Debunk.org

06/05/2026

Don’t miss Debunk at 𝗘𝘂𝗿𝗼𝗣𝗖𝗼𝗺 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟲, taking place on 📆June 9–10 in 📌Brussels under the theme “𝗕𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝗻𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘀: 𝗰𝗿𝗲𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝘅𝗶𝗺𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗶𝗻 𝗮 𝗳𝗿𝗮𝗴𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗹𝗱.”

Our team, 𝗩𝗶𝗸𝘁𝗼𝗿𝗮𝘀 𝗗𝗮𝘂𝗸š𝗮𝘀, 𝗦𝗼𝗽𝗵𝗶𝗲 𝗦𝗮𝗰𝗶𝗹𝗼𝘁𝘁𝗼, 𝗠𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗼 𝗣𝘂𝗴𝗹𝗶𝗲𝘀𝗲, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗠𝗮𝗹𝗮𝗸 𝗔𝗹𝘁𝗮𝗲𝗯, will join communicators from across Europe for two days of inspiring discussions, hands-on workshops, and meaningful exchanges.

Viktoras Daukšas, Head of Organisation at Debunk, will speak on a panel focused on countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) in regional elections. Alongside this, our team will also lead a training session.

We look forward to seeing you there!

Find the registration link in the comments

15/04/2026

05/03/2026

Nearly 𝟲 𝗺𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗴𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝗰𝗮𝗺 𝗮𝗱𝘀 were removed from Meta platforms in just 2025, after Debunk.org reported over 26 thousand suspicious URLs under 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗘𝗨 𝗗𝗶𝗴𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲𝘀 𝗔𝗰𝘁 𝗧𝗿𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗙𝗹𝗮𝗴𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝗺𝗲𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗶𝘀𝗺. The ads that were tied to fraud, illegal gambling, and deceptive medical schemes had an estimated aggregated reach exceeding 2,3 Billion across the EU.

Our organization was awarded Trusted Flagger status in April 2025. By the end of the year, nearly 1,500 reports were submitted with more than 26,000 URLs of illegal content, out of which 99,8 % were removed, proving once more that Debunk.org has an outstanding team.

𝑮𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕 𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌, 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚𝒐𝒏𝒆!

Find the details at the link in the comments.

20/02/2026

⏰𝗜𝗻 𝗰𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝗺𝗶𝘀𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝗶𝘁

👉 Our latest investigation uncovered over 𝟱𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬 𝗮𝗱𝘀 𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗽𝗼𝗹, 𝗘𝘂𝗿𝗼𝗽𝗼𝗹, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗘𝗨 𝗶𝗻𝘀𝘁𝗶𝘁𝘂𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 to promote fake fraud “refund programs.” More than 𝟱𝟬 𝗺𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗘𝘂𝗿𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗮𝗻𝘀 𝘄𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗲𝗱 in just a year.

❗All tracked pages have now been removed, but the underlying business model remains intact. Actors can rapidly rebuild using new domains and ad accounts.

🔎The rest of the findings you can read at the link in the comments.

17/02/2026

🚨𝗡𝗲𝘄 𝗥𝗲𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁 𝗣𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝘀𝗵𝗲𝗱
In our latest read, learn more about how undisguised actors impersonated Interpol, Europol, national "cyber" police, and EU bodies on social media ads promising compensation to fraud victims.

👉We have found:
• 50,426 ads
• 1,139 related pages and 459 domains
• 52 million reach in Europe

🔴𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗰𝗵𝗲𝗺𝗲 𝗱𝗶𝗱 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗿𝗲𝗰𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿 𝘀𝘁𝗼𝗹𝗲𝗻 𝗳𝘂𝗻𝗱𝘀. 𝗜𝘁 𝘁𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗲𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝘃𝗶𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗺𝘀 𝗮 𝘀𝗲𝗰𝗼𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗶𝗺𝗲.

👇Read the full report at the link in the comments.

16/02/2026

🙄 When teams use different terms, frameworks, and thresholds, FIMI analysis becomes hard to review, compare, and reuse.

📢 𝗙𝗜𝗠𝗜𝟭𝟬𝟭 𝗶𝘀 𝗮 𝘀𝗲𝗹𝗳-𝗽𝗮𝗰𝗲𝗱 𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗿𝘀𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝘀𝗶𝗴𝗻𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼 𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗻 𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗹𝘆𝘀𝘁𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘂𝗻𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗮𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗱 𝘀𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗲𝘁𝗵𝗼𝗱𝗼𝗹𝗼𝗴𝗶𝗲𝘀.

