WAFarmers

WAFarmers The Western Australian Farmers Federation (Inc) (WAFarmers) has been the voice of farmers since 1912.

With more than 3,000 members, we represent, support and promote primary producers across the State.

The Journalist, The Doctor and The Missing Questions by WAFarmers' CEO Trevor WhittingtonThe recent Weekend Australian a...
02/06/2026

The Journalist, The Doctor and The Missing Questions by WAFarmers' CEO Trevor Whittington

The recent Weekend Australian article on paraquat and Parkinson's disease has generated significant response in The Australian.

For the avoidance of doubt, Parkinson's disease is a devastating condition. The experiences of those living with it deserve to be heard, and Dr David Blacker's advocacy comes from a place of genuine personal experience and concern.

My concern is not that difficult questions were asked.

My concern is whether enough questions were asked.

Last year Dr Blacker approached WAFarmers seeking discussion about paraquat, Parkinson's disease and possible alternatives. The correspondence was respectful, thoughtful and acknowledged the complexity of balancing human health, food production and practical farming realities.

That complexity was largely missing from the final story.

The article devoted considerable attention to the possible links between paraquat and Parkinson's disease. What received far less attention were the practical questions that inevitably follow.

If paraquat is removed, what replaces it?

How are growers expected to manage resistant ryegrass populations?

What are the consequences for no-till farming systems that have dramatically reduced soil erosion across Australia?

What are the impacts on fuel use, moisture conservation, production costs and farm profitability?

These are not talking points. They are the central policy questions.

I was also surprised that a story of such national significance appeared to contain relatively little input from organisations whose day job is understanding these issues, including Grain Producers Australia, CropLife Australia and the National Farmers' Federation.

Good journalism should ask difficult questions.

Great journalism should ask them of everyone.

I've written a detailed response below:

When Journalism Picks a Side

By Trevor Whittington – CEO WAFarmers

One of the more interesting developments in modern journalism is that reporters increasingly seem to know the answer before they begin asking the questions.

That might sound unfair. After all, journalism has always involved judgement. Reporters decide what is newsworthy, which facts deserve prominence and which voices deserve attention. Yet increasingly there is a sense that many modern stories are built around a narrative first and an investigation second. The conclusion is established, the heroes and villains identified, and the reporting process becomes one of gathering supporting material.

Australian journalism has already travelled this road before. Over the past decade we have watched repeated debates about whether journalists are investigators, advocates or activists. We have seen fierce arguments around reporting on climate policy, agriculture, sexual assault allegations, Indigenous affairs, energy and a host of other contentious issues where the line between reporting and campaigning has become increasingly blurred. The common thread is rarely whether a particular cause is right or wrong. Rather, it is whether the journalist approaches the issue seeking to test a hypothesis or confirm one.

Reading Ros Thomas's recent Weekend Australian feature on paraquat and Parkinson's disease, I was reminded of those debates. The article is well written, emotionally powerful and clearly the product of considerable effort. It contains heartbreaking stories from farmers living with Parkinson's disease, references international studies, overseas litigation, regulatory reviews and medical experts. On the surface it looks exactly like the sort of long-form investigative journalism newspapers should be producing more of.

The problem is that by the time you reach the end, you are left with the feeling that the destination was already known before the journey began. The victims have been identified. The regulator is portrayed as compromised. The farming industry is cast as resistant to change. The chemical company occupies its traditional role as corporate villain. What is far less obvious is whether competing explanations, competing evidence and competing interests were examined with the same enthusiasm as material supporting the central narrative.

My own involvement in the story was minor, but revealing.

A fortnight ago, while sitting at the back of an NFF meeting in Canberra during seeding and attempting to work through several hundred emails, I received a text message from the journalist. The story, I was informed, was heading to print. The subject matter was not some local issue affecting a handful of growers. It was paraquat, Parkinson's disease, international litigation, Australian chemical regulation and the future of one of the most widely used herbicides in modern broadacre agriculture.

My immediate reaction was not to defend paraquat. It was to suggest she might be talking to the wrong person.

If I were writing a story on one of the biggest agricultural policy debates in the developed world, my first instinct would be to consult the organisations whose day job is understanding the issue. Grain Producers Australia would seem an obvious starting point. CropLife Australia another. The National Farmers' Federation might offer a useful perspective, while w**d scientists, resistance specialists and agronomists could explain the practical implications of removing a major farming tool from the system.

After all, I am the CEO of one small state farming organisation of three staff. We represent grain and livestock farmers in Western Australia. We are not the national peak body for grain production, chemical regulation, w**d science or herbicide resistance. Had this been a story about capital gains tax and family farming, readers would rightly expect comment from the NFF. Had it been a story about aviation safety, nobody would think it complete without hearing from CASA or national aviation organisations. Yet in a story examining one of the most important herbicides used in modern grain production, the voices that occupy most of the article are not the people responsible for managing the agronomic, economic and environmental consequences of any future ban.

That does not automatically make the article wrong. It does, however, make it incomplete. And incompleteness is often where narrative-driven journalism begins to emerge.

The article relies heavily on the testimony of farmers suffering from Parkinson's disease. Their stories are genuine. Their suffering is real. Their search for answers is entirely understandable. Anyone who has watched a friend or family member battle Parkinson's would struggle not to feel sympathy. Likewise, I have genuine sympathy for Dr David Blacker. He is clearly an intelligent and accomplished neurologist who has experienced a devastating illness firsthand. His desire to understand why Parkinson's disease is increasing is entirely reasonable.

My own interaction with Dr Blacker last year was perhaps the most interesting part of the entire saga because it bears little resemblance to the adversarial narrative that eventually emerged in the media. Dr Blacker approached WAFarmers seeking a discussion about paraquat, Parkinson's disease and possible alternatives. His correspondence was thoughtful, detailed and respectful. He was clearly motivated by personal experience and by a sincere desire to understand whether Australian agriculture could transition away from products he believed may contribute to the condition.

While we disagreed on a number of points, particularly around the weight of evidence and the practical implications of removing paraquat from modern farming systems, the exchange itself was constructive. I explained that farmers view paraquat through a very different lens than many medical professionals. For growers, the question is not whether a chemical has hazards – all chemicals do – but whether the risks can be managed and whether viable alternatives exist. Dr Blacker, to his credit, acknowledged the enormous challenge of feeding a growing global population and recognised that there were no easy answers.

In fact, the correspondence ended on a thoughtful note. Nobody changed their position dramatically, but neither side dismissed the other. It reinforced my view that these debates are usually far more nuanced than the public discussion suggests. Over the following months Dr Blacker moved from inquiry to advocacy, which is entirely his right. Citizens in a democracy are entitled to campaign for causes they believe in. Somewhere between those original emails and the eventual newspaper feature, however, a complex discussion about science, risk, regulation and food production was transformed into a much simpler story about victims, villains and institutional failure.

That transformation says less about Dr Blacker than it does about modern journalism.

There is nothing wrong with advocacy. Australia depends upon it. Farmers advocate. Environmental groups advocate. Doctors advocate. Industry advocates. The journalist's role, however, is different. Advocates begin with a conclusion and seek support for it. Journalists are supposed to begin with a question and follow the evidence wherever it leads. That distinction matters because once journalism becomes invested in a particular narrative, facts that strengthen the story are amplified while facts that complicate it receive far less attention.

That is where the article begins to raise difficult questions.

Many of the examples presented appear to describe something quite different from the case being made. Several of the farmers interviewed describe handling multiple chemicals over decades, often with little or no PPE. They describe spray drift, contaminated water supplies, hand mixing chemicals, chemical exposure through clothing and practices that would horrify modern workplace safety officers. These experiences are important and deserve examination, but they also raise an obvious question that receives surprisingly little attention. Are we examining modern paraquat use or reconstructing agricultural practices from half a century ago?

That distinction matters because contemporary agriculture is not agriculture in 1975. Modern labels are different. Modern PPE is different. Modern training requirements are different. Modern application systems are different. Modern understanding of occupational exposure is different. Yet throughout the article historical exposure, modern exposure, epidemiological studies, personal testimony and legal action are woven together into a single narrative thread. The result is emotionally compelling, but it leaves many of the complexities unexplored.

The most obvious missing piece is context.

The article repeatedly notes that Parkinson's disease is increasing globally. That is true. The World Health Organisation has documented the rise. Neurologists around the world have documented the rise. Researchers continue to debate the causes. Yet if Parkinson's disease is increasing across entire populations and across countries with vastly different agricultural systems, surely the first obligation of an investigative journalist is to explore the broader picture.

Where is the discussion of diesel emissions, solvents, heavy metals, particulate pollution, microplastics, pharmaceuticals or cumulative lifetime exposure to hundreds of synthetic compounds? Where is the discussion of ageing populations and improved diagnosis? One does not need to agree with any particular explanation. One simply needs to acknowledge that the scientific picture is considerably more complicated than the article suggests.

Perhaps the most revealing section concerns the APVMA. Readers are told in no uncertain terms that the regulator is funded by farmers, not that the government levies ag chemicals to fund the regulator. The implication is subtle but unmistakable. Industry funds the regulator, therefore industry influences the regulator, therefore the regulator's conclusions should be viewed with suspicion.

It is an effective piece of framing, but it quickly weakens when placed in a broader context. Much of modern government operates on cost-recovery models. Mining regulators are funded by mining companies. Port regulators are funded by ports. Aviation regulators are funded by aviation. Fisheries management is funded by fisheries. Water regulation is funded by water users. If levy funding is evidence of corruption, then half the regulatory system is compromised. If not, then the repeated references to funding arrangements become less a matter of evidence and more a matter of narrative construction.

None of this means the APVMA is infallible. No regulator is. Every regulator should be challenged. Every regulator should be scrutinised. Every regulator should be forced to defend its conclusions. But scrutiny requires engaging with the science, not merely the accounting structure.

Perhaps the most remarkable omission in the entire article is the lack of any serious examination of alternatives. A reader unfamiliar with modern grain production could easily come away with the impression that removing paraquat would undoubtedly create some inconvenience for farmers, but that workable substitutes are readily available and the transition is largely a matter of industry reluctance. Yet the obvious policy questions are never properly explored. What exactly replaces paraquat in no-till farming systems that have been developed over four decades to reduce soil erosion, conserve moisture and improve soil structure? How are growers expected to manage increasingly resistant ryegrass populations across Western Australia, South Australia and the eastern states? What additional cultivation passes would be required, how much extra fuel would be consumed, what would be the impact on production costs and yields, and what environmental trade-offs would emerge through increased soil disturbance and reduced moisture retention?

These are not secondary considerations or talking points supplied by industry lobbyists. They are the central questions policymakers, regulators and farmers must confront if a major agricultural tool is removed. The distinction is important because advocacy is primarily concerned with what should happen, whereas policy must deal with what happens next. One is morally appealing. The other is often messy, complicated and full of unintended consequences. Serious journalism should be interested in both.

The real tragedy here is that Parkinson's disease deserves better than a simplistic narrative. Farmers deserve better than a simplistic narrative. Dr Blacker deserves better than a simplistic narrative. The public deserves better than a simplistic narrative.

The Australian has built much of its reputation by questioning conventional wisdom, challenging assumptions and applying scepticism to fashionable causes. That is precisely why this article is disappointing. Not because it asks difficult questions of agriculture, but because it appears reluctant to ask equally difficult questions of its own assumptions.

