https://www.facebook.com/2113700812274687/

Maan-Hage, Hargeisa, Hargeisa (2026)

27/12/2025

Somaliland Xaq Ayay u leedahay in Aayahaeeda Mustaqbal katashato. Wax kastoo guul ah oo ay gaadhaana waa wax Somali usoo hoyatay.
Ictiraafka Israaiiludu siisay Somaliland wuxuu u baahanyay in si qoto dheer loo dul istaago.

Suaalaha is waydiinta leh Waxa weeye

1. Somaliland Maxay ictiraafka kaga badalatay yuhuuda?
A. Ma in lasiiyo bada somaliland oo ay dagaal kula gasho Iiraan, xuutiyiinta, Turkey ama Somalida kale.
B. Ma in yuhuuda gurtaan macdanta naadirka ah ee taala Somaliland?
C. Mise in Somaliland diinta islaamka ka tanaasusho oo ku biirto diinta Ibraahiimiyada ee loo yaqaano abraham accord?

Miday doontaba hanoqotee maxaa khatar ku xeeran?
Si dawladu ma is waydiisay oo is barbar dhig maku samaysay faaidada iyo khatarta inoo leedahay hada ama mustaqbalka.

A. Saaxiibtimo lasamayno yuhuuda? Seh yuhuudu ma aaminsantay adoo muslima inay saaxiib inaga dhigato?

ولن ترضى عنك اليهود ولا النصارى حتى تتبع
ملتهم)

B. Hadii aynu siino badeena oo dagaal kula galaan xuutiyiinta, Malaga yaabaa khatar inay inagu keento oo xitaa dakada Berbera la burbiriyo sidoo kalena hargeisa ay duqeeyaan? Dagaalkaasi ma noqonayaa mid guul inoo ah.

C. Hadli somaliland ogolaato in Palatine ta Dagan Qassa loosoo raro deegaanka Somaliland, Khatar intee leeg ayay inagu tahay?
Malaga yaabaa inay noqoto sidii Yuhuuda loogu soo raray dhulka falastiinta kadibna sida falastiinta dhulkoogii looga qaaday inagana inooga qaadaan.

Suaalahaygu maaha inaan kasoo horjeedo in Somaliland ictiraaf hesho. Seh waa in dawladu kajawaabto suaalahaas sidoo kalena dastuurka hor keento si umadu ula socdaan uma ogaadaan Waxaynu ictiraafka ku badalanay iyo in ladarsay khataraha ay inoo keeni karto.

18/05/2025

Our Destiny, Not Theirs: A Somali Youth’s Plea on Foreign Influence

Part 6 - New Entrants: China’s Principle and Israel’s Interest

In the last few years, two unexpected players have entered the Somalia/Somaliland arena in different ways: China (and its rival Taiwan), and Israel.

A. China

Traditionally had limited involvement in Somalia beyond occasional aid and diplomatic niceties. But when Somaliland made a bold move in 2020 to establish formal ties with Taiwan (the island China claims as a renegade province), Beijing took notice – and action. Somaliland and Taiwan opened reciprocal representative offices, effectively recognizing each other to a degree.
This was a breakthrough for Somaliland (Taiwan is one of the few entities that would treat it as a country, given Taiwan itself knows the pain of non-recognition). Taiwan brought development assistance and hopes of investment to Somaliland. Many Somalilanders celebrated this as a step out of isolation.

China, however, was furious. To China, this was an intolerable provocation in its own backyard struggle with Taiwan. China firmly warned Somaliland not to strengthen ties with Taiwan and doubled down on supporting Somalia’s claim over Somaliland. Essentially, Beijing fused its “One China” policy with a “One Somalia” stance. Chinese officials pressured Somaliland to drop the Taiwan deal (to no avail), and at the same time wooed the Somali federal government with promises. In 2020, Somalia’s President reaffirmed adherence to One China and cut ties with Taiwan (not that Somalia had official ties, but it was symbolic). China likely offered more development projects in Mogadishu as a reward. Indeed, in 2022 China announced plans to support port development in Mogadishu and other infrastructure – a clear message: China will help Somalia, while Somaliland gets nothing if it aligns with China’s adversary.

