Zagros Human Rights Center

Zagros Human Rights Center Zagros Human Rights Center is a non-governmental organization founded in 2010 and based in Geneva, Switzerland.

Since July 2021, it has held consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

Freedom of Association: Centre Zagros Submits Comments to the UN Human Rights CommitteeCentre Zagros for Human Rights ha...
28/07/2026

Freedom of Association: Centre Zagros Submits Comments to the UN Human Rights Committee

Centre Zagros for Human Rights has submitted written comments in response to the Human Rights Committee’s call for contributions for the second reading of Draft General Comment No. 38 on Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (right to freedom of association).

Our submission is now available on the official website of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

It addresses two main areas: the protection of civic space for associations representing ethnic and religious minorities — particularly in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey — and the relationship between freedom of association (Art. 22), freedom of expression (Art. 19), and the right to peaceful assembly (Art. 21).

We put forward 11 concrete recommendations to the Committee, grounded in the realities documented by our organization in the field.

The right to freedom of association

Comments on the Draft General Comment No. 38 of the Human Rights Committee

Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Right to Freedom of Association

Submitted for the 146th Session — June 2026



I. PRESENTATION OF CENTRE ZAGROS AND PURPOSE OF THIS SUBMISSION

Centre Zagros pour les Droits de l’Homme is a civil society organization that documents human rights violations and advocates for their protection from a global perspective. Its work covers women’s rights, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the rights of human rights defenders. Centre Zagros operates primarily in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and other contexts characterized by systematic restrictions on civic space. It works alongside diverse communities, ethnic and religious minorities, women human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, lawyers, and members of cultural associations, who face State repression. It is from this daily field work that we submit these observations.
We submit these observations to the Committee in the framework of the call for contributions for the second reading of Draft General Comment No. 38 (hereinafter “the Draft”). These observations focus primarily on two dimensions: the protection of civil society space, and the relationship between Article 22 and the rights to freedom of expression (Article 19) and peaceful assembly (Article 21).
Centre Zagros requests that this submission be made public.



II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS: WHAT THE DRAFT ACHIEVES AND WHAT CAN BE STRENGTHENED

Centre Zagros welcomes the overall quality of the Draft. Several points merit recognition as valuable achievements. Paragraph 7 affirms that the right to freedom of association is not conditioned on formal State authorization, an essential protection for unregistered associations, whose situation is particularly precarious in States where we work. Paragraph 14 explicitly recognizes the right of associations to seek, receive, and use funding from abroad, without risking designation as “foreign agents.” Paragraph 34 introduces the concept of cumulative assessment of measures, an innovation we strongly welcome. Finally, paragraph 49 closes the door to “public transparency” justifications advanced in support of foreign agent laws, by recalling that the list of legitimate aims under Article 22(2) is exhaustive.
These elements form a solid foundation. Our observations aim to strengthen specific points, fill certain gaps, and anchor the text more firmly in the lived realities of associations representing ethnic minorities and human rights defenders in authoritarian contexts.



III. OBSERVATIONS ON PARAGRAPH 9: INDIVIDUALS PARTICULARLY AFFECTED

Paragraph 9 lists individuals whose right to freedom of association is subject to differentiated and heightened impact. Centre Zagros welcomes the intersectional approach adopted and the mention of environmental and land rights defenders, migrants, and asylum-seekers.
We nonetheless recommend that the Committee strengthen this paragraph on two points.

Associations representing ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities. While paragraph 9 mentions “indigenous peoples,” it does not explicitly name national and ethnic minorities, whose associations are nonetheless subject to heightened surveillance and systematic restrictions in many States parties. In the contexts documented by Centre Zagros, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and beyond, associations representing diverse minority communities (Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, Azeris, Mandaeans, Yazidis, Assyro-Chaldeans, and other ethnic and religious minorities) are regularly designated as threats to “national unity” or “national security.” This designation is based not on violent conduct but on the very identity these associations represent. The Committee should clarify that restrictions disproportionately affecting associations formed on an ethnic, linguistic, or religious basis are presumptively incompatible with Article 22, read in conjunction with Articles 26 and 27 of the Covenant.