👍 What changes after FIMI101:
• one shared baseline across teams
• a repeatable workflow from signal to assessment
• clearer handovers, onboarding, and internal reviews
• outputs that are easier to brief and publish

📢 𝔸𝕡𝕡𝕝𝕚𝕔𝕒𝕥𝕚𝕠𝕟𝕤 𝕠𝕡𝕖𝕟: 𝟙𝟝 𝔽𝕖𝕓𝕣𝕦𝕒𝕣𝕪 – 𝟛𝟘 𝕄𝕒𝕣𝕔𝕙

🤝 Explore the course and book a discovery call at the link in the comments.

11/02/2026

🔴𝗙𝗜𝗠𝗜𝟭𝟬𝟭 helps institutions move from individual judgment to shared institutional standards for analysing Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference.
🏗️ Built by Debunk.org analysts, aligned with the EEAS FIMI framework, and shaped by training delivered to over 650 professionals worldwide.

𝑶𝒏𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅. 𝑶𝒏𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒈𝒆. 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒚𝒔𝒊𝒔.

🗓️New institutional intake: 𝟭𝟱 𝗙𝗲𝗯𝗿𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 – 𝟯𝟬 𝗠𝗮𝗿𝗰𝗵
🔎Learn more and request an organisational offer at the 𝗗𝗲𝗯𝘂𝗻𝗸.𝗼𝗿𝗴 𝗔𝗰𝗮𝗱𝗲𝗺𝘆 website. Find the link in the comments

03/02/2026

🚨𝗖𝗮𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗘𝗨'𝘀 𝗗𝗶𝗴𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲 𝗔𝗰𝘁 𝗯𝗲 𝘂𝘀𝗲𝗱, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝘁𝗼 𝗽𝗿𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗰𝘁 𝘁𝗼 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗙𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻 𝗜𝗻𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗠𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗽𝘂𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 (𝗙𝗜𝗠𝗜) 𝗜𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀, is a topic of the 𝗘𝗨 𝗗𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗼 𝗟𝗮𝗯's recent report, 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒚 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 & 𝑮𝒂𝒑𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑺𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎 𝑨𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒆.

👉Through the analysis of Incident Alerts generated by the 𝗙𝗗𝗘𝗜 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁, EU DisinfoLab has assessed how existing DSA provisions could apply to the observed behaviours of VLOPs regarding systemic risk assessments, mitigations and other hosting providers. They also talk about the implications of inconsistent platform enforcement and the applicability of DSA provisions and potential violations. Find the report link in the comments.

29/01/2026

🔎𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝗱𝗼 𝘄𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼 𝘀𝗵𝗶𝗳𝘁 𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝗳𝗼𝗰𝘂𝘀 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗹𝘆𝘇𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝘁𝗼 𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗹𝘆𝘇𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗮𝘃𝗶𝗼𝗿?

👉Foreign Information Manipulation Interference (FIMI) is not necessarily illegal, at least not overtly. This makes the jobs of researchers difficult as it limits the legal repercussions at our disposal.

👉By shifting our focus from content to behaviour and documenting coordination patterns, automation, and amplification, as well as investing in improving our attribution, we will be better able to generate legal arguments for the removal of FIMI content.

❗As the 𝗘𝗨 𝗗𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗼𝗟𝗮𝗯 lays out in their report 𝗥𝗲𝗴𝘂𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘆 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀 & 𝗚𝗮𝗽𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝗔𝗱𝗱𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗦𝘆𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗺𝗶𝗰 𝗣𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺 𝗔𝗯𝘂𝘀𝗲, “platforms tend to act more decisively when presented with misuse of their services through inauthenticity.” For more valuable insights on regulations, systemic platform abuse, and the DSA, check out the link in the comment.

22/01/2026

🥸Unattributed networks working in Moldova during the September 2025 Parliamentary election amplified Kremlin-aligned narratives and manipulated digital discourse, concentrating on Telegram, TikTok, and Facebook as covert amplifiers of disinformation.

☑️Through the dedicated research of 𝗗𝗙𝗥𝗟𝗮𝗯 and 𝗢𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗠𝗶𝗻𝗱𝘀, we determined that this Russian operation hid coordination behind simulated grassroots participation and automated interaction patterns.

🔎 𝗙𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗸𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀.