15/04/2023
Dear friends,
The day before yesterday, an excellent conversation on European defence took place, promoted by UEF France together with our sections in Milano and Frankfurt.
It was an amazing meeting. It seems to me that the topics discussed were very poignant. UEF France (which demonstrated a good level of political analysis) also presented a resolution on the topic, which will soon be finalised.
The debate was introduced by Guillaume Ancel
(https://fr.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guillaume_Ancel) and Domenico Moro from Centro Studi sul Federalismo (Turin).
It seems to me that the central message of Ancel (a retired senior officer who is famous in France for the frankness with which he has recounted his military experiences in Rwanda and Bosnia in numerous books) can be summarised as follows:
(1) the war in Ukraine is a historic opportunity to make progress in European defence. It must be done soon. This window of opportunity could close within a few years, forcing us to wait decades before a new opportunity arises;
(2) we should not try to create the perfect institutional solution now. Creating a true federal government structure for defence will take years, perhaps decades. What is needed, however, is for governments to show a political will to move in that direction now;
(3) the crucial challenge today is also to create a solid basis for a common strategic culture on which to base common defence and security policies. Waging war together requires that we develop and consolidate a common way of politically weighing risks and solutions. Despite many important advances, the problem of Europeans' insufficient common strategic 'culture' in military matters is still serious. It is necessary to identify together - in value terms - what are the indispensable themes of a common foreign and defence policy, which are so important to Europeans that they must be prepared to 'defend them to the end', including with the instruments of war, because they represent 'red lines' that cannot be compromised;
(4) France can help create this common culture, provided it accepts reality, from which the official French narrative is far removed. The country still believes it is a world-class military power, but it has effectively disarmed its army. The same has happened in many European countries and even in Great Britain. The only function preserved has been to conduct limited international missions abroad. The war in Ukraine was a sudden awakening for many governments, which are now trying to rebuild their armed forces. But the path will be slow and expensive. The recent major French investments in defence (budget 2023) are in fact 60 per cent focused on nuclear power, still leave traditional defence unprotected, and are not sufficient for France to conduct a high-intensity conventional war in the coming years. On the contrary, France's military lack of capacity is worsening;
(5) on military nuclear power, France must abandon the idea that the Force de Frappe can only be used to defend the hexagon and must instead consider any attack on European security as a direct attack on its own security as well, offering its own atomic deterrence as a contribution to European defence;
(6) France must give up its unrealistic ambition to assert its political supremacy over European military structures in Europe. Equal political decision-sharing mechanisms must be created with some involvement of the European institutions, including Parliament. Joint commands are needed;
(7) the first steps towards the creation of a European defence system combining the national and European levels must be identified. National armies cannot be replaced. One can, however, think of widespread forms of military Erasmus, with exchanges of officers enabling national armies to be permeated with European experience, as happens in our universities;
(8) The industrial model must not simply be based on rationalising production and expenditure, keeping separate production structures intact. Even ambitious joint projects (as in fighter planes and tanks) have limitations due to the fact that they are carried out between competing companies, suggesting that industrial conflicts will continue. The European experience to be used must be that of Airbus: that is, permanent industrial integrations based on common production lines where technological capabilities of excellence can be combined;
(9) for the process leading progressively to a European defence to gain strength, industrial agreements are important but not sufficient. In fact, political and social consensus around the idea of a common defence must also be increased, making it clear that the current situation is not sustainable. The American shield is not safe. A purely national defence of Europe no longer has any chance of being effective. We must come out of the silence on the military issue in Europe.
