and implementation of obligations arising from the dialogue with Priština. Domestic reactions exposed competing narratives of responsibility: the authorities portrayed the resolution as politically motivated, while pro-European opposition parties viewed it as confirmation of democratic decline. At the same time, differences among the European Parliament, the Commission and the member states demonstrated that EU policy towards Serbia is shaped by competing institutional roles and national priorities. The result is not disengagement, but a model of selective integration in which economic cooperation continues while political advancement becomes more conditional, less predictable and increasingly dependent on rebuilding trust across the Union.
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https://china-cee.eu/2026/08/31/serbia-monthly-briefing-serbias-european-integration-at-a-standstill-the-european-parliaments-july-2026-report-and-the-new-politics-of-conditionality/
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Ivona Lađevac

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( ) summit held in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, represents a critical juncture in th...
29/09/2026

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( ) summit held in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, represents a critical juncture in the structural evolution of the Alliance’s collective defense paradigm, signaling the consolidation of what contemporary strategic literature conceptualizes as “NATO 3.0.” Moving beyond the legacy frameworks of Post-Cold War crisis management, the Ankara Summit formalized an institutional shift toward deep conventional deterrence, accelerated defense-industrial manufacturing, and the fortification of regional critical infrastructure. Convened against a backdrop of protracted systemic instability, which includes the ongoing Ukraine crisis, heightened geopolitical volatility in the Middle East, and significant adjustments in regional allied deployments, such as the partial recalibration of the U.S. rotational footprint at the Mihail Kogălniceanu air base, the summit forced a strategic reassessment of security architectures in the Black Sea basin. Crucially, the agreements reached among member states in Ankara established binding mechanisms to expand the Euro-Atlantic defense-industrial base, institutionalized deeper operational integration with the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4), and codified a unified posture designed to sustain long-term military friction along the multi-domain periphery of the Alliance.

Within this overarching strategic transformation, ’s role and its bilateral alignment with the Republic of Türkiye emerge as pivotal variables in determining the efficacy of NATO’s Eastern Flank. Guided by a mandate approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT), the Romanian delegation, led by President Nicușor Dan and Minister of National Defence Radu Miruță, sought to reconcile broader Allied solidarity with the rigorous projection of Bucharest’s core national security interests. Historically anchored in the 2011 Strategic Partnership, Bucharest-Ankara relations have experienced rapid acceleration since 2022, manifested in functional minilateral initiatives such as the joint Black Sea mine countermeasures (MCM Black Sea) task force with Bulgaria, and landmark defense procurement contracts, notably Romania’s late-2025 acquisition of the Turkish-built Hisar-class corvette. However, as the outcomes of the 2026 Ankara Summit demonstrate, the bilateral relationship is transitioning from a framework of tactical maritime coordination to a more complex, multi-layered strategic axis.
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https://china-cee.eu/2026/08/31/romania-monthly-briefing-navigating-nato-3-0-strategic-autonomy-and-bilateral-defense-integration-in-turkish-romanian-relations/
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Csongor B. Veress

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Petőfi Sándor Street 11
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1052

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