21/06/2026
THE CLOSED SHOP REVIEW OF THE ACT JUDICIARY
Yesterday, after careful consideration, I raised a complaint with the ACT Judicial Council regarding the appointment of Jon White SC to the position of Resident Justice in the ACT.
I would have made this complaint to the ACT Bar Association, but that avenue is now closed to me due to this appointment.
The details of the complaint are available at the following link and raise questions regarding the suitability of this appointment:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1AqypQ4i5WD-j-UZmYj3SWXSgw6yadCTd/view?usp=sharing
I will let readers examine the details of the complaint for themselves and will not repeat them here. However, let me explain my concerns even before the complaint is reviewed.
We have a justice system and legal framework in which the conduct and behaviour of members of the legal profession, from solicitors and barristers to magistrates and judges, are reviewed by their own professional bodies.
For barristers, complaints are assessed by the ACT Bar Association; for solicitors, by the ACT Law Society; and for magistrates and supreme court justices, by the ACT Judicial Council. In simple terms, we have a legal profession that is largely responsible for reviewing its own conduct and, at times, determining whether misconduct has occurred.
This was part of the reason that, in 2022, I sought an independent review of the performance of the judiciary through two petitions. The first called for an independent review of sentencing consistency within the ACT judiciary over the preceding five years. It received 2,446 signatures. The second sought a review of the judicial appointments process, calling for greater transparency and due process in judicial appointments. It received 2,194 signatures.
Neither petition was effectively considered through the Dangerous Driving Inquiry (the limited committee that was meant to examine the concerns raised in all three petitions), and through bureaucratic sleight of hand, the status quo remains unchanged more than four years later.
I would advise maintaining limited expectations of what can be expected from the ACT Judicial Council's assessment of my complaint. There will be no public coverage, reporting, or publication of outcomes.
We hear regularly from the current Government that we have a transparent justice system, yet complaints regarding judicial officers are never placed on the public record, and the ACT Government has continued to resist independent oversight of the performance of the judiciary using the justification of "judicial independence".
There is an obvious lack of transparency. The ACT Judicial Council's approach of not conducting public hearings, not publishing complaints, and not routinely releasing investigation reports is generally justified by four themes.
First, there is the argument of protecting judicial independence. It is claimed that judges and magistrates must be protected from political pressure, media campaigns, and public attacks that could undermine their independence. Supporters of confidentiality argue that a complaint is not proof of misconduct and that many complaints arise from dissatisfaction with a court decision rather than actual misconduct. It is further claimed that publicising complaints before they are substantiated could damage judicial independence and public confidence in the courts.
Second, there is the argument that judicial reputation and procedural fairness require protection. It is claimed that judges have limited ability to publicly defend themselves because judicial ethics generally prevent them from commenting on matters before the courts or engaging in public disputes. Therefore, publishing allegations that are ultimately unfounded could cause irreparable reputational damage. The argument is similar to the principle that a person should not be publicly accused until there is evidence supporting the allegation.
This argument is relied upon because many judicial complaints are dismissed at an early stage as misconceived, vexatious, attempts to appeal a decision through a complaints process, or complaints about judicial reasoning rather than judicial conduct.
Another argument is that courts are a separate branch of government. Unlike executive agencies, they are not intended to be overseen through ordinary administrative complaint mechanisms. The traditional Australian position is that serious judicial misconduct ultimately becomes a matter for Parliament (or the Legislative Assembly in relation to ACT appointments) because judges can only be removed through parliamentary processes, not by a complaints body. Complaint bodies therefore act primarily as screening and investigative mechanisms rather than disciplinary tribunals.
One of the more paradoxical arguments used to defend this veil of secrecy is that it encourages frank participation. It is claimed that complainants may be more willing to come forward, witnesses may be more cooperative, judicial officers may respond more candidly, and informal resolution may be possible without public spectacle.
This is a primary rationale underpinning judicial conduct systems across Australia.
A central criticism of the confidentiality arguments advanced in defence of judicial complaint processes is that they prioritise the protection of judicial officers and institutional reputation over public accountability. Given that judicial office is wholly publicly funded, this criticism carries significant weight. While judicial independence is an essential principle of the rule of law, independence should not be confused with immunity from scrutiny. Citizens are required to fund these institutions through taxation, yet are afforded little insight into their closed-door processes.
When complaints, investigations, and findings are withheld from public view, there is limited opportunity for the community to assess whether concerns have been investigated thoroughly, impartially, and consistently. The result can be a perception that judicial conduct is subject to a lower level of accountability than that expected of other public officials, regulators, or professions.
I contend that excessive secrecy can undermine, rather than strengthen, public confidence in the administration of justice. Confidence is not maintained solely through assurances that complaints have been properly handled, but through transparent processes that demonstrate fairness and accountability. Without public access to hearing records, investigation reports, or detailed reasons for decisions, complainants and the broader community are effectively asked to trust outcomes without being able to scrutinise the process that produced them. Current judicial complaint mechanisms risk creating an appearance of institutional self-protection, particularly where serious allegations are dismissed without publicly available reasons or independent review.
The Council is made up of the following persons: the ACT Chief Justice (who serves as Head of the Council), the ACT Chief Magistrate, an appointed legal practitioner, and an appointed community member representing community interests. Some matters may be referred by the Council to the relevant head of jurisdiction (the Chief Justice or the Chief Magistrate respectively). The Council's legislative framework is established under the Judicial Commissions Act 1994 (ACT).
It is worth noting the outcomes of eight years of complaints regarding judicial conduct between 2017 and 2025.
There have been 73 complaints received.
• 62 were dismissed after a preliminary examination (s 35B).
• 4 were referred to the head of jurisdiction (s 35C).
• 1 was examined by the Council (s 35D).
• 3 were withdrawn.
• 1 was considered an invalid complaint.
Seventy complaints have been finalised out of 73. The Council publishes an annual report. Despite being fifteen pages long, only two pages are devoted to complaints and conduct matters. No further information is provided, particularly regarding the nature of the complaints or alleged misconduct.
This is why I have made this complaint public. I am affording the respondent (the subject of my complaint) more procedural rights than were afforded to me through his conduct in the Supreme Court, including the right to procedural fairness and the opportunity to respond. I was afforded no such opportunity. Nor do I have the protection of the Court or the Bench to shield me from public scrutiny.
I believe my complaint is likely to be dismissed, ignored, and ultimately forgotten.
It is important in the public interest for the community to understand the level of self-regulation and governance afforded to the legal profession. I suggest that the appropriateness of these mechanisms needs to be reviewed.
Otherwise, we can continue allowing the profession to mark its own homework.