This dynamic puts Somaliland in the crossfire of the US-China global rivalry too. The US, as mentioned, quietly liked the Taiwan-Somaliland connection (common values of democracy, etc., plus it irked China). Some US lawmakers even cite Somaliland’s Taiwan ties as a reason to boost U.S. engagement – to show support for those who side with the West over China. Somaliland’s representative in the US proudly noted that partnering with Taiwan improved Somaliland’s image in Washington.

For Somalia’s government, China has become an even more vital ally to keep. China is a U.N. Security Council member that will block any attempts to recognize Somaliland. It also can invest in big projects – something Somalia needs. Recently, China mediated in the Ethiopia conflict and is active in Djibouti (where it has a military base). So, Somalia values Chinese friendship as a counterweight to Western influence. Interestingly, when Ethiopia struck the port deal with Somaliland, Somalia’s President got strong backing from Egypt and China to oppose it.

In short, China’s involvement reinforces the status quo bias internationally. Somaliland’s recognition bid now faces the informal veto of a superpower (China). And China will use Somalia/Somaliland issues in its chess game with the West and Taiwan. If Taiwan’s presence in Somaliland grows, China might respond by further empowering Somalia’s central government with investment and possibly security cooperation, so that Somaliland remains isolated.

Somalis again risk being pawns: do we really want to become a bargaining chip in U.S.-China competition? Our conflict should not be another arena for them to score points. Let’s not forget, these giants will shake hands in a summit far away and trade us off if it suits them. We must assert our own agency.

B. Israel

Now, Israel is another intriguing actor. Officially, Israel has no relations with Somalia (a Muslim-majority country historically supportive of Palestine). Somaliland, however, has quietly courted Israel for years, seeing parallels – a small democracy in a hostile region looking for recognition. Israel actually was one of the countries that recognized independent Somaliland in 1960 before it unified with Somalia. In recent times, there have been growing murmurs of Israel getting involved – not out of love for Somalis per se, but out of strategic interest.

Reports surfaced in 2024 that Israel is considering establishing a military presence in Somaliland – possibly a naval base – with the encouragement of the UAE. The logic: Somaliland’s coast is prime real estate overlooking the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab al-Mandab strait which leads to Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat. With Houthi in Yemen (who are anti-Israel) and Iranian influence in the Red Sea, Israel would love a vantage point to monitor and respond to threats. An Israeli base in Somaliland could help “counter Iranian arms shipments” and guard maritime routes. In exchange, Israel might offer what Somaliland craves – diplomatic recognition and economic investment. There’s even talk this could be brokered as part of the broader Abraham Accords trend (where UAE, Bahrain, etc., normalized with Israel – perhaps Somaliland could be slotted in as well with Gulf help).

Imagine the impact: Israel formally recognizing Somaliland would be a game-changer, likely encouraging some Western nations to follow. Somaliland would gain a powerful military ally and investor. But the backlash would also be fierce: Somalia’s government and many citizens (sympathetic to Palestine) would see it as a betrayal. Muslim countries that currently fence-sit might double-down against Somaliland recognition to avoid angering their own publics. It could inflame religious and nationalist sentiments.

Also, as the Rio Times report noted, Israel doing this could “strain its relations with Somalia and other Muslim-majority African nations”. Would Israel care? Perhaps not much, if the benefit outweighs that. Israel also likely calculates that with Sudan (another nearby country) normalizing relations and Ethiopia friendly, adding Somaliland would strengthen an Israel-Ethiopia-UAE axis in the Red Sea. Indeed, analysts mention a “trilateral axis” emerging there that.