The paraquat debate is important. The health of farmers is important. The integrity of chemical regulation is important. Food production is important. Every one of these issues deserves rigorous scrutiny. What they do not deserve is a style of journalism that increasingly resembles the preparation of a legal brief, where evidence supporting the preferred case is assembled diligently while contradictory evidence receives only passing attention.

The most difficult stories are not those where the journalist knows the answer. They are the stories where nobody knows the answer and the task is to genuinely explore uncertainty. After reading this article, I was left with the distinct impression that uncertainty was the one thing the story had little interest in examining.

And that should concern all of us far more than any single chemical.

How to Rebuild a Flock on Paper by Trevor Whittington, CEO of WAFarmersThat’s the simple takeaway from the latest instal...
02/06/2026

How to Rebuild a Flock on Paper by Trevor Whittington, CEO of WAFarmers

That’s the simple takeaway from the latest instalment of the live export transition process.

Last week another piece of the Government’s $139 million transition package quietly appeared online in the form of an economic report prepared by Melbourne-based economists, commissioned by Sydney based Sheep Producers Australia and funded by the Federal Department of Agriculture in Canberra.
The report itself is a 64-page effort by Rennie Advisory titled WA Roadmap to 2028 – Economic Analysis.

According to the authors, the report provides:
“an economic evidence base to inform the WA Sheep Industry Roadmap to 2028.”

Excellent. I like economics. I like evidence even more.

Now let’s start with the good.

The economic baseline projects an increase of around 300,000 sheep in the state flock from approximately 8.7 million head in FY2026 to 9 million head by FY2030, largely driven by bigger flocks and a shift toward sheep meat breeds.

But in a perfect world, according to Rennie, coordinated interventions could by 2030, increase flock size by 17 per cent, add 1.5 million sheep, generate an additional $660 million in value-add, create thousands of jobs, and lift average mixed-farm income by roughly $100,000 annually.

In other words, the modelling largely demonstrates what could happen under favourable conditions rather than what economic evidence suggests is likely to happen in a business-as-usual scenario.
To its credit, the report correctly identifies many of the industry’s problems, including declining ewe numbers, labour shortages, processor bottlenecks, land-use competition from cropping and collapsing producer confidence.

Unfortunately, these are hardly groundbreaking discoveries.
WA producers sat through endless workshops telling the Government-appointed Independent Panel precisely the same things, only for consultants to later repackage much of the Glyde Panel process and vacuum up from the vast library of existing literature produced by MLA, DPIRD and countless previous industry reviews.

The problem is not the diagnosis.

The problem is the extraordinary analytical leap from diagnosis to projected recovery, minus the economic detail explaining how those conclusions were reached.

The report provides only broad descriptions of the modelling architecture while simultaneously making relatively large public claims about flock rebuilding, value-add, employment growth, profitability and supply-chain transformation.

What is largely absent, however, is the deeper level of calibration detail economists would normally expect to properly interrogate such modelling. There is limited transparency around behavioural assumptions, adoption rates, confidence ranges, investment hurdle rates, downside scenarios, probability weighting, sensitivity testing or validation against observed historical producer behaviour.

That matters because these assumptions ultimately determine whether the projected outcomes represent realistic economic probabilities or simply optimistic theoretical possibilities assembled inside a favourable modelling environment.

The report repeatedly relies on what it calls “illustrative modelling”. Now in high-end consulting circles that phrase has a very specific meaning carefully designed to sound more impressive than it actually is.

Illustrative modelling is not predictive modelling.
It is not investment-grade forecasting.

It is not probabilistic economic analysis.

It is essentially a structured “what if” exercise designed to show how a system might behave if a large number of favourable assumptions happen to line up at the same time.

And that is precisely where the report becomes vulnerable.

Much of the modelling depends on highly optimistic assumptions aligning simultaneously across a fragmented, commercially constrained and politically disrupted industry.

The report effectively says:
“Now that the Federal Government has dynamited one of the walls of the house, here are several optimistic scenarios showing how big the new house could become without fully factoring in the challenges involved in rebuilding it.”

And that, in many ways, captures the entire problem.

The modelling itself relies heavily on what might politely be described as stacked optimism.

Unfortunately for Rennie, the audience for this report is a deeply cynical group of farmers who have spent years watching governments convince themselves that central planning, workshops and consultant reports can somehow compensate for the deliberate removal of a major buyer from the saleyards system.
That scepticism has only deepened as nearly a quarter of the transition funding appears to have disappeared into an endless procession of talking, planning, steering groups and reports delivered at a pace only rivalled by the Defence Department’s efforts to build submarines.

In that context, what Rennie has produced is largely the wrong report for the wrong audience at the wrong time, in other words they have produced a report for the last war.

As a strategic framework document designed to help a largely clueless government understand the broad structure of the sheep industry and the challenges involved in replacing live exports, it would have been perfectly adequate.

What it is not, however, is a serious background document capable of underpinning a credible roadmap for rebuilding the WA sheep flock and replacing the economic role live exporters once played in the saleyards system.

Putting aside the fact that much of the report references market prices, margins and operating conditions from 2025 — making parts of it already dated for anyone attempting to understand how the recent recovery in sheep prices has altered farmer, processor and marketer behaviour — the deeper problem lies in the language surrounding the analysis itself.

The report often implies a level of evidentiary certainty the underlying methodology simply does not support.

More importantly, it largely treats industry participants as though they are mechanically rational economic actors responding neatly to price signals and coordination incentives.

Real agriculture does not work like that.

Behavioural economics, investment psychology and decades of agricultural history tell us confidence, trust, memory and risk perception matter enormously in capital allocation decisions. Farmers who have spent years destocking sheep, dismantling fencing, selling labour, investing in machinery and watching governments legislate away established markets do not simply reverse course because a consultant models a favourable scenario on paper.

Once confidence is broken, industries rarely respond in a smooth linear fashion to improved prices alone.

That is particularly true in agriculture, where investment cycles are long, biological systems are slow and memories of political and financial pain tend to outlast commodity rallies.

The report itself quietly concedes this in the disclaimer, acknowledging the work does not provide forecasts, guaranteed outcomes or policy recommendations. Yet publicly the document is framed as an “economic evidence base” underpinning industry transition.

Those are not the same thing.

At its core, the report’s strongest conclusions depend upon simultaneous success across a remarkably large number of uncertain variables. Flock rebuilding, processor coordination, labour availability, finishing capacity, data integration, behavioural alignment, premium market development and producer confidence all need to improve together and remain aligned over time.
Individually, none of these assumptions are absurd.

Collectively, however, they create what economists would recognise as a classic stacked-optimism problem. The strongest outcomes only emerge when nearly every favourable assumption aligns simultaneously across a fragmented, capital-constrained and politically disrupted industry.

And this is where the report starts to drift away from the real-world experience of WA agriculture.

Australia’s sheep sector has not spent the past thirty years asleep waiting for interstate consultants to discover genetics, processor coordination and supply-chain optimisation. Industry participants have already poured enormous amounts of money, research and effort into genetic improvement, objective measurement, processing rationalisation, extension systems, market development, carcase feedback, producer groups and supply-chain optimisation. In a perfect world all of these initiatives would have seamlessly combined into a highly profitable integrated supply chain.

But despite decades of effort — and hundreds of millions spent by everyone from MLA, DPIRD, processors, consultants, Austrade and producers themselves — the long-term directional trend has remained stubbornly consistent: fewer sheep and more cropping.
That is one of the key challenges a useful report needed to grapple with.

What structural barriers have prevented the industry from reaching the promised land despite decades of effort?
Or has the market simply spoken, reaching a rational conclusion about relative returns, labour intensity, political risk and lifestyle preferences?

