Gabrielius Landsbergis

26/05/2026

13/05/2026

Europe suddenly got busy discussing how to reengage Russia and settle the war.

On one hand I can understand — it is clear that Putin is on the back foot. He is not yet losing, but he is struggling. Hundreds of thousands killed since the start of his three day “operation”, thousands added to the list every day, this is hardly an advertisement for recruits to join the meat-grinder.

The Ukrainian strategy of going after Russian soldiers has produced results. The Russians are now losing more territory than they gained, for the first time after Ukraine attacked Russian territory in Belgorod. So it might be the right time to send signals to Putin that if he wants to get out — this could be his opportunity, or things could get worse.

But what do Europeans bring to the table? There were no new initiatives, nothing that would strengthen Ukraine's position in the mid- to long-term. So whichever European goes empty-handed to Moscow will return with Putin’s wish list in their pocket. We saw the same with Witkoff and the subsequent US push to force Ukraine to give up on un-occupied territories.

What would Putin request from Europeans? Agree to no EU enlargement, remove sanctions, no new assistance packages to Ukraine, etc. Whatever he asks for would certainly weaken Ukraine’s position. Europeans are in no position to bluff — it is known that European decisions take a long time and are usually much weaker than advertised. (Where is the Coalition of the Willing? I’m trying to remember).

So I see no added value of EU participation, on the contrary, the EU — if involved — might try to play a role that would look exactly the same as the US, i.e. trying to push Ukraine to accept Putin’s demands, not because it is best for Ukraine, but because the EU wants to end the war for itself.

I am convinced that Ukrainians have channels open with the Russians. The Ukrainians are the only ones that have real leverage in the negotiations, and they will know better than anybody about where they are willing to compromise.

Europe could help Ukraine most by staying out of this.

22/04/2026

If Zelenskyy is warning us that Russia might attack the Baltics, I think he probably has a pretty good reason. As a Balt, I am surprised that many of us are treating Zelenskyy’s warning with contempt, while I myself understand where he is coming from.

Some accuse Zelenskyy of spreading narratives that help Russia. Well, I very much doubt he is trying to help Russia, and I don’t think he would take that risk lightly.

Some say he is pushing a fake scare story to focus the West’s attention on supporting Ukraine. But Ukraine has been deprived of that support for a long time, and has unfortunately learnt to live without it. I don’t think he is playing games. I find it more likely that he is offering his honest analysis to his friends.

Anybody feeling instinctive anger whenever the issue of a possible Russian attack against a Baltic State is raised should have a think about these three questions:

1. Are we sure Putin has no good reasons to attack NATO? He only needs one, and it doesn’t need to be as ambitious as a full invasion and annexation. He might be thinking that a small incursion could fracture our alliance and reboot his popularity at home by providing a win for his war machine. He could use his reserves or divert some troops from Ukraine, which he sees is a much harder nut to crack than the Baltics. Are we certain that he isn’t even tempted to try?

2. If not the Baltics, then where? Even though the Baltic States have raised defence spending as a percentage of GDP to the highest levels in NATO, we remain vulnerable while the effect of that boost comes online. We have no conscription like the Finns, the German brigade won’t be here for at least a year, our militaries are less developed than other potential NATO targets, so why wouldn’t Putin choose us?

3. And are we 100% certain that Article 5 is still deterring Russia as much as it used to? Even if we still believe in the “ironclad commitment” of our allies, any expert would have to admit that some of our main allies are somewhat distracted right now while others have only recently started rebuilding their militaries. Should Putin wait until Europe gets stronger? Or until US attention returns to Europe?

Zelenskyy has good reason to doubt that the West would suddenly experience a surge of bravery if a second country in the East were attacked now, NATO member or not.

So I’m sorry, but this is why I see where Zelenskyy is coming from. The Baltics could be the target, Putin might be tempted, and our allies are currently in a tough spot. The window of opportunity is open.

My suggestion to my fellow Baltic statesmen is this: Instead of getting flustered, get ready.

Prepare contingency plans, learn Ukrainian survival techniques fast, and think about how to quickly extend the Ukrainian defence umbrella over the Baltic Sea — if indeed the m***e does hit the ventilator.

16/04/2026

It’s a fair question — how did the Vice President of the United States fly to Budapest, days before the election, in a clear attempt to boost Orbán's popularity, but instead end up assisting in a historic defeat?

A visit by a Vice President of the United States is, under any circumstances, a major event — especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where pro-American sentiment runs deep regardless of which party is in the White House. That a visit may have contributed to a loss is, depending on your sympathies, either grimly ironic or darkly comic.

The veep’s logic was clear. Orbán was the closest leader in Europe to Trump, so surely his people would welcome Washington's blessing?

There are even some solid historic precedents. Maybe not in Hungary, not during election time, but US leaders have made a huge positive impact on us Europeans in the past. Kennedy's 'Ich bin ein Berliner.' Reagan's 'Tear down this wall.' American leaders moved Europeans to tears. So why not this time?

…continue reading at the link below 🔗⬇️

30/03/2026

Keturi krizės valdymo etapai.

Žymioje britų komedijoje „Yes Minister" ministro kabineto sekretorius, paklaustas, kaip reaguoti į iškilusią krizę, atsako, kad reiktų laikytis keturių etapų strategijos.
Keturių etapų krizių valdymo struktūra, anot jo, atrodo taip – prasidėjus krizei, geriausia pirmoji reakcija – „Mums tikrai nieko blogo neatsitiks".

Jei krizė neatsitraukia, pareigūnams patartina reaguoti žodžiais – „Kažkas gali ir nutikti, bet tikrai nėra dėl ko jaudintis".
Krizei aštrėjant, pareigūnas turėtų sakyti – „Gal ir reikėtų kažką daryti, bet deja tai nėra įmanoma".
Na ir galiausiai, krizei pasiekus piką, belieka pasakyti – „Krizę tikrai galėjome spręsti, tačiau dabar jau per vėlu."

Į Lietuvos oro erdvę įskridus dar vienam dronui kyla natūralus klausimas – ar per ketverius metus karo neturėjome būti geriau pasiruošę? Vyriausybės atsakas – „sprendimų parduotuvės lentynose nėra". Arba pagal anksčiau išvardintas kategorijas – trečioji krizės valdymo stadija.

Nuo pilno masto invazijos pradžios teko dalyvauti ne vienoje diskusijoje svarstant, ar Baltijos šalys yra pasiruošusios dronų karui.

Dažniausia reakcija būdavo – nėra ko nerimauti. Karas toli nuo Lietuvos, mes NATO nariai, bet kokia kritika ar klausimai – tik nereikalingai kelia nerimą.

Karui besitęsiant tapo aišku, kad vis daugiau rusų žūsta būtent nuo dronų sukeltų sprogimų. Svarstymai dėl mūsų pasirengimo šiek tiek ėmė keistis – taip, dronai efektyvūs, bet mūsų karo planai kitokie. Tad investuoti į dronus nėra prasmės.
Dabar esame trečiojoje fazėje, pripažįstame, kad situacija grėsminga, ir, taip, ukrainiečiai turi ir veikiančius radarus dronams pastebėti, elektroninio karo priemones jiems stabdyti bei kinetines priemones jiems numušti. Tad kažką daryti lyg ir reiktų, bet tiesiog nėra lengvų sprendimų.

Karas prieš Iraną tik dar kartą patvirtino, kad kitas karas bus taip pat dronų karas. Tad nestebina ir Saudo Arabijos, Kataro ir kitų Persijos įlankos valstybių reakcija – ieškoti sprendimų Ukrainoje. Prezidentas Zelenskis visą savaitę keliauja regione, pasirašo gynybos sutartis, kartu su juo keliauja gynybos ekspertai.

Nejau tikime, kad Rusijos ataka prieš Rytų Europos valstybes atrodytų kitaip? Tokia pati taktika – tūkstančiai dronų kirstų mūsų sienas, atakuotų energetikos, infrastruktūros objektus, ilgam sutrikdydami valstybės gyvenimą. Estijos karinių pajėgų vadas pripažino, kad Estija nebūtų pasiruošusi susitvarkyti su 1000 dronų.
Net jei ir užsimerkiame prieš pokyčius, vykstančius aljanse, privalome būti pasiruošę atlaikyti ir susidoroti su tokia pačia taktika, su kuria dabar susiduria Ukraina ar Persijos įlankos valstybės.

Gal ir ateis kolegos iš NATO padėti, jei būsime užpulti, bet užduokime sau klausimą – kuo jie mums padės? Milijonus kainuojančiomis oro gynybos raketomis, kurios masiškai deginamos kare prieš Iraną? Lėktuvais, kurie Lenkijoje iš 19 įskridusių dronų sugebėjo numušti keturis. Reikia ne tik mums, bet ir draugams iš NATO pripažinti, kad, deja, dronų karui kol kas esame nepasiruošę.