So here again, Somalia/Somaliland becomes part of a larger strategic puzzle – this time the Middle East security puzzle. For Israel (and UAE), enabling Somaliland’s independence might be worthwhile to secure a Red Sea foothold. For Egypt and maybe other countries, it’s something to thwart (Egypt has firmly said it won’t allow anyone to threaten Somalia’s unity, partly because Egypt sees Somalia as a partner against Ethiopia). We end up a proxy in not just one, but multiple overlapping rivalries – Gulf vs. Gulf, West vs. China, Israel/UAE vs. Iran/Egypt.

This is dangerous terrain. It means escalation in our region could occur not due to Somali needs, but due to unrelated conflicts. Already, we saw hints: Egyptian troops in Somalia, Ethiopian troops to the border – these movements in 2023–24 were less about us and more about their feud over the Nile and Red Sea access. Likewise, if Israel and Iran’s shadow war heats up, would Somaliland become a target because of an Israeli base? Would Houthi fire missiles at our port because foreign warships docked there? These scenarios are no longer far-fetched – Houthis have already threatened all ships heading to Israel and struck vessels in the Red Sea.

We, the youth, must ask: Is this the future we want?

To potentially become collateral damage in global conflicts? Somalis are tired of wars that are not our own. We suffered during the Cold War when the superpowers fought through our proxy war with Ethiopia. We suffered in the war on terror when international jihadists and counterterror forces clashed on our soil. We shouldn’t have to suffer in an Iran-Israel or China-Taiwan proxy conflict next.

Israel’s interest, if genuine, might bring some short-term gains for Somaliland, but we must weigh it against long-term consequences. An alignment with Israel could isolate Somaliland from much of the Muslim world; it could also harden Somalia’s stance even further, making any reconciliation impossible. Conversely, if Somalia embraces allies like Egypt and China to counter this, it might militarize the situation more. This is a precarious path.

15/05/2025

Our Destiny, Not Theirs: A Somali Youth’s Plea on Foreign Influence
Part 5 - Western Powers and Big Players: Principles or Pragmatism?

B. The United Kingdom and Europe: Colonial Legacies and New Engagements

The UK has a special historical connection to this issue – it was the colonial ruler of Somaliland (British Somaliland) before 1960, while Italy colonized the south. Indeed, in June 1960 Britain granted independence to Somaliland as a separate nation, which then voluntarily unified with the south a few days later. Because of this history, Somaliland’s argument for recognition leans on the idea that “we were once independent and entered a union that failed.” Some in Britain feel a sense of responsibility or at least a unique position to weigh in.

The UK’s official stance today, like others, is not to recognize Somaliland unilaterally. British diplomats say they encourage dialogue and that any change in status must be decided between Hargeisa and Mogadishu. However, the UK has been relatively sympathetic to Somaliland’s case in subtle ways:
The UK allows Somaliland’s representatives in London to operate openly (though not as an official embassy). Many members of the Somali diaspora in Britain hail from Somaliland and advocate for its recognition.

The British government has given significant aid directly to Somaliland for development and even security capacity-building, treating it as a distinct region for aid purposes. This support has helped Somaliland strengthen its institutions. Importantly, British parliamentarians have periodically taken up the cause.

In January 2022, the UK Parliament held a historic debate on recognizing Somaliland. Several MPs, including a former Cabinet minister, argued passionately that Somaliland deserves independence and that Britain should lead the way in the international community. They lauded Somaliland’s democratic progress and said waiting decades more would be futile.

Somaliland’s leadership publicly thanked these MPs for raising the issue. In that debate, the British government minister responded cautiously, reiterating support for continued talks between Somaliland and Somalia rather than recognition. Still, the mere fact such a debate occurred – and again in the House of Lords in 2024 – signals a growing sentiment in the UK to “face reality,” as one MP put it.

If a critical mass of countries ever move to recognize Somaliland, the UK might be among the first, owing to both moral arguments and an influential Somaliland diaspora lobbying from within. For Somalia, Britain remains a key ally too.