Those designing a “future flock strategy” should probably have demanded their consultants answer those questions rather than producing a document an MBA student could have assembled with the assistance of a couple of AI programs.

The report is a major missed opportunity to examine the real structural challenges facing the industry.

For example, it largely sidesteps the dominant force reshaping Western Australian agriculture over the past three decades: the relentless economic superiority of broadacre cropping relative to livestock production.

Nor does the report seriously grapple with the generational shift now reshaping the Wheatbelt.

A younger generation of operators has increasingly gravitated toward machinery-based systems rather than labour-intensive livestock enterprises.

Cropping is more scalable, easier to automate, operationally simpler and politically less exposed.

Many producers have already voted with their headers, air seeders and balance sheets.

To its credit, the report acknowledges that cropping has substantially outperformed sheep enterprises in both productivity and farm returns.

What it never convincingly explains is why producers would suddenly reverse this long-running capital allocation trend.
This is not merely a cyclical adjustment driven by seasonal conditions or temporary commodity prices.

It is a generational restructuring of Western Australian agriculture.
Yet the Rennie report largely treats this transformation as though it were reversible through better coordination, improved market signalling and enough industry workshops.

Perhaps the rush to secure government grants for feedlots was the signal that the industry had fundamentally changed.
Or perhaps it simply demonstrated that farmers remain exceptionally good at filling out grant applications when free money appears on the table.

Either way, the report never seriously grapples with the deeper question.

Where is the evidence — or even the serious discussion — about the scale of the economic, labour, cultural and structural barriers the industry would need to overcome to reverse thirty years of momentum away from sheep and toward cropping?

What producers actually want to know is far simpler:
Where are the genuine low-hanging opportunities capable of replacing the economic hole left by the destruction of live exports and which offer better returns than grain farming? And who will pay?

Because this is where the modelling becomes deeply optimistic.
The report effectively assumes a future “great leap forward” in sheep industry coordination and profitability without identifying any genuinely disruptive catalyst capable of fundamentally changing enterprise economics.

Improved coordination along the supply chain is all well and good but who pays? There is no GRDC-scale billion-dollar research fund ready to bankroll a breakthrough transforming sheep productivity.
There is no technological discontinuity comparable to genetically modified cropping systems.

There is no major new China-style demand shock entering global sheep markets.

And there is certainly no sudden wave of young farmers desperately trying to re-enter labour-intensive livestock production.
Without some genuinely transformative catalyst, the report risks confusing aspiration with economic probability.

The real failure here does not even sit with the consultants themselves.

It sits with those responsible for designing the terms of reference.
They missed an important opportunity to properly research and model the real drivers of change within the industry, starting with the extent to which the recent uplift in sheep prices has already begun restoring producer confidence and altering decision-making behaviour.

There should have been far deeper analysis around what will drive flock rebuilding in the real world. Is it confidence? Price? Seasonal conditions? Labour availability? Sovereign risk? Access to capital? Processor competition? Generational succession? Or simply whether sheep can compete economically against another thousand hectares of crop and a new header?

Instead, too much of the transition funding now appears to have been directed toward producing optimistic pathway documents rather than genuinely adversarial economic analysis examining the anchors dragging behind the industry.

The result is a report that spends far more time describing what a perfectly coordinated sheep industry might look like in theory than honestly confronting why the industry has struggled to achieve that coordination for the past thirty years despite endless workshops, committees, strategic plans and consultant reviews.

It reminds me somewhat of the old Soviet Union, which also had a fondness for producing impressive five-year plans on paper — full of ambitious production targets, coordination assumptions and glowing projections — all dependent on vast systems of central planning somehow working perfectly once the report was printed.
Unfortunately, agriculture, like human nature, has a habit of refusing to cooperate with beautifully designed plans.

No doubt farmers can’t wait for the Roadmap and the Future Flock Strategy to be released

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