In my opinion, the core of Domenico Moro's speech can be summarised as follows:
(1) Emmanuel Macron must clarify whether his call for Europe's strategic autonomy is a case of neo-Gollist rhetoric waved for domestic political reasons or a real willingness of France to share military sovereignty;
(2) in the second case, it is important from an institutional point of view to create operational structures that, without claiming to replace national armies (this would be a clear political and operational mistake), are clearly placed under the direct control of European institutions (Council and Parliament) and do not depend on ad hoc transfers of military resources;
(3) given its military strength, it is probably up to France to make a high-level proposal. This is a historic mission that Macron must not shirk by agreeing to transfer military sovereignty to Europe in the same way that Kohl agreed to transfer sovereignty to Europe with the single currency;
(4) a first concrete step could be to propose the integration of the Eurocorps Treaty within the EU legal framework, without the need therefore to change the EU Treaties. This would allow a hard core of countries to move forward;
(5) policy does not always advance according to criteria of full rationality. Thus, it is possible that progress towards European defence may occur not out of political conviction, but by force of things and in a possibly complex and tortuous way. Not even an initiative by governments openly distant from federalist positions such as the Italian one is therefore not excluded;
(6) however, it is to be expected that the issue will be one of the pillars of the 2024 European election campaign, which will be very 'political' (e.g. possible agreement between the EPP and ECR). The issue of European defence is indeed 'hot' because of the war in Ukraine, also because of the long-term unknown of the American position, which is now structural and will already manifest itself during the parallel European election.
(7) What would be the best model of European defence from a federalist political theory point of view? It would be necessary to create a federal defence system that would allow a central European power to control limited military resources of its own without having to depend on troops and means provided by the member states, even taking into account the different risk perception in public opinion in our countries;
(8) in terms of political acceptance and military operability, national armies should continue to operate as the core of the European defence system, with a pre-eminent territorial defence function. The experience of Ukraine shows that national territorial defence (the role of a National Guard) can be effective if well prepared.
(9) Instead, the European military force would mainly be used for joint operations outside European territory. This is the idea of the 28th army (also supported by the SPD in the recent past). Instead, national armies would not necessarily be used for all external tasks, even taking into account the different strategic urgencies of individual countries;
(10) if European integration has so far not progressed in military terms as hoped, the EU has nevertheless developed a great deal of experience in the joint management of power (currency, trade, competition). What has happened in recent years shows that Europe is capable of finding common answers to even the most serious crises. There is no reason to believe that this is impossible on security and defence issues;
(11) the shock of the Russian attack on Ukraine has allowed the EU to make huge strides on industrial issues (SCAF), joint procurement, etc., overcoming decades-old fouling and disagreements. Strong political will can create important dynamics.
I hope to do justice to both Ancel and Domenico, whose ideas are in my opinion complementary and in many points consonant. Any misinterpretation is solely my responsibility.
It should be noted that a member of the Assemblée Nationale took part in the debate. It is Macronian Natalia Pouzyreff. It is certainly very positive that UEF France has counterparts among the political forces. Pouzyreff's position is however (at least in my opinion) rather ambiguous. In his view, progress is only possible in two directions: (1) introducing elements of flexibility in the voting modalities to reach consensus within the European Council, making use of constructive abstentions as provided for in the Treaties, and (2) making progress towards a European pillar of NATO. In the latter regard, Pouzyreff proposed a single EU seat in NATO to enable the Alliance to function on an equal footing. However, given the differences in the EU, any progress can only be based on cooperation between a limited number of states. On the issues raised and proposals made by Ancel and Domenico, she was very reticent, finding the creation of even a gradual European defence unrealistic.
One of the many participants in the debate also pointed out that even Édouard Philippe (former French prime minister), one of Macron's closest and most important allies, speaking at a recent convention of his party (Horizons) had ruled out any possibility of a common European defence. Philippe is one of the most pro-European French politicians! It is clear that promoting federalism in France is difficult.
A few operational considerations: just as the federalists helped to create a pro-European currency front in the 1970s and 1980s by bringing together pro-European personalities in European committees, in the same way a European committee for common defence must now be created. The promoters of the idea need to confront each other. A few years ago we met Felgentreu and Camporini. Now Ancel. It is clear that many of these people do not know each other. Discussions take place more at national level than at European level. We have to help change things (and very soon). In the end, ideas only walk on people's legs.
https://fr.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guillaume_Ancel
Guillaume Ancel est un ancien officier et écrivain français né le 3 décembre 1965. Il a publié plusieurs livres concernant des opérations militaires extérieures au Rwanda, au Cambodge et en Bosnie. Après 20 ans de service dans l'armée qu'il quitte avec le grade de lieutenant-colonel, il pou...