The UK is one of the largest donors to Somalia’s state-building and humanitarian efforts. It co-chairs international forums on Somalia’s future. London hosted major conferences to support Somalia in 2012 and 2017. The UK provides training to Somali forces (recently British troops have trained anti-terror units in Somalia). So, Britain also values a unified, stable Somalia for security reasons – remember, terrorist attacks in Somalia (like the 2019 Mogadishu bombing) killed a dual British-Somali citizen MP, so the threat can touch them too. This puts the UK in a bit of a dilemma: its heart (and Parliament) sees justice in Somaliland’s aspirations, but its strategic mind sees the chaos that a rushed recognition might unleash.

For now, it walks a middle line. Somalis should note: unlike the Gulf or Ethiopia who act out of narrow interests, the UK’s approach at least tries to uphold an international principle (don’t redraw borders violently) while acknowledging democracy. It may not satisfy either side completely, but it comes off as more principled than, say, the UAE’s blatant dual dealings.

The wider European Union (EU) similarly supports Somali unity officially. The EU has funded Somali government programs and the African Union peacekeeping mission, and it diplomatically backs the federal government. Yet, European nations also engage Somaliland practically.

Several EU countries have set up “liaison offices” in Hargeisa to supervise aid projects and maintain communication. None recognize it, but they treat it almost as an autonomous territory. The EU is caught between legal norms (they generally don’t favor secession movements) and on-ground effectiveness (Somaliland uses aid money more effectively than the rest of Somalia in many cases). One European angle deserves mention: the issue of piracy a decade ago. Somali pirates were hijacking ships off the coast (mostly based in Puntland, not Somaliland). An international naval force had to patrol the Indian Ocean.

Somaliland cooperated with the EU on anti-piracy, even handing over suspects. This showed that Somaliland could be a useful partner for international security despite its undefined status. The experience likely warmed some Europeans to the notion that Somaliland is a responsible actor. However, the African Union (AU) remains a tougher audience. The AU has a core principle: no redrawing of colonial-era borders, to prevent endless secessionism in Africa. Somaliland’s case tests this principle because technically it is reverting to a colonial border (the old British Somaliland boundary).

In fact, years ago an AU fact-finding mission acknowledged Somaliland’s unique case, noting it was not a typical “secession” since it had been separated at independence. Yet the AU has never formally endorsed recognition, fearing a domino effect (Biafra in Nigeria, Ambazonia in Cameroon, etc., might all reignite). So AU members, including powerful ones like South Africa and Nigeria, have so far sided with Somalia’s government in international forums. It was notable that when Ethiopia attempted its port/recognition gambit, the AU quickly reaffirmed support for Somalia’s unity– a rare open statement, probably to dissuade others from breaking ranks. The Arab League similarly backs Somalia’s claim over Somaliland (Arab states reflexively avoid dividing a member state).

This means Somaliland faces an uphill battle diplomatically: some Western voices sympathize, but formal intergovernmental bodies do not.

For young Somalis, especially in Somaliland, this could be frustrating – seeing your successful democracy held back by rigid continental politics. And for youth in Somalia, it might be reassuring – knowing that the AU, Arab League, UN, etc., have your country’s back. But we should question: are these bodies defending unity for our sake or just their own precedent? Probably both. It’s a reminder that Somalis must ultimately persuade other Africans and Arabs that Somaliland’s case can be resolved without destabilizing the region. That could mean a negotiated settlement everyone accepts, rather than a unilateral recognition that ruffles multilateral feathers.

04/05/2025

Our Destiny, Not Theirs: A Somali Youth’s Plea on Foreign Influence

Part 5 - Western Powers and Big Players: Principles or Pragmatism?

Beyond our region and the Middle East, major global powers and institutions also influence the Somalia-Somaliland question. Chief among them: the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the African Union, and more recently China (with its eye on Somaliland-Taiwan relations) and a quietly interested Israel.

