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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science is one of the leading international journals in the field. It publishes outstanding new work on a variety of traditional and 'cutting edge' issues, such as the metaphysics of science and the applicability of mathematics to physics, as well as foundational issues in the physical sciences, the life sciences and the social sciences. Recent topics covered in the journal include: the nature of theoretical knowledge, probabilistic analyses of causation, the stability of cultural traits, gene-based accounts of the 'tree of life', and non-linguistic representations in organic chemistry. The journal seeks to advance the field by publishing innovative and thought-provoking papers, discussion notes and book reviews that open up new directions or shed new light on well-known issues.

Just accepted: Guglielmo Militello, Louis Paré, Eve Gazave & Lucie Laplane, 'The Identity of Stem Cell Kinds'Read it her...
02/10/2026

Just accepted: Guglielmo Militello, Louis Paré, Eve Gazave & Lucie Laplane, 'The Identity of Stem Cell Kinds'
Read it here:
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/743816

ABSTRACT. Stem cells are defined by their self-renewal and differentiation abilities. Through those properties, they ensure the production and renewal of organisms’ cells and, in some species, the regeneration of lost parts, making them a key element of biology. Although they share a same function and definition, there is a wide diversity across stem cells, reflected by the fact that stem cells are categorized into various types and subtypes. This diversity among stem cells raises a key philosophical question: do stem cells belong to a natural kind? Claims and arguments made by biologists and philosophers, far from converging toward a consensual response, highlight the need for more (interdisciplinary) investigation to advance this question. In response to this challenge, we explore the hypothesis that a phylogenetic approach may offer a productive framework for addressing these conceptual tensions. After describing the strengths and limitations of such a strategy, we discuss how it can advance fields like regenerative medicine and cancer therapies by clarifying stem cell diversity and improving therapeutic strategies.

Just accepted: Laurenz Casser, 'The Mismeasure of Pain'Read it here: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/74390...
01/10/2026

Just accepted: Laurenz Casser, 'The Mismeasure of Pain'
Read it here:
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/743906

ABSTRACT. A persistent claim in the history of modern medicine is that humans differ in their pain sensitivity. While opinions about which groups hurt more have varied over time, emphasis has always been on the sensitivity of people of colour, women and other significant groups. I argue that claims about biosocial differences in sensitivity are not supported by compelling evidence. Specifically, I argue that evidence for systematic differences in prominent measures of sensitivity has been spurious, and even if it was not, such differences still wouldn’t imply a gap in pain sensitivity. This is because the experimental results are equally well explained in terms of differences in response biases—something common measurement methods typically do not (and perhaps could not) control for. While the arguments presented here do not rule out variations, they cast serious doubt on the search for differences in pain sensitivity at the level of race and gender.

Just accepted: Johannes Nyström, 'Model-Based Robustness Analysis as Constraint-Checking'Read it here:https://www.journa...
30/09/2026

Just accepted: Johannes Nyström, 'Model-Based Robustness Analysis as Constraint-Checking'
Read it here:
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/743907

ABSTRACT. Model-based robustness analysis assesses whether an ensemble of scientific models converges on an outcome, to support confidence in that outcome. While commonplace in many model-based sciences, the viability of the strategy is contested. In this article, I advance the debate in two steps. I first argue that Schupbach's influential account, based on explanatory elimination, is limited in its ability to support strong confirmation. I then develop a novel account according to which robustness provides confirmation through assessments of the strength of underlying scientific constraints on model building. I also formally analyse the proposed epistemic mechanism in a Bayesian framework. The results show that it can generate both confirmation and disconfirmation under plausible conditions, and reveal what determines its significance. The account therefore provides a general framework for understanding the epistemic significance of robustness analysis in scientific modelling.

If you missed this year's BSPS annual conference, fear not! By the power of technology, we bring you Eleanor Knox's keyn...
29/09/2026

If you missed this year's BSPS annual conference, fear not! By the power of technology, we bring you Eleanor Knox's keynote talk, 'The Scale (and Context) Relativity of Spacetime Structure'

Keynote address delivered in July 2026 at the annual conference of ...

From the new issue: E J Green, 'A Pluralist Perspective on Shape Constancy'Read it here: https://www.journals.uchicago.e...
17/09/2026

From the new issue: E J Green, 'A Pluralist Perspective on Shape Constancy'
Read it here: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/727427

ABSTRACT. The ability to perceive the shapes of things as enduring through changes in how they stimulate our sense organs is vital to our sense of stability in the world. But what sort of capacity is shape constancy and how is it reflected in perceptual experience? I defend a pluralist account of shape constancy: there are multiple kinds of shape constancy centred on geometrical properties at various levels of abstraction, and properties at these levels feature in the content of perceptual experience, governing patterns of apparent shape similarity. I propose that the varieties of shape constancy are subserved by the syntactic complexity of perceptual shape representations. By assigning discrete constituents to various abstract shape parameters, these representations attune us to the preservation of certain abstract shape properties through changes in more determinate shape properties. Finally, I draw broader lessons concerning the nature and function of perceptual constancy.

From the latest issue: Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez, James Read & Andrés Páez, 'Causation and the Conservation of Energy...
16/09/2026

From the latest issue: Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez, James Read & Andrés Páez, 'Causation and the Conservation of Energy in General Relativity'
Read it here: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/727030

ABSTRACT. Consensus has it that conserved quantity theories of causation—whereby causation is analysed in terms of the exchange of conserved quantities (for example, energy)—face damning problems. In particular, it is often claimed that in general relativity there simply are no conservation laws for (say) total stress-energy. If this is correct, it is difficult to see how conserved quantity theories of causation could survive. Here, we resist the consensus and defend conserved quantity theories from this conclusion, at least when focusing on the apparent problems posed by general relativity. We argue that this approach to causation can be defended in general relativity once we appreciate the availability of approximate symmetries in generic general relativistic spacetimes and the role of modelling and idealization. Given this, conserved quantity theories of causation stand or fall on other grounds.

From the new issue: Manolo Martínez & Luca Barlassina, 'The Informational Profile of Valence: The Metasemantic Argument ...
15/09/2026

From the new issue: Manolo Martínez & Luca Barlassina, 'The Informational Profile of Valence: The Metasemantic Argument for Imperativism'
Read it here: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/726998

ABSTRACT. Some mental states have valence—they are pleasant or unpleasant. According to imperativism, valence depends on imperative content, while evaluativism tells us that it depends on evaluative content. We argue that if one considers valence’s informational profile, it becomes evident that imperativism is superior to evaluativism. More precisely, we show that if one applies the best available metasemantics to the role played by (un)pleasant mental states in our cognitive economy, then these states turn out to have imperative rather than evaluative content since, first, they are much more informative about behaviour than they are about the world, and, second, they occupy a stage in the information-processing chain that is closer to behaviour production than it is to the uptake of sensory information. This is our metasemantic argument for imperativism.

From the new issue: Zhixiang Cheng, 'Interpretative Models and the Biological Significance of Fisher’s Fundamental Theor...
14/09/2026

From the new issue: Zhixiang Cheng, 'Interpretative Models and the Biological Significance of Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection'
Read it here: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/727428

ABSTRACT. This article addresses the ongoing controversy over the biological significance of Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection. The differences and commonality between the modern and traditional interpretations of the theorem are presented. I argue that both the traditional and modern assessments are implicitly guided by a bipartite, ‘laws of nature–world’ framework, which has constituted a hindrance to properly appreciating the biological significance of the theorem. Instead of approaching it as if it were a standalone empirical law of nature, we had better adopt a tripartite, ‘theory–model–world’ framework and consider the theorem as a product of a special kind of ideal ‘interpretative model’. By doing so, and by comparing the corresponding interpretative model with two other ones of different kinds, we could reach a better characterization of the significance of the theorem.

From the new issue: Rasmus Jaksland & Kian Salimkhani, 'The Many Problems of Spacetime Emergence in Quantum Gravity'Read...
11/09/2026

From the new issue: Rasmus Jaksland & Kian Salimkhani, 'The Many Problems of Spacetime Emergence in Quantum Gravity'
Read it here: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/727052

ABSTRACT. We argue that what is discussed in philosophy under the umbrella of spacetime emergence in fact consists of a plethora of different problems. We advocate casting such debates in terms of the emergent spatiotemporal aspects, as already happens in physics. We then argue against three ways to reject our call for specificity: the many distinct philosophical problems relating to the emergence of the various spatiotemporal aspects do not suggest any singular, overarching, or exceptional problem of spacetime emergence. We also discuss how the objections are reflected by five conceptions of spacetime and we observe that different spatiotemporal aspects are emergent in the different quantum gravity approaches, whereby investigating emergence in quantum gravity collectively is problematic. Finally, we illustrate how conducting the investigation at the level of specific spatiotemporal aspects aids philosophical inquiry.

From the latest issue: Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg, 'Geometric Pooling: A User’s Guide'Read it here: https://w...
10/09/2026

From the latest issue: Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg, 'Geometric Pooling: A User’s Guide'
Read it here: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/727000

ABSTRACT. Much of our information comes to us indirectly, in the form of conclusions others have drawn from evidence they gathered. When we hear these conclusions, how can we modify our own opinions so as to gain the benefit of their evidence? In this article, we study the method known as geometric pooling. We begin by raising objections to a recent argument in support of this method, and then turn to what we take to be better arguments in its favour; finally, we consider a further argument that appeals to the utility of geometric pooling in social settings, and we use our results from earlier in the article to suggest an amendment.

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Department Of Philosophy, Logic And Scientific Method, LSE
London
WC2A2AE

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