Nesugebu rasti argumentų, kodėl šiandien Lietuva, viena iš artimiausių Ukrainos rėmėjų, nėra Ukrainoje, nesimoko visko, ko tik galima iš Ukrainos išmokti. Kodėl nesiekiame, kaip Saudo Arabija, saugumo sutarties su Ukraina. Kodėl dar neturime kontraktų su Ukrainos dronų gamintojais, radarų sistemų gamintojais ar inžinieriais.
Nenoriu atverti diskusijos, ar reikalingi Lietuvai tankai. Sakoma, kad kariuomenė be bažnyčios pati konservatyviausia valstybės institucija. Tai reiškia, pakeisti įpročius yra nepaprastai sunku. Bet Lietuva neturi kitos išeities kaip ruoštis scenarijams, kurių realumu anksčiau netikėjome, tačiau kurie su kiekviena diena vis labiau akivaizdūs.

Nes jeigu ne, netrukus galime pasiekti ir ketvirtąjį krizės valdymo laiptelį – kuomet beliks pripažinti, kad mokytis ir keistis reikėjo, tik jau per vėlu.

22/03/2026

My 3 quick points on the European reaction to the US call for help in the Strait of Hormuz:

1. Western militaries are not ready to deal with the low-cost autonomous war fighting revolution that accelerated after 2022.
Iran, having helped Russia for those four years, had a chance to develop, upgrade and adapt its knowledge and technology to the latest standards. The US, even with the strongest fleet in the world, is not using it to unblock the Strait. Why? Because it might be vulnerable to drone, speedboat, underwater attacks. What do Europeans have to offer to defend against this? Very little.

2. Trust erosion. Europeans were not involved in the preparatory stage of the war.
They are kept in the dark about the goals of the war as it stands currently. Therefore many in Europe ask themselves a question—is it possible that the US might suddenly withdraw, leaving Europeans and Gulf countries to deal with the aftermath? Given recent experience, that scenario is not as far-fetched as Washington might like us to think.

3. And lastly - the confusion of the US global strategy.
The National Security Strategy, as well as a number of US official statements, stresses that European focus now should be devoted towards deterring Russia in the East, while the US deals with threats elsewhere. Three weeks into this new conflict—and the discussion now revolves around the question of European willingness to help the US in Iran, which is... elsewhere. With the US clearly distracted and their ammunition reserves shrinking, Russia’s ambition to test NATO could have only grown.European involvement in Iran, before a rebuilding of at least some of the lost trust, and without stronger US security guarantees for Europe and Ukraine, might be a very dangerous endeavour.

18/03/2026

Is it time to put Europe's geopolitical aspirations to rest? Recently Europe hasn't even been able to act as a trade bloc, let alone a great power. Perhaps a formal geopolitical Europe is impossible? Perhaps coalitions of the willing are the realistic vehicle for the foreseeable future. But Europeans deserve to know that this is the choice being made—and that it does not come for free.
Full article: https://landsbergis.com/the-end-of-europes-geopolitical-dream/ #/portal/signup/free

06/03/2026

The inability to rein in Hungary is damaging enough on its own. But actively pressing Ukraine to comply is simply disgraceful, even (especially) if you offer to pay for the compliance.

The collective power of all those in Brussels should be used to block the ambitions of people like Putin and Orbán, not to twist the arms of Ukrainians while they’re fighting on Europe’s behalf.

Full article ➔

The pressure is not being put on the Hungarian government. It is being put on the Ukrainian government.

24/02/2026

There is nothing normal about what’s happening to Ukraine, and there never was. Four years of horror must not be normalised. Please, wherever you are, if you commemorate this day – be angry. Act.

Be angry. Act.

14/02/2026

A change of tone. Rubio brought a lot of white paint to Munich to cover the cracks caused by the great rupture. From the Beatles and Michelangelo to German beer and the common victory in the Cold War, he invoked all the symbols of culture that are meant to unite us into a single Western civilisation. Europe and the US are connected. That much was clear.

But what about the values that once held the transatlantic community together? According to Marco Rubio, international law is no longer working. That was supposed to be holding us together. Other fundamental principles - like democracy or true freedom of speech were simply not mentioned.

So is it now clear that this is all about interests, not common values.
And do we actually have common interests?

I am not sure that Europeans see the announced civilisational decline, supposedly caused mainly by migration and deindustrialisation, as a core uniting interest. For most Europeans, the common interest is security. And according to the Secretary, Europe has to defend itself on its own, otherwise NATO looks weak.

This was not a departure from the general position of the US administration. It was simply delivered in more polite terms. I am not sure the white paint will hold.