These actors tend to speak the language of international law, stability, and development. Publicly, almost all of them adhere to the principle of Somalia’s territorial integrity – meaning they do not officially support Somaliland’s independence. Yet behind closed doors, or in their actions, some also hedge and make unique engagements.

A. The United States: Counterterrorism First, Unity Second

For the U.S., Somalia has historically been viewed through the lenses of humanitarian concern and security threat. Images of starving Somali children in 1992 prompted a U.S.-led relief mission (which ended tragically with Black Hawk Down). Years later, the rise of Islamist militias and pirates made Somalia a “hotspot” for U.S. counterterrorism. The U.S. helped stand up the current Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in the 2010s and has been a key sponsor of the African Union forces fighting al-Shabaab. In 2013, the U.S. formally recognized the Somali government for the first time since 1991 – implicitly reaffirming support for a unified Somali republic including Somaliland.

So, on paper, America is a champion of one Somalia. U.S. officials often urge dialogue but stress that recognition of Somaliland is not on the table unless Somalia agrees. The U.S. has backed U.N. resolutions affirming Somalia’s unity and supported the African Union’s stance against redrawing boundaries. Many Somali unionists take heart in this, thinking “the superpower is on our side.”

However, U.S. policy has not been entirely one-note. In practice, Washington has developed quiet ties with Somaliland too. Why? Because Somaliland is stable, relatively democratic, and strategically located – useful for U.S. interests! American diplomats and military personnel have frequented Hargeisa in recent years. There’s no U.S. embassy (since that would imply recognition), but there is engagement. In 2020, reports emerged that U.S. military even evaluated Somaliland airfields for potential use against al-Shabaab. In 2022, the head of U.S. Africa Command made an unprecedented visit to Somaliland, meeting its leadership. Congressional staff delegations have also toured Somaliland. All this signals a growing U.S. willingness to work directly with Somaliland, treating it almost like a separate partner short of legal recognition.

Moreover, American political voices have increasingly spoken up for Somaliland. Conservative think tanks and some Republicans in Congress argue that recognizing Somaliland would reward a pro-West democracy and secure a foothold against terrorist groups and even against Chinese influence. In fact, under the Trump Administration (2017-2020), several key officials were in favor of recognizing Somaliland. They saw it as “acknowledging reality” and perhaps gaining an African ally that Taiwan (a U.S. friend) already partners with. President Trump did not go so far as to change the policy (and lost re-election), but interestingly, there were recent reports in late 2024 that if he returned to office, Trump was poised to recognize Somaliland. This was floated as part of a strategy to deepen U.S. ties in the Horn of Africa, boost democracy, and counter China.

Such a move would be revolutionary – breaking with decades of U.S. stance. But even those who advocate it warn of downsides: it could destabilize Somalia, embolden al-Shabaab (taking advantage of government infighting), anger other allies like Turkey or the African Union, and set a precedent separatist elsewhere might cite. The U.S., being a global leader, has to weigh those consequences carefully. For now, the official line remains to help Somalis reconcile Somaliland’s status internally, rather than jump to recognition.

However, U.S. interests might slowly trump its hesitations. Somaliland’s location along the Gulf of Aden and near the entrance to the Red Sea is extremely valuable. Hundreds of ships pass that coast, carrying oil and goods to America’s allies. With Yemen in conflict and Iran-backed threats in the Bab al-Mandab chokepoint, the U.S. would love more eyes and facilities in the area. A stable port or airfield in Somaliland could complement the big U.S. base in Djibouti (which is currently very congested with multiple foreign forces). This is why some analysts say deepening a partnership with Somaliland “even without full recognition” could still benefit U.S. strategic goals. Indeed, cooperating with Somaliland allows the U.S. to monitor conflicts in the Horn (like in nearby Ethiopia or Sudan) and project power in the Red Sea, all while keeping an eye on al-Shabaab from another angle.

From Somaliland’s perspective, these are positive developments – they feel seen by the U.S. at last. In 2024, Somaliland held a democratic election (a new president was peacefully elected), and the U.S. Ambassador even attended the inauguration, saying “you have many friends in the international community”. Such gestures boost Somalilanders’ morale and standing. The new Somaliland president has pledged closer ties with the U.S. and also Taiwan. We can sense momentum building.

From Somalia’s unity perspective, this is worrisome. The Somali government relies on U.S. military aid to fight terrorists and build the national army. If the U.S. tilts too far toward Somaliland, Mogadishu fears losing crucial support. However, so far, the U.S. tries to balance – increasing engagement in Hargeisa while still funding and training Somalia’s forces and reaffirming official support for the federal government. It’s a delicate dance.

For Somali youth on both sides, the key point is America will do what serves American interests in the end. Right now, that interest calculation is in flux. The U.S. supports unity in principle but also hedges by befriending Somaliland’s administration – a foot in both camps. We should neither overestimate the U.S. as a savior nor assume they will always back one side. If tomorrow an independent Somaliland aligned with U.S. goals (like hosting a base or recognizing Israel perhaps), Washington might shift dramatically in its favor. Conversely, if unity is seen as more stabilizing or if Somalia offers equal strategic benefits, they’ll stick with one Somalia.

So, my fellow youth, I urge: Do not outsource our decision to Washington. American friendship is welcome, but our destiny is ours. Let’s lobby and make our cases to them, sure – but in the end, we should solve our dispute in a way that we can live with, because foreign powers will adapt to whatever outcome we produce. If we unite, we must unite on our own terms, and if we separate, let it be by our own agreement – not as a concession in someone else’s global chess move.

27/04/2025

Goaaminta Masiirka Umada inagaa leh ee Shisheeye malaha: Baaq Dhalinyaro Soomaaliyeed oo ku saabsan Faragelinta Shisheeye

Dhalinta Soomaaliyeed ee qaaliga ah, meel kasta oo aad joogtaan – Muqdisho, Hargeysa, ama meel kasta kale – waxaan idinka codsanayaa inaynu is dul taagno oo caqli fayaw ku eegno duruufaha madaw ee soomaalidu ku jirto.

Yaa Kataliya oo haya furayaasha mustaqbalkeenna?

Muddo tobanaan sano ah, Soomaaliya iyo Somaliland waxay ku jireen loollan adag oo u dhexeeya midnimo iyo kala-go’.

Somaliland, waqooyiga Soomaaliya, waxay ku dhawaaqday madaxbannaanideeda sanadkii 1991 kaddib Burburkii Dawladii Siyaad Barre.

Soomaaliya, oo ka soo kabaneysa burbur dowladeed, waxay ilaa hada ku adkeysaneysaa in dalku midaysan yahay oonay ictiraafin Dawlada Somaliland.

Arrintan dib-u-midaysiga ama kala-go’a rasmiga ah waa arrin dareen weyn leh oo u baahan caqli iyo aragti dheer in lagu xaliyo, waxay ku saabsan tahay taariikhdeenna, aqoonsigeenna, iyo himilooyinkeenna nabadeed iyo mustaqbal.

Laakiin intay Soomalidu doodeyso, waxa xusid mudan in awoodaha shisheeye faro galin qaawan ku hayaan masiirka iyo aayo katashiga Soomaalida.

Laga soo bilaabo waddamada deriska nala ah sida Itoobiya iyo Kenya, ilaa wadamada Bariga Dhexe sida Imaaraadka Carabta (UAE), Turkiga iyo Qatar, iyo sidoo kale awoodaha waaweyn ee caalamiga ah sida Maraykanka, Ingiriiska – xitaa dalal fog sida Shiinaha iyo Israa'iil – dhammaantood waxay leeyihiin dano kala duwan oo ku xiran haddii Soomaaliya sii midaysnaato ama Somaliland hesho madaxbannaani.

Waxay noo soo bandhigaan kaalmo, heshiisyo, iyo xitaa taageero militari. Waxay ka hadlaan “xasillooni,” “amniga,” iyo “horumarka.” Laakiin inta badan, mid waliba wuxuu raadinayaa dantiisa gaarka ah.