Associations submitting information to treaty bodies. Centre Zagros has documented numerous cases in which association members were prosecuted, detained, or subjected to travel bans directly following the submission of observations to UN treaty bodies or meetings with Special Rapporteurs. This practice constitutes a particularly grave form of interference, as it aims to sever civil society from the international human rights protection architecture. Paragraph 9 should explicitly name associations engaging with international mechanisms as entities particularly vulnerable to reprisals.

Recommendation 1 (paragraph 9). Add explicit reference to associations representing ethnic, national, or linguistic minorities, and to those engaging with international human rights bodies, as categories particularly exposed to differentiated impact from restrictions.



IV. OBSERVATIONS ON PARAGRAPH 10: THE RIGHT TO “CONTROVERSIAL” ASSOCIATIONS

Paragraph 10 rightly recalls that freedom of association also protects ideas and activities that may be perceived as controversial, dissenting, or disturbing, and that the reference to “democratic society” in Article 22 provides its foundation. Centre Zagros considers this paragraph to be one of the most important in the Draft and believes it deserves further development.
In authoritarian States, the label “controversial” is precisely the rhetorical tool used to justify restrictions. Associations representing ethnic and religious minorities, independent trade unions, women’s movements, human rights defender organizations, and LGBTQI+ organizations are systematically portrayed by governments as actors who “divide” society or “threatened traditional values.” The strength of paragraph 10 lies in the fact that it turns this argument around: it is precisely the existence of associations carrying non-majority views that defines a democratic society.
We suggest the Committee strengthen this paragraph by clarifying that:(a) the fact that an association advocates positions disapproved of by the government or a majority of the population constitutes never in itself a legitimate ground for restriction under Article 22(2);(b) designating an association/p> as “extremist,” “subversive,” or similar does not constitute legal justification for a restriction: such a designation must itself satisfy the requirements of legality, legitimacy, and necessity in a democratic society; and(c) attacks on associations of minority groups constitute a warning sign of broader repression — and accordingly, the Committee should encourage States to adopt proactive measures to prevent such attacks, not merely to respond after the fact.

V. OBSERVATIONS ON PARAGRAPHS 14 AND 15: FUNDING AND AUTONOMY

Paragraph 14 explicitly recognizes the right to seek, receive, and use funding, including from abroad, and mentions the risk of being designated a “foreign agent.” Paragraph 49 complements this protection by clarifying that the justifications advanced for foreign agent laws do not fall among the legitimate aims under Article 22(2). Centre Zagros welcomes both provisions and considers them a major contribution of the Draft.
We wish the Draft to deepen these points on two aspects.
Stigmatization as a restriction in itself
Foreign agent laws produce their chilling effects primarily through public stigmatization, not only through the formal sanctions they provide for. When an organization is required to affix the label “foreign agent” to all its communications, it is in effect discredited in the eyes of the public, potential donors, and the public authorities with whom it interacts. This chilling effect is deliberate and constitutes a restriction on the right to association independently of any subsequent sanction.
We recommend that the Committee clarify, in this context or under paragraph 14, that reporting or labelling obligations that create public stigmatization of an association on account of its foreign funding sources constitute a restriction under Article 22(2) and must accordingly satisfy the requirements of legality, legitimacy, and necessity in a democratic society.
Asset freezing as de facto dissolution
Paragraph 30 mentions the misuse of counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering measures. Centre Zagros draws the Committee’s attention to asset freezing as a particularly potent tool: an association whose accounts are frozen is effectively dissolved without formal procedure, without a judicial decision, and without rapid recourse. This mechanism is regularly used against human rights associations in the contexts we observe.

Recommendation 2 (paragraphs 14 and 30). Clarify that measures which in practice prevent an association from functioning financially — such as asset freezes or banking restrictions based on vague designations — constitute restrictions on Article 22 requiring prompt judicial oversight and effective remedy.Recommendation 3 (paragraph 14). Clarify that labelling or reporting obligations imposed on associations on account of their foreign funding themselves constitute a restriction on Article 22 and must satisfy the three-part test in paragraph 2.



