The Community Organizations for Management and Sustainable Development

The Community Organizations  for Management and Sustainable Development COMAND promotes alternate economic development models to bring marginalised peoples and communities into the mainstream.

COMAND provides consultancy to CBOs to formalize informal communities and to develop third sector community enterprises.

27/05/2026

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COMAND CALLS FOR A SUCCESSOR PROGRAMME THAT PUTS PEOPLE AT THE CENTRE OF DEVELOPMENTThe Community Organizations for Mana...
05/05/2026

COMAND CALLS FOR A SUCCESSOR PROGRAMME THAT PUTS PEOPLE AT THE CENTRE OF DEVELOPMENT

The Community Organizations for Management and Sustainable Development (COMAND) declares that Jamaica must stop treating poor and working people as a problem to be managed and begin recognizing them as a force for nation-building.

For too long, the history of Operation PRIDE has been buried under distortion, bureaucratic fear, and elite discomfort. The truth is far simpler and far more powerful: Operation PRIDE was one of the boldest expressions of people-centred development in modern Jamaica. It recognized that the landless, the poor, and the working class were not waiting helplessly on the State. They were already organizing, already occupying, already building, and already creating communities out of necessity and determination.

The State did not invent that movement. The people did.

Operation PRIDE was meant to give that people’s movement legal structure, developmental support, and legitimacy. The programme’s full meaning must never be forgotten: Programme for Integrated Development, Enterprise. That did not mean charity. It did not mean handouts. It meant land, order, savings, enterprise, self-management, and community power.

At the centre of that model were the Industrial and Provident Societies. These were not token committees. They were the lawful instruments through which communities could hold funds, enter contracts, manage development, and act as organized corporate bodies. In plain language, the people became the developers of their own communities.

And that is where the resistance began.

Because once ordinary Jamaicans became capable of managing land, enforcing compliance, collecting development funds, and directing community growth, a dangerous message was sent to the old order: the poor no longer needed to beg. They no longer needed a political middleman, an overbearing bureaucrat, or a self-appointed expert hovering over every aspect of their advancement. They could act for themselves.

That did not sit well with sections of the bureaucracy and the gatekeeping class.

The enterprise component of Operation PRIDE was never allowed to flourish because too many within the system were uncomfortable with the idea of autonomous, organized, poor communities becoming centres of savings, contracting, production, and wealth creation. The Provident Societies showed real strength. In many cases, they collected more for development than the state agencies. They were better able to monitor compliance. They had more moral authority within the settlements. They were often better positioned to maintain development control than distant offices and paper-based bureaucracies.

Yet instead of strengthening these institutions, the system weakened them.

Instead of oversight, there was encroachment.
Instead of partnership, there was control.
Instead of empowerment, there was suffocation.

Let us be clear: no serious development model can function without fiduciary responsibility, transparency, and accountability. COMAND fully supports strong safeguards in the management of community resources. But safeguards are not the same as seizure. Supervision is not the same as displacement. The proper role of the State was to ensure standards, protect the public interest, and reinforce accountability while leaving real developmental power in the hands of the people.

That is not what happened.

The savings instruments of the Provident Societies were commandeered. Their autonomy was eroded. Their enterprise potential was blocked. What should have become engines of community investment were reduced to dependent appendages of state agencies. Jamaica lost not only a housing programme, but a historic opportunity to build a new model of bottom-up development rooted in self-help, lawful land access, and internal economic circulation.

And still the poor were blamed.

That injustice must end.

Even where there were instances of weak administration or local misapplication, the broad smear campaign against community-based institutions has never been honestly sustained by the record. The Angus Report did not level charges of corruption against the communities as communities. Yet it was the communities that carried the stigma, while the larger system escaped proper scrutiny.

This was never just about land.
It was about power.
It was about who is allowed to control development.
It was about whether poor people could be trusted with responsibility, resources, and the right to shape their own future.

COMAND says the answer must now be yes.

At a time when housing is out of reach for thousands, when informal settlements continue to expand, when landlessness and insecure tenure remain unresolved, and when centralized bureaucracy has plainly failed to produce adequate solutions, Jamaica must move beyond nostalgia and build a successor programme rooted in the best principles of people-centred development.

COMAND therefore calls for a successor national programme that:

Places organized communities at the centre of land, housing, and settlement development.

Recognizes community-based institutions as legitimate partners in planning, implementation, and development control.

Provides legal access to land, tenure security, and infrastructure within a framework of accountability.

Includes savings mobilization, enterprise support, local contracting, and community wealth creation as core pillars.

Ensures strong fiduciary oversight without bureaucratic capture or political suffocation.

Builds sustainable communities not as sites of dependence, but as centres of productivity, dignity, and self-determination.

Jamaica cannot continue to speak about inclusion while denying ordinary people the tools of self-determination. The country cannot solve its housing crisis through delay, control, and contempt for grassroots initiative. And it cannot claim to believe in democracy while refusing to trust the people with the instruments of development.

The lesson of Operation PRIDE is not that the people failed. The lesson is that the people were blocked.

That blockage must be confronted.
A new framework must be built.
And the people must be restored to the centre of development.

Community Organizations for Management and Sustainable Development (COMAND)
Award-winning umbrella organization for best practice in community mobilization, participatory governance, and sustainable development.

01/03/2026

GRANVILLE PEACE, JUSTICE & RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION

Death at an Early Age

By O. Dave Allen

A double murder in Norwood has once again shaken St. James, striking at the very heart of the constituency of the Minister of National Security and Peace. The incident, carried prominently in Wednesday’s edition of The Western Mirror, stands in uneasy contrast to official assurances that violent crime in the parish is sharply declining.

According to SSP Eron Samuels, commanding officer for St. James, the parish has recorded a 124 per cent increase in its crime-clearance rate. The police have set themselves a target of keeping murders below 50 for 2026. Up to last Sunday, only four murders had reportedly been recorded for the year — a 43.9 per cent reduction compared to the same period in 2025, based on figures cited by Clinton Pickering in the February 4, 2026 edition of The Western Mirror.

Statistics matter. But so do names.

A question therefore arises — and it is not a political question, but a moral one: Is the four-year-old boy shot and killed during the New Year’s operation in Granville counted among those four murders?

If he is included, then the reduction statistic carries the weight of a child’s life within it. If he is not, then transparency demands clarity. Either way, public trust depends on full disclosure.

This is not a trivial matter. Crime data is now used to justify extraordinary security measures — Zones of Special Operations (ZOSOs), prolonged curfews, expanded police powers. Mount Salem has been under ZOSO since 2017. Recently, an additional 48-hour curfew was imposed in sections of that community. Heavy policing, movement restrictions, and recurring emergency powers have become normalized tools of governance.

Yet violent incidents continue to occur.

This reality demands an honest examination of effectiveness.

Now consider Granville.

There was a time when Granville was labelled the murder capital of St. James. In one year alone, over 40 murders were recorded in a community of fewer than 6,000 people — a rate that, by global standards, mirrored conflict conditions.

Today, police reports indicate a remarkable 74 per cent reduction in violent crime in the Granville division.

This decline occurred without:
• a functioning police station for more than three years,
• a ZOSO designation,
• extended curfews,
• or any large-scale, extraordinary state social-intervention programme.

There have been no headline-grabbing “don removals,” no sweeping security lockdowns, no suspension of daily life through repeated curfew orders. Yet violence has fallen.

Why?

That question deserves rigorous study. Was it community fatigue with bloodshed? Quiet mediation by elders and faith leaders? Demographic shifts? Migration? Economic recalibration? Informal social discipline? Whatever the cause, it suggests that security policy must move beyond force alone.

It is therefore understandable that on the first day of the year, residents of Granville took to the streets in protest after a police operation left two young men dead and a four-year-old child killed in his bed.

When a child dies at such an early age, the debate can never be purely statistical. It becomes ethical. It becomes communal. It becomes about the soul of a society.

Crime reduction cannot be measured by percentages alone. It must also be measured by public confidence, proportionality, and the preservation of innocent life. A 43.9 per cent reduction means little to a family burying a child. A 124 per cent clearance rate does not erase grief.

If ZOSOs and curfews are to remain central tools of Jamaica’s security architecture, they must be subjected to transparent, comparative evaluation — including comparison with communities like Granville that have seen significant reductions without prolonged emergency measures.

Security must protect life. Peace must mean more than enforcement.

And justice must ensure that no child’s death is reduced to a footnote in a quarterly crime report.

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