La Soco Qaybaha Dambe

Waxaan idiin qorayaa anigoo ah qof dhalinyaro Soomaaliyeed ah, oo wadaagaya ra’yigayga shakhsi ahaaneed iyo digniin qalbigeyga ka soo go’day: Aayaha dalkeenna ma aha wax lagu gorgortamo ama ciyaar loogu jiro dano shisheeye. Innaga, dhalinyarada Soomaaliya iyo Somaliland, waa inaan fahamnaa sida faragelintan shisheeye ay u qaabeyso khilaafkeenna – waana inaan annagu go’aansannaa sida aan uga jawaab celin lahayn.

Miyaan nahay shax lagu ciyaaro oo kaliya oo lagu ciyaaro miiska siyaasadda adduunka, mise waxaan noqon karnaa dad u madaxbannaan inay masiirkooda go'aamiyaan? Aan si taxadar leh u eegno kuwa ciyaartan ku jira, isla markaana aan isweydiinno su’aalo adag oo aan nafteenna ku xisaabtanno intaan waddadan ku jirno.

27/04/2025

Our Destiny, Not Theirs: A Somali Youth’s Plea on Foreign Influence
Part 4 - The Gulf Power Tug-of-War: Middle Eastern Influence in Our Land

2. Qatar and Turkey: Friends of Mogadishu, Foes of Separation

On the other side of the Gulf rivalry stand Qatar and Turkey – closely allied with each other and, notably, with Somalia’s internationally recognized government. Where the UAE saw opportunity in Somaliland, Qatar and Turkey saw opportunity in the Federal Republic of Somalia.

Turkey has arguably been Somalia’s most visibly positive foreign partner in the past decade. Turks have built roads, hospitals, and schools in Somalia. In 2011, amid a famine, Turkey’s then-Prime Minister (now President) Erdogan visited Mogadishu – a groundbreaking event when most leaders wouldn’t set foot there. Turkish aid poured in. Turkish companies now manage Mogadishu’s port and airport. Culturally, Turkey won Somali hearts by showing brotherly solidarity when we were in need. Many Somali youth admire Turkey, seeing it as a model Muslim nation helping a fellow Muslim nation. But Turkey’s involvement isn’t just charity. It’s also strategic: Somalia gives Turkey a foothold in the Horn of Africa, a region where Turkey wants influence. In 2017, Turkey opened its largest overseas military training base in Mogadishu, training thousands of Somali soldiers.

These troops form the core of Somalia’s national army rebuilding effort. Training and equipping another country’s army is a serious commitment – it means Turkey has a stake in Somalia’s future security architecture. This also implicitly aligns Turkey against Somaliland’s secession, because Turkey is arming the forces of the Somali federal government.

You can bet Turkey did not appreciate the UAE arming a separate force in Somaliland. In fact, this became another front in their proxy competition. Qatar, a smaller Gulf state but very wealthy, has been Somalia’s key political backer in recent years. Qatar was a close friend of Somalia’s previous president (Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmaajo”) and reportedly funded his government’s projects and even political campaigns.

Qatari diplomacy (and money) helped keep the Somali federal government afloat at times when it had few other allies. Qatar’s global influence (for example via its media network Al-Jazeera) often presented Somalia’s government in a sympathetic light while criticizing those seen as opposing it (including Somaliland or UAE-backed figures).

Why does Qatar care? Partly to counter its Gulf rivals (UAE/Saudi) wherever they operate, and partly to support its ally Turkey in extending influence. Somalia under Farmaajo leaned towards the Turkey-Qatar axis; in return, it received investment – like a $200 million Qatari-funded coastal road project, and security aid. When the Gulf crisis erupted in 2017, Somalia’s refusal to cut ties with Qatar was seen as siding with Qatar against the Saudi/UAE bloc. So Somalia became one more arena for the Middle East power struggle. Even after Farmaajo, the new President Hassan Sheikh has maintained good ties with Qatar and Turkey, while trying to also repair relations with UAE.

For Somaliland, Qatar has little presence and even less love. Somaliland perceives Qatar as hostile to its independence aspirations – because Qatar consistently supports the Somali federal government position.

In fact, Somaliland once even accused Qatar of plotting to destabilize it due to some leaked audio alleging a Qatari businessman talked of funding violent incidents to “advance Doha’s interests” in Somaliland. While the veracity of that is unclear, it shows the distrust.

Qatar, for its part, likely sees little benefit in engaging Somaliland separately, as that would anger Mogadishu (its friend) and please the UAE (its rival). So Qatar stays firmly on the side of Somali unity. The result: Somalia and Somaliland are effectively backed by opposing Gulf camps. UAE (with quiet Saudi concurrence) props up Somaliland’s economy and diplomatic standing; Turkey-Qatar bolster Somalia’s government and army.

It is a classic proxy situation. When Somaliland and Somalia delegations have met for talks in the past, guess who often mediated? Turkey – which, while claiming neutrality, is clearly closer to Somalia’s side. Meanwhile, the UAE has occasionally lobbied quietly for Somaliland’s case in forums where it has influence.

These external biases make true dialogue harder. If one side feels fully supported by a big patron, they are less likely to compromise. Somalis must ask ourselves: are we allowing foreign rivalries to dictate our own unity? It’s disheartening that the Gulf dispute thousands of miles away spilled onto Somali soil and even into our internal conflict. We saw in 2018 how this played out militarily: after the UAE’s base in Berbera was announced, Somalia signed a defense cooperation deal with Turkey – and later with Qatar and even Egypt – essentially to counterbalance the UAE’s moves.

External powers arming both sides of a potential divide – this is a recipe for prolonging the standoff. Moreover, these Middle Eastern influences can change rapidly.

The Gulf countries reconciled among themselves in 2021 (Saudi, UAE and Qatar patched up their feud officially). Yet their competitive habits persist subtly in places like Somalia.

If tomorrow there’s a fallout again, Somalia could become an arena of contest anew. Or if they all decide to leave Somalia alone, we could suddenly lose major sponsors overnight. Neither outcome is comforting because it means Somali affairs have become dependent on others’ moods.

To the Somali youth: let’s remember our dignity. These countries are all wealthy and powerful, but Somalia is not a prize to be won. We should welcome genuine partnerships – Turkey building schools, UAE building ports, Qatar funding humanitarian aid, etc., are all fine if they truly help our people. But we must reject being used as pawns to fight proxy battles. For instance, if foreign money is funding Somali politicians just to ensure they align with one foreign camp or another, we should expose and resist that. If a foreign base is built on Somali land, it should be because it benefits Somali security too, not just someone else’s war.

Ask yourself: Has the influx of Gulf money and projects made average Somalis’ lives notably better, or has it mostly empowered certain elites and factions? Where is the new road or hospital? (In fairness, some infrastructure has been built – but not nearly enough to justify the hype.)

We, the youth, must demand transparency: when foreign aid or investment comes, how is it used? Does it serve the Somali people or just foreign interests and a few local intermediaries? Ultimately, the Gulf tug-of-war teaches us that remaining divided makes us an easy rope to tug. Only by resolving our own differences – finding a mutually acceptable status for Somaliland and Somalia – can we step out of this proxy game. Otherwise, as one analyst warned, these rivalries will “proliferate divisions” and entrench conflicts as outside powers carve out zones of interest focused on their gain, not our unity.

Let’s not give them the satisfaction. We can appreciate Turkey’s friendship or the UAE’s investments, but let’s channel them toward a Somali-driven solution, not let them dictate the terms.

Maan-Hage

27/12/2025

18/05/2025

15/05/2025

04/05/2025

27/04/2025

27/04/2025

Address

Website

Alerts

Shortcuts

Share

Category