VI. OBSERVATIONS ON PARAGRAPHS 30 AND 34: THE LOGIC OF CUMULATION

Paragraph 34 introduces a concept that Centre Zagros considers one of the Draft’s most important contributions: the in globo assessment of the environment in which associations operate. As the Draft states, “cumulative and indirect measures may violate the right to freedom of association even where any single action or omission by the authorities does not appear determinative.” This approach corresponds exactly to what Centre Zagros documents in the field.
In Iran, for example, a human rights association defending minorities, whether representing Baluchis, Arabs, Azeris, Mandaeans, Yazidis, or other communities, may simultaneously face: a registration refusal based on vague criteria; an informal designation as “linked to separatism” in unpublished intelligence reports; repeated tax audits; the practical impossibility of opening a bank account; and regular summonses of members before security forces. None of these measures, taken in isolation, formally constitutes a dissolution. Together, they make any associational activity impossible. International human rights law cannot ignore this reality.
We suggest the Committee develop paragraph 34 by clarifying:

(a) that States parties have an obligation to assess the cumulative effect of their policies on the capacity of associations to function, and not merely the conformity of each individual measure in isolation;(b) that informal harassment , repeated summonses, verbal intimidation, overt surveillance, constitutes a form of interference incompatible with Article 22 even when unaccompanied by formal sanctions; and(c) that when the Committee examines individual communications or periodic reports, it must take into account the overall context in which an association operates, and not only the formal acts reported to it.Recommendation 4 (paragraph 34). Strengthen the principle of cumulative assessment by clarifying that it applies not only to the Committee in its examination of communications, but also to States parties in the drafting and review of their association legislation.



VII. OBSERVATIONS ON PARAGRAPHS 43 TO 50: THE RESTRICTIONS REGIME

Section V of the Draft, on restrictions, constitutes a solid analytical framework. Centre Zagros offers the following additional observations.
Legality (paragraph 43): the membership offence
Paragraph 43 rightly recalls that the legality requirement means the legal basis must be clear, precise, and accessible. Centre Zagros wishes to draw the Committee’s attention to a phenomenon that merits explicit naming: in several States where we operate, the mere fact of being a member of a designated association, without any violent act attributable to the individual, constitutes a criminal offence carrying severe penalties. This legal construction violates both Article 22 and the principle of criminal legality under Article 15 of the Covenant, which paragraph 44 recalls as non-derogable.

Recommendation 5 (paragraphs 43–44). Explicitly clarify that the criminalization of mere membership in an association, without requiring an individual harmful act, is incompatible with Article 22 read in conjunction with the principle of criminal legality under Article 15.

Necessity in a democratic society (paragraph 50)
Centre Zagros wishes to emphasize the importance of the standard “necessary in a democratic society” as an autonomous and demanding criterion. A democratic society is defined by pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness. A restriction that is aimed precisely at suppressing pluralism, at preventing associations representing minority identities or dissenting opinions from existing , is by definition incompatible with a democratic society, regardless of the legitimate aims invoked. This point merits explicit formulation in the Draft.

Recommendation 6 (paragraph 50). Clarify that the criterion of “necessity in a democratic society” entails compatibility with the fundamental requirements of pluralism and tolerance. A restriction specifically targeting associations representing non-majority viewpoints cannot satisfy this criterion.

National security as a systematic ground (paragraph 46)
Centre Zagros welcomes paragraph 49, which closes the door to “public transparency” justifications advanced for foreign agent laws. We urge the Committee to go further: in the States we observe, “national security” is invoked as a ground for restriction in an almost automatic manner, without the State being required to demonstrate a concrete link between the association’s activities and a real threat to the nation’s existence, territorial integrity, or political independence.
The Committee should clarify that mere criticism of government policy, documentation of human rights violations, or representation of a minority identity do not constitute threats to national security within the meaning of Article 22(2). This clarification, which may seem obvious, is indispensable in the context of States that have institutionalized the conflation of rights defence with threats to State security.

Recommendation 7 (paragraph 46). Clarify that criticism of government policy, documentation of human rights violations, and representation of a minority identity cannot, in themselves, constitute a threat to national security within the meaning of Article 22(2).



VIII. THE INTERSECTION OF ARTICLES 19, 21, AND 22

Paragraph 2 of the Draft recognizes the interdependence between Article 22 and Articles 18, 19, 21, and 25. We consider this interdependence deserves development in the section on restrictions, as it has direct practical consequences for the assessment of the conformity of State measures.
Centre Zagros has documented a systematic practice in several States: associations are sanctioned, through suspension, withdrawal of registration, or prosecution of their members, not for their organizational activities, but for what they say. Monitoring reports, press releases, public statements, or submissions to UN bodies give rise to proceedings brought under association law rather than ordinary criminal law. This technique allows States to circumvent the requirements of Article 19 by framing the restriction as an administrative measure.
The Draft would benefit from clarifying that:

(a) any restriction on the expressive activity of an association, publications, public positions, communication with international bodies, must satisfy both the requirements of Article 19(3) and those of Article 22(2); States may not use association law to circumvent the guarantees of Article 19;(b) organizing a peaceful assembly, calling publicly to demonstrate, or facilitating a protest are fully-fledged associational activities falling under the joint protection of Articles 21 and 22; and(c) where a restriction simultaneously affects the expression, assembly, and association of the same group, the Committee must assess the cumulative effect of those restrictions on civic space as a whole, in accordance with the approach introduced in paragraph 34.

It should also be noted that certain associations are themselves created to facilitate the exercise of other rights: journalists’ associations, bar associations, minority cultural associations, electoral monitoring organizations. For these actors, an infringement of freedom of association is not only a violation in itself, it is the means by which a State simultaneously restricts a series of other rights guaranteed by the Covenant. The Draft would benefit from highlighting this structural dimension.

Recommendation 8 (Section V). Clarify in the section on restrictions that measures targeting the expressive activity of an association must satisfy the cumulative requirements of Articles 19 and 22, and that their assessment must take into account the overall effect on civic space.



IX. THE DIGITAL DIMENSION: BEYOND GENERAL PRONOUNCEMENTS

Paragraph 11 recognizes that Article 22 applies equally to organizations operating online, and identifies digital surveillance, Internet shutdowns, and monitoring of social media as threats to freedom of association. Centre Zagros fully supports this approach and wishes to draw attention to two specific aspects.
Surveillance as interference, independently of any sanction
In the contexts documented by Centre Zagros, digital surveillance of associations, even where it does not immediately give rise to prosecution, produces a powerful and documented chilling effect: members withdraw from online groups, leaders self-censor, associations avoid engaging on sensitive issues. This chilling effect is in itself a restriction on freedom of association.

Recommendation 9 (paragraph 30). Clarify that surveillance of an association’s communications, including digital surveillance, without a precise legal basis, demonstrated necessity, and independent judicial oversight, constitutes interference incompatible with Article 22, even in the absence of a subsequent formal sanction.

Platform injunctions as de facto dissolution
In practice, States obtain the suspension of accounts or removal of associational content by issuing injunctions addressed to digital platforms, without going through judicial procedure. Such injunctions constitute a form of de facto dissolution of an association’s digital presence, equivalent in effect to a formal restriction.

Recommendation 10 (paragraphs 11 and 37). Clarify that State injunctions addressed to digital platforms with a view to removing associational content or suspending accounts constitute restrictions on Article 22 and must satisfy the conditions of paragraph 2, with independent judicial oversight.



X. OBSERVATIONS ON SECTION VI: STATES OF EMERGENCY

Centre Zagros welcomes the fact that the Draft devotes an entire section to the issue of states of emergency. This section is of crucial importance in the contexts in which we work, where states of emergency have become tools of permanent governance rather than exceptional responses to specific threats. In Turkey, the state of emergency that followed the failed coup of 2016 enabled the dissolution of thousands of associations by decree, without judicial decision.
We wish the Committee to strengthen paragraph 55 by clarifying that:

(a) derogations from Article 22 cannot be indefinite in time and must be regularly re-evaluated; a state of emergency declared years ago cannot justify permanent restrictions without continuous demonstration of their necessity;(b) derogation measures cannot target specific associations on account of their ethnic or religious identity, even if presented as general security measures; and(c) associations that document violations committed during a state of emergency, or that provide humanitarian assistance in conflict zones, cannot be subjected to additional restrictions solely on account of those activities.Recommendation 11 (paragraph 55). Clarify that derogations from Article 22 are time-limited, must be subject to periodic re-evaluation, and may in no case discriminatorily target associations formed on an ethnic or religious identity basis.



XI. CONCLUSION

Centre Zagros pour les Droits de l’Homme hopes that these observations will contribute to a General Comment equal to the challenges faced every day by associations defending the rights of minorities, women’s rights, freedom of expression, and the rule of law in contexts where these values are actively combated.
We work with activists who have been imprisoned simply for attending an association meeting, with lawyers whose bar association has been dissolved by decree, with journalists whose professional association has been designated a terrorist threat. For them, a strong General Comment on Article 22 is not a doctrinal text, it is a concrete instrument of protection.
It is in this spirit that we submit these observations, and we thank the Committee for the considerable work accomplished during the first reading. A summary of our recommendations appears below.



Summary of Recommendations

Rec. 1 (§ 9). Add explicit reference to associations of ethnic/linguistic minorities and those engaging with international mechanisms as categories particularly exposed.Rec. 2 (§ 14/30). Asset freeze or banking restrictions are restrictions on Art. 22 requiring prompt judicial oversight.Rec. 3 (§ 14). Labelling or reporting obligations linked to foreign funding constitute a restriction under Art. 22(2).Rec. 4 (§ 34). Cumulative assessment applies equally to States in the drafting of their legislation.Rec. 5 (§ 43–44). Criminalization of mere association membership, without an individual harmful act, is incompatible with Art. 22 and Art. 15.Rec. 6 (§ 50). “Necessity in a democratic society” requires compatibility with pluralism: a restriction targeting non-majority associations cannot satisfy this criterion.Rec. 7 (§ 46). Criticism of government, documentation of violations, and representation of a minority identity do not constitute threats to national security.Rec. 8 (Section V). Restrictions on the expressive activity of an association must satisfy the cumulative requirements of Art. 19 and Art. 22.Rec. 9 (§ 30). Digital surveillance without a legal basis constitutes interference incompatible with Art. 22.Rec. 10 (§ 11/37). Platform injunctions targeting associational accounts are restrictions on Art. 22 requiring judicial oversight.Rec. 11 (§ 55). Derogations from Art. 22 are time-limited and may not discriminatorily target associations based on ethnic or religious identity.

Link : https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/cfi-subm/2026/359-gc38-22/subm-comments-general-cso-19-centre-zagros-center-nter.docx

Written statement : Violence and Repression Against Women and Girls in the Islamic Republic of IranHuman Rights CouncilS...
27/07/2026

Written statement : Violence and Repression Against Women and Girls in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Human Rights Council
Sixty-second session
15 June–10 July 2026
Agenda item 3
Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights,
including the right to development

Written statement submitted by Centre Zagros pour les Droits de l’Homme, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status*

The Secretary-General has received the following written statement, which is circulated in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31.
[25 May 2026]

I. Introduction

The period from 1 January to 20 May 2026 has produced verifiable evidence of a systematic and deliberately escalating campaign of gender-based violence conducted by the Iranian state against women and girls. What confronts this Council is not an accumulation of isolated incidents but a coherent structure of repression in which violence against women functions as an explicit instrument of political and social control. As nationwide protests erupted in late 2025, the Islamic Republic responded with a gendered crackdown of exceptional severity, targeting women across every sphere of civic life. These measures demand urgent, concrete action from this body.

II. Overview: A Legal Architecture of Subordination

The Law on Protecting the Family through the Promotion of the Culture of Chastity and Hijab, which entered into force in December 2024, has deepened the legal subordination of women in Iran. Its deliberately vague provisions criminalise improper dress, extend enforcement obligations to employers and educational administrators, and create civilian surveillance networks. Sanctions range from travel bans and imprisonment of up to fifteen years to the death penalty for peaceful activism against compulsory veiling. Far from protecting women, this legislation legalises violence against them and has provided the framework within which the abuses documented during this period have occurred. [3]

III. Repression of Women Activists, Professionals, and Human Rights Defenders

As of 10 May 2026, the Campaign to Free Political Prisoners in Iran (CFPPI) had documented 64 women political prisoners sentenced to ex*****on or facing a serious risk of death sentence. [1] Those listed include physicians, lawyers, teachers, engineers, artists, students, and mothers, their arrests spanning the country from Rasht to Ahvaz, from Mashhad to Kerman.

Among those documented: Ameneh Soleymani, a doctor and clinic director, faces death under the charge of “corruption on earth” for treating injured protesters. Sarvenaz Amiri, a physician, was arrested at her Tehran home on 11 January 2026 on identical grounds. Fatemeh Afshari, an operating room specialist and mother of an eight-year-old, was arrested for providing emergency care. Treating the wounded has become, in the logic of the Islamic Republic, a capital offence. Mojgan Ilanlou, 55, a documentary filmmaker and former political prisoner, was arrested at her home in Tehran on 15 March 2026 and transferred to Evin Prison. Negar Ajam, a journalist, and Negin Khaksar, a pianist, were detained following the January 2026 protests. The arrest of artists and journalists for their professional identity is not incidental repression: it is the deliberate suppression of women’s public voice. [1]

IV. State Violence, Arbitrary Detention, and Gender-Based Violence in Custody

The arrests documented during the reporting period are characterised by systematic violations of due process. Multiple cases involve enforced disappearances: Aniseh Nejati, a mother of a five-year-old, has been held in conditions of enforced disappearance since 10 January 2026; Dasta Farrokhi, Roxana Ghanbari, and sisters Mahsa and Mandana Sotoudeh are among those whose whereabouts remain concealed from their families. [1]

Najmeh Mohammadi, 23, sentenced to death on charges of “enmity against God,” was subjected to confessions extracted under torture, a pattern documented across multiple cases. Reliable sources corroborate that women detained in connection with protests and hijab enforcement have been subjected to physical violence, including r**e and sexual abuse by state agents, constituting grave violations of the prohibition of torture. [1] [3] Nasimeh Eslam Zehy was arrested while pregnant and has since given birth in prison; her husband was executed in 2026 and she remains on death row with her infant. Diana Taherabadi, sixteen, and Somayeh Nazari, also a minor, both face death sentences in detention facilities. [1]

V. Discriminatory Legal and Institutional Restrictions

The Chastity and Hijab Law exemplifies a broader pattern of discriminatory legislation subjecting women to coercive enforcement in every dimension of daily life. During the reporting period, women were arrested for online expression, for attending memorial ceremonies, and for professing minority religious identities. Azar Yahoo faces a death sentence for sharing a sticker in cyberspace. Minou Mehrabani, a Zoroastrian woman, was arrested in March 2026 for administering a faith-related Telegram channel. [1]

Judicial proceedings against women have been marked by extreme brevity and absence of meaningful procedural protection. Zahra Shahbaz Tabari, 68, received a death sentence at a trial reportedly lasting ten minutes. Mani Farhadi, a Kurdish activist, was sentenced to death without access to a privately retained lawyer. These cases do not represent a failure of due process: they represent its deliberate elimination. [1]

VI. Violence against Women from Ethnic and Religious Minorities

The repression documented during this period is marked by sharp intersectionality. Women belonging to ethnic and religious minorities face compounded persecution in which political, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination converge. Kurdish women’s rights defenders Pakhshan Azizi and Varisheh Moradi remain under confirmed death sentences; the application of Moradi’s sentence, temporarily stayed in December 2025, was re-examined by authorities in April 2026. [1]

Bahá’í women are disproportionately represented on death row: Arshia Afshar (18), Aylin Sahragar (24), Kamelia Nazari (18), Shakila Ghasemi, Mahsa and Mandana Sotoudeh, Nita Babanejad, and Sara Sepehri face capital charges or enforced disappearance solely on the basis of their religious identity. Seyedeh Ghazal Shafie, 23, a member of the Yarsan community, was arrested at her home on 9 January 2026. Farideh Ketabi, elderly and infirm, was arrested in March 2026 solely to pressure her daughter — an LGBTQI+ activist in exile in Europe. Field documentation records at least 250 women killed during the January 2026 protests, including 24 Kurdish women and three Kurdish girls under eighteen shot by security forces. [1] [2]

VII. Human and Psychological Impact

The human cost of this repression must be placed on record. Women are detained for treating the wounded, for attending funerals, for inquiring about disappeared relatives, for sharing content online. Mahnaz Haddad Kakhki, a 53-year-old teacher, was arrested on 22 February 2026 solely for appearing at court to ask about her son’s whereabouts. [1] Families living under the shadow of secret detention and imminent ex*****on experience sustained psychological violence that compounds their grief and forecloses any avenue for redress.

The deliberate targeting of women doctors, lawyers, journalists, and artists sends a clear message to Iranian society: that women who exercise independent judgment, or who bear witness to injustice, will be treated as enemies of the state. This effect is intended, not incidental. [5]

VIII. Legal Analysis

Iran is a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The violations documented here constitute systematic breaches of Iran’s binding obligations. The death penalty imposed on women for protest, medical care, religious practice, and artistic expression violates Articles 6 and 18–19 of the ICCPR. Torture and sexual violence in detention violate Article 7. The detention of minors on capital charges violates Articles 6(5) and 24 of the ICCPR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Chastity and Hijab Law is incompatible with Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR and with customary norms corresponding to CEDAW. The pattern described, widespread, systematic, deliberately targeting women as a social group, raises serious questions of crimes against humanity that this Council must examine with urgency.

IX. Recommendations

We call upon the Council, the Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls, and Member States to:

– Demand the immediate and unconditional release of all 64 women on death row or facing ex*****on risk as documented by CFPPI as of May 2026, and of all women detained for the exercise of protected rights;

– Call for immediate commutation of all death sentences imposed on women for protest, medical care, religious identity, or expression, including those of Pakhshan Azizi, Varisheh Moradi, Sharifeh Mohammadi, Nasimeh Eslam Zehy, and Najmeh Mohammadi;

– Press Iran to repeal the Chastity and Hijab Law and cease all measures subjecting women to detention, judicial sanction, or physical violence;

– Call for independent investigations into all cases of torture and sexual violence against women in detention, and into the killings of women and girls during the January 2026 protests;

– Urge the authorities to disclose the whereabouts and legal status of all women held in enforced disappearance and guarantee their access to independent legal counsel;

– Invite the Special Rapporteur to examine the evidence supporting characterisation of Iran’s treatment of women as gender apartheid and to recommend appropriate accountability measures.



Sources :

[1] Campaign to Free Political Prisoners in Iran (CFPPI) ; List of 64 women political prisoners sentenced to ex*****on . https://cfppi.org

[2] Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, Statistical report on violations of women’s rights, 8 March 2026; field reports, January – May 2026. https://hengaw.net

[3] Iran Human Rights Monitor (Iran HRM) ; Annual report 2025, Part 4; monthly reports, January–May 2026. https://iran-hrm.com

[4] Zagros Human Rights Center ; Documentation on gender-based violence, ethnic and religious minority women, and political prisoners in Iran, 2026.

[5] Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI) ; Reports on mass arrests, reprisals against families, and women political prisoners, January–May 2026. https://iranhumanrights.org



Link :https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g26/093/39/pdf/g2609339.pdf

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