25/05/2026
Revisiting the referendum: A critical examination of Kiir’s bribery claims and SPLM infiltration allegations
May 25, 2026 BY TEREZA LEILA JUBE
When President Salva Kiir recently claimed before a public audience that former Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir attempted to bribe him with $505 million to derail South Sudan’s independence referendum, the statement sparked immediate controversy. While the allegation makes for dramatic political theatre, a meticulous examination of the historical record, parliamentary proceedings, and internal SPLM dynamics suggests a far more complex and troubling reality.
The bribery claim: Timing and credibility
Addressing the 43rd anniversary of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), Kiir alleged that Al-Bashir made the cash offer in the presence of three regional leaders: the late Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, and the then-President of Mauritania. The purported purpose: to persuade Kiir to cancel the 2011 referendum that ultimately led to South Sudan’s secession.
Critics have raised immediate red flags about the narrative’s timing and plausibility. If such an extraordinary event occurred, why has it taken nearly fifteen years to disclose? Moreover, seasoned observers of Sudan-South Sudan relations note that high-stakes political maneuvering of this nature rarely unfolds before a gallery of heads of state.
“This is not how such operations are conducted,” a former intelligence official with knowledge of cross-border political dynamics told this reporter. “Matters of this sensitivity are handled through security channels and intermediaries, not in multi-lateral summits with multiple heads of state present.”
A history of allegiances: Kiir and the NCP
The credibility of Kiir’s narrative faces further scrutiny when contextualized against his political trajectory. Records indicate that President Kiir maintained consistent communication with Sudan’s National Congress Party (NCP) dating back to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) negotiations.
Particularly revealing are events from 2004 in Yei, where Kiir reportedly broke ranks with Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the revered founder of the SPLM. Subsequently, at the Rumbek Conference, Kiir aligned himself with a Bahr el Ghazal faction that included Bona Malwal, Dominic Dim, Justin Yach, and other members of the JCE group. According to multiple political analysts, individuals within this circle, particularly Bona Malwal, maintained longstanding alliances with the Khartoum regime.
The implications are significant: if key figures within Kiir’s inner circle had established ties to the NCP during the critical period leading to the referendum, the president’s claim that Al-Bashir needed to bribe him directly becomes logically problematic.
The helicopter crash: Unanswered questions and unseemly celebrations
No examination of this period can avoid the tragic death of Dr. John Garang on July 30, 2005, when his helicopter crashed in the forests of Eastern Equatoria while returning from Uganda. The incident remains shrouded in controversy, with successive calls for a transparent investigation.
What is historically documented, and deeply troubling, is that upon news of Garang’s death reaching Juba, certain individuals reportedly distributed sweets in celebration. Witnesses and political historians have consistently identified these celebrants as belonging to factions loyal to Salva Kiir.
General Aleu Ayieny, who served on the official investigation committee into the crash (and who was appointed by Kiir himself), has repeatedly suggested that the Ugandan government bore complicity in Garang’s death. More significantly, Ayieny allegedly threatened that if he and his associates were not reinstated to party and government positions following their dismissal, he would publicly disclose what truly transpired. Napoleon Adwok G*i, another Kiir appointee who served as clerk of the investigation’s information, further complicates the committee’s credibility.
These circumstances have led many to question whether the official investigation was ever intended to uncover the truth, or instead served as a mechanism for control and, some allege, blackmail.
Parliamentary crisis: The referendum battle of 2007-2009
The legislative history of the referendum offers perhaps the most concrete evidence of where loyalties actually lie. Between 2007 and 2009, Sudan’s National Assembly witnessed intense conflict between the NCP and SPLM over multiple pieces of legislation: the Security Bill, the Referendum Bill, the Borders Bill, the Abyei Bill, the Nuba Mountains Bill, and the Blue Nile Bill.
When the draft referendum law was released, SPLM-North representative Yasir Arman discovered a devastating alteration. The NCP had effectively removed secession as an option, replacing it with language that merely “confirmed unity.” The draft also included a provision allowing a six-year postponement of any vote. In other words, the referendum had been rendered meaningless.
Arman’s response was swift. After alerting his colleagues, he led a walkout of SPLM parliamentarians. They contacted Pagan Amum, then SPLM Secretary-General, who was not himself a member of parliament. What followed was a rare public challenge to NCP dominance: the SPLM and opposition parties called for a demonstration demanding democratic reforms.
The government banned the rally the day before, a Sunday, according to contemporaneous accounts. Yet hundreds gathered in Khartoum regardless, led by Pagan Amum and Yasir Arman. Amum’s declaration became legendary: “The referendum will be held, even if the heavens rain down fire.”
Security forces dispersed the gathering, arresting both Amum and Arman. Though both were later released, the incident prompted all SPLM members in the national government to withdraw from Khartoum and return to Juba.
The night revelations: Infiltration exposed
In Juba, emergency meetings stretched from 6:00 P.M. until 7:00 A.M. the following morning. During these marathon sessions, a disturbing pattern emerged: the SPLM parliamentary bloc had been compromised. The individuals who were infiltrated included Manawa Aligo (head of the SPLM parliamentary bloc), General Aleu Ayieny, and Maulana Telar Ring.
Crucially, all three figures were drawn from the faction loyal to President Salva Kiir himself. If these individuals were compromised by the NCP while serving as Kiir’s trusted allies, questions naturally arise about the president’s awareness of or complicity in it.
On December 1, 2007, Kiir responded by issuing a decree dismissing Telar Ring and Aleu Ayieny from the SPLM Political Bureau and revoking their party membership entirely. Kiir publicly framed the decision as necessary to protect the movement’s unity. However, the dismissals of these former friends and allies sparked intense speculation.
Telar Ring, who served as Minister of State in the Sudanese Presidency, had reportedly succeeded in isolating the First Vice President from the party and imposing austerity policies on southern affairs. Some speculated that he aspired to replace Pagan Amum as SPLM Secretary-General. Meanwhile, Aleu Ayieny used his position on the Garang helicopter investigation committee as leverage, repeatedly threatening to expose the truth about the crash unless reinstated.
Manawa Aligo fared worse than his colleagues. Unlike Telar and Ayieny, he possessed neither political leverage nor a power base in Bahr el Ghazal. Consequently, he was never reinstated—a disparity that speaks volumes about how political influence, rather than innocence, determined outcomes.
Remarkably, on September 1, 2009, the SPLM officially readmitted Telar Ring and Aleu Ayieny. Pagan Amum announced that the Political Bureau, after three days of deliberation, had reinstated them with full rights and obligations under the SPLM constitution.
Consequences of compromise
The infiltration of SPLM members had tangible, lasting consequences. Implementation of “popular consultation” provisions for the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and Abyei was effectively blocked. The border between Sudan and South Sudan remains undemarcated to this day, a direct legacy of these parliamentary battles and compromised leadership.
“The people of South Sudan were determined to hold the referendum on schedule,” notes a regional political analyst who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. “This popular determination is precisely what made Kiir and his compromised circle fear they would be the losers if their plan to prevent the referendum succeeded. So Kiir disappeared strategically. The heroism he now claims is a fabrication.”
Deconstructing the $505 million narrative
Even setting aside the political history, the bribery allegation contains internal inconsistencies that undermine its credibility.
First, the specific figure $505 millions. The specificity suggests a constructed narrative rather than an actual recollection.
Second, the logistics of the alleged bribe defy standard practice. “Heads of state are not bribed directly in front of other heads of state,” a former diplomat told a reporter. “These matters are handled through intermediaries—figures like Tut Kew, who had a reputation for facilitating transactions between Khartoum and Juba, or Salah Gosh, the former Sudanese intelligence chief who specialized in exactly this type of operation.”
Third, Kiir rarely conducts high-level meetings without senior advisors. Throughout the critical period, he was typically accompanied by figures such as Pagan Amum, Nhial Deng Nhial, Deng Alor, or Barnaba Marial Benjamin. Any credible account of such a meeting would need to account for their presence or explain their absence.
Fourth, if Al-Bashir genuinely feared the referendum’s outcome and sought to bribe Kiir, logic suggests he would have employed the very networks he had spent years cultivating within Kiir’s circle, the same compromised individuals whose existence undermines Kiir’s current narrative.
The four scandals Kiir would rather not discuss
President Kiir’s dramatic bribery allegation serves a strategic purpose: it deflects attention from far more damaging questions that have haunted his presidency. These include:
The death of John Garang -Who was truly responsible for the helicopter crash that killed South Sudan’s founding father? Why has every investigation been opaque? Why did Kiir appoint his own loyalists to the inquiry committee? And why have figures like Aleu Ayieny suggested they could reveal explosive information?
The 2013 Juba massacres -Who ordered the door-to-door killings of Nuer civilians in Juba following the December 2013 political crisis? The violence that erupted transformed South Sudan from a promising new nation into a failed state.
Systematic corruption -Independent estimates suggest that more than $20 billion, not $505 million, has been embezzled or misappropriated during South Sudan’s brief existence as an independent nation. The president’s focus on a comparatively modest bribery allegation appears designed to distract from this staggering figure.
International pariah status -Who bears responsibility for reducing South Sudan from a nation that inspired global hope to one that commands neither respect nor influence in regional or international forums?
The Murle abduction narrative: Parallel myths
The pattern of constructing convenient narratives extends beyond presidential politics. The most persistent myth in South Sudan, that the Murle people abduct children due to infertility, follows a similar pattern of unsubstantiated accusation serving political ends.
Historical records from B.A. Lewis, who served as an administrator in the 1930s and 1940s, indicates that the Murle did experience a period of fertility challenges. Lewis attributed this to gonorrhea introduced by military personnel posted to Pibor (Lewis, 1972:154). He later documented the restoration of fertility among Murle women and speculated whether this would reduce child abduction (1972:160).
Jon Arensen, another researcher specializing in Murle society, documented a temporary reduction in birthrates among the Murle during the 1960s due to venereal disease, possibly the continuation of the same epidemic Lewis observed. A World Health Organization campaign successfully eradicated the disease in Pibor during the 1960s.
Crucially, no medical data from the past fifty years has identified infertility as a continuing problem among the Murle. While periods of reduced fertility in the distant past may have increased demand for children, anthropological records confirm that child abduction was common throughout the region long before these periods, and was practiced by multiple communities, not exclusively the Murle.
As Lewis presciently observed, it remains “interesting to see if the newfound fertility in Murle women will curb the illicit trade in ‘incest children’ for cattle with the Bor Dinka; a practice frowned upon by authority, but difficult to prevent” (1972:160). The persistence of the infertility narrative despite contrary evidence suggests it serves a social function: delegitimizing the Murle and justifying their marginalization within Jonglei State’s complex ethnic landscape.
Conclusion: A pattern of convenient narratives
President Salva Kiir’s $505 million bribery allegation fits a recognizable pattern: the deployment of dramatic, unverifiable claims to reshape public memory, deflect from accountability, and construct a heroic legacy largely disconnected from documented history.
The evidentiary record, parliamentary proceedings, the documented compromise of Kiir’s own allies, the troubling circumstances surrounding Garang’s death, and the staggering scale of corruption during his presidency paint a picture fundamentally at odds with the narrative Kiir now advances.
If Al-Bashir were still in power or able to respond, observers suggest he would not remain silent. Whatever else may be said about Sudan’s former president, he was known to relish political argument and defend his historical record.
Until independent evidence emerges to support Kiir’s claims, evidence beyond a convenient story delivered fifteen years late, before a sympathetic audience, with no corroborating witnesses, the wiser course is skepticism. South Sudan’s painful history deserves truth, not mythology; accountability, not deflection; and leadership willing to answer hard questions rather than hiding behind unsubstantiated allegations.
The writer is a lawyer, political activist, and a member of the National Salvation Front (NAS).
