04/10/2025
Date: October 2, 2025
Excellencies, Honorable Members,
We write regarding the “Trump Gaza plan” announced on September 29, 2025. Its humanitarian provisions—cessation of hostilities, large-scale aid, and stabilisation—are important and merit engagement. At the same time, credible reporting shows that the text presented publicly differs from what Arab and Muslim leaders were shown earlier—after edits requested by Israel’s prime minister—tightening Israeli control over withdrawal and allowing an open-ended “security perimeter.” This has prompted regional concern.
Below we summarise key areas where the plan, as publicly articulated, conflicts with Palestinians’ fundamental rights, democratic principles, and the internationally endorsed two-state framework; we also explain why humanitarian aid must not be conditioned on political concessions.
A. Self-Determination and International Law
1. Indefinite external control. The plan’s phased withdrawal, conditioned on disarmament benchmarks subject to Israeli discretion alongside an open-ended security perimeter, amounts to continued effective control—inconsistent with the ICJ’s 2024 Advisory Opinion, which found Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory unlawful and set consequences for third States. Therefore, any arrangement that preserves unilateral vetoes or indefinite security zones conflicts with the duty to end the unlawful situation and enable effective Palestinian sovereignty.
2. Failure to restore inalienable rights. UNGA 3236 (1974) affirms the Palestinian people’s inalienable right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty. Humanitarian steps, while essential, do not substitute for restoring those rights and ending unlawful control. Therefore, a framework that halts fighting but withholds effective sovereignty does not meet UN standards.
3. Settlements/annexation unaddressed. The plan lacks enforceable commitments on settlement cessation/rollback, despite UNSC 2334 (2016) reaffirming that settlements have no legal validity and constitute a flagrant violation. Therefore, endorsing the plan absent such measures risks contravening Security Council parameters.
B. Democracy and the Right to Choose Representatives
Palestinians have the right to elect their representatives and to take part in public affairs through freely chosen representatives, under ICCPR Article 25 and Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 25. The plan outlines externally designed transitional governance and exclusions imposed by outside actors, effectively installing a foreign mandate rather than enabling Palestinian electoral choice (as described in the published 20-point text and contemporaneous reporting). Therefore, durable legitimacy requires Palestinian-run elections on a clear timeline, supported—but not replaced—by international actors.
C. Two-State Solution: Latest UNGA Endorsement and the Recognition Wave
On September 12, 2025, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed a France–Saudi-led declaration providing tangible, time-bound, irreversible steps toward a two-state solution (vote 142–10–12). Therefore, any viable initiative should align with and operationalise this mandate; by lacking a clear political horizon explicitly anchored in a two-state solution, the plan diverges from the latest UN guidance.
In parallel, there is a growing wave of recognitions of the State of Palestine—including by Britain, Canada, Australia and Portugal in recent days—alongside broader diplomatic moves at the UN high-level week. Therefore, a plan without an explicit two-state horizon—and with indefinite external controls—contradicts the current direction of international recognition and diplomacy.
D. Humanitarian Aid Must Not Be Conditioned on Political Progress
The plan sequences ceasefire, withdrawals, governance and reconstruction/aid in staged phases tied to security/political benchmarks. International humanitarian law prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of warfare (Additional Protocol I, customary IHL) and the Rome Statute criminalises it. The UN Security Council (2712, 2720) demands unimpeded humanitarian access and created a UN mechanism to facilitate and scale aid, independent of political bargaining. Therefore,conditioning humanitarian assistance and reconstruction on political/security progress is contrary to international law and risks legitimising the use of aid as a weapon of war.
Discrepancy Between Public Roll-Out and Briefings to Arab/Muslim Leaders
Credible reporting indicates the public plan contained “significant changes” requested by the Israeli prime minister—changes not shown to Arab/Muslim leaders during UNGA week—prompting anger among those governments. Therefore, European policymakers and parliaments should exercise heightened caution and request the final, authoritative text and a concordance before any endorsement or resource commitments.
Recommendations to European Policymakers and Parliaments
1. Condition any political endorsement on compliance with international law. Seek written revisions that:
o Remove any indefinite Israeli security perimeter and unilateral veto over withdrawal;
o Commit to a time-bound end to the unlawful presence and transfer of effective sovereignty (ICJ 2024);
o Guarantee Palestinian-led elections on a defined timeline (ICCPR Art. 25 / GC-25);
o Align explicitly with the latest UNGA two-state framework (France–Saudi declaration) and with the current recognition trend.
2. Treat humanitarian tracks as sacrosanct and unconditional. In line with IHL and UNSC 2712/2720, insist that aid flows and civilian protection are not tied to political benchmarks or negotiations.
3. Address settlements and annexation explicitly. Require enforceable commitments consistent with UNSC 2334 (2016) that settlement activity cease and be reversed as part of any roadmap.
4. Request a single, authoritative text. Given credible reports of divergent versions (public vs earlier briefings), obtain the complete, consolidated text before any political endorsement or funding.
Conclusion
Therefore, while immediate humanitarian measures are vital, endorsing the plan as currently framed—absent a clear two-state political horizon, unconditional humanitarian access, Palestinian electoral agency, and settlement compliance—would risk entrenching a rights-deficient status quo contrary to international law and the General Assembly’s latest roadmap.
Respectfully,
Anouar Gharbi / General Secretary
Geneva Council for International Affairs and Development / GCIAD
Address: 15 Rue des Savoises 1205 Geneva / Switzerland
WEB : https://gciad.org email : [email protected] / +4122